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Major Professor: Emily Barman, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Sociology 
 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explains the existence, sources, and variability of intra-
organizational conflict in a hybrid organization. It assesses the usefulness of “structural” 
and “cultural” explanations of conflict and ultimately advances an alternative explanation 
for the presence of and variability in conflict in a hybrid organization. Homeowners’ 
associations are used as a case for understanding the development of multiple 
institutional logics and the relationship between institutional pluralism and complexity 
and the presence of and variability in conflict in a hybrid organization. Drawing from 
quantitative and qualitative research conducted on homeowners’ associations in the 
Greater-Boston area, including 250 surveys and 56 in-depth interviews with board 
members of homeowners’ associations, I show how the American history and ideology of 
homeownership has generated two multiple, permanent, and functionally contradictory 
institutional logics—one based on the market and the other based on the community—in 
homeowners’ associations. Using institutional theory and the concepts of institutional 
work and ambidexterity, I argue that organizational actor’s responses to the presence of 
  vii
institutional pluralism and complexity, as evidenced in their perceptions and practices, 
determine whether a hybrid organization is subject to more or less conflict.  
My findings lead to three general conclusions. First, many homeowners’ 
associations experience significant conflict. Second, structural and cultural explanations 
of conflict only partially explain the presence of conflict in homeowners’ associations. 
They do not explain the variability of conflict in homeowners’ associations. Third, and 
most significantly, the micro-actions of organizational actors matter in situations of 
institutional pluralism and complexity. I propose that organizational actors’ responses to 
institutional pluralism and complexity explain variability in conflict; organizational 
actors either “don’t do” or “do” logics. Organizational actors who “don’t do” logics 
respond to institutional pluralism and complexity by eliminating and compartmentalizing 
logics. They perceive multiplicity as novel and problematic and enact disruptive practices 
to contest and separate logics. This results in more conflict. Organizational actors who 
“do” logics respond to institutional pluralism and complexity ambidextrously. They 
perceive multiplicity as routine, and even beneficial, and enact practices to maintain 
multiple institutional logics via context-specific and purposeful practices including 
adjustment, improvisation, and switching. This results in less conflict. 
. 
  
  viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................. iv 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. vi 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................ ix 
LIST OF FIGURES .........................................................................................................x 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................1 
CHAPTER TWO: STRUCTURE V. CULTURE: THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL 
DETERMINANTS OF CONFLICT ................................................................... 43 
CHAPTER THREE: IDENTIFYING, EXPLAINING, AND DEFINING THE LOGICS 
OF HOMEOWNERSHIP ................................................................................... 92 
CHAPTER FOUR: “DOING” LOGICS TO LESSEN CONFLICTS ........................... 159 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 224 
APPENDIX A: BOARD MEMBER QUESTIONNAIRE ............................................ 247 
APPENDIX B: BOARD MEMBER INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ................................. 254 
APPENDIX C: BOARD MEMBER INTERVIEWEE CHARACTERISTICS ............. 262 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 264 
CURRICULUM VITAE .............................................................................................. 289 
 
  
  ix
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 1-1: Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury's (2012) Revised Inter-institutional 
System Ideal Types. ......................................................................................... 24-25 
 
TABLE 2-1: Homeowners' Association Board Member Survey Descriptive Statistics. .. 69 
 
TABLE 2-2: Logistic Regression Predicting Intra-Organizational Conflict in 
Homeowners' Associations. ................................................................................... 73 
 
TABLE 3-1: Ideal Types of Institutional Logics in Homeowners' Associations ........... 129 
 
TABLE 4-1: Major Characteristics of Non-ambidextrous and Ambidextrous 
Organizations ....................................................................................................... 185 
 
TABLE 4-2: Representative Examples of Organizational Actors' Eliminatory and 
Compartmentalizing Responses to Institutional Pluralism and Complexity. .......... 193 
 
TABLE 4-3: Representative Examples of Organizational Actors' Ambidextrous 
Responses to Institutional Pluralism and Complexity. .......................................... 206 
 
TABLE C-1: Board Member Interviewee Characteristics. ........................................... 262 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1-1: Introduction to Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) 
Expressing Legal Purpose of Homeowners' Association ...........................................9 
 
FIGURE 1-2: Institutional Location of Homeowners' Associations ................................ 11 
 
FIGURE 3-1: Cultural Embeddedness of Homeowners' Associations .......................... 152 
 
FIGURE 4-1: Institutional Pluralism and Complexity in Hybrid Organizations ............ 161 
 
FIGURE 4-2: Organizational Responses to Institutional Pluralism and Complexity in 
More and Less Conflicted Homeowners' Associations ......................................... 186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Over Boards: Condo Committees Rule in a Crazy Game of Power and Money 
- The Boston Globe Headline (June 12, 2005) 
Buyer Beware – Of the Association; Convenience May Come at a Cost 
- The Washington Post Headline (October 20, 2007) 
Homeowner Associations in Disrepute 
- Arizona Daily Star Headline (September 2, 2008) 
Corruption Investigation: Agents Pursue Might Be Arrested 
- Las Vegas Sun Headline (March 30, 2012) 
Man Stabbed in Dispute with HOA President 
- UT San Diego Headline (September 6, 2013) 
Nevada HOA Board Called ‘Too Conflicted’ to Function Properly 
- Las Vegas Review-Journal Headline (September 21, 2013) 
 
Introduction 
 An abundance of newspaper headlines suggest that homeowners’ associations 
(also, community associations, common interest associations, condominium owners 
associations, cooperative ownership associations, collective housing associations) are 
fraught with conflict. The allegations of misdoing and mismanagement range from the 
mild (e.g., “Owner Told “No Christmas Lights” by Homeowners’ Association”) to the 
brazen (e.g., “HOA Uses Satellites to Spot Violations”) to the outrageous (e.g., “HOA: 
Upscale Condo Owners to Use One Door, Renters to Use the POOR DOOR”). Yet, an 
independent national survey of homeowners’ association residents conducted in February 
2012 by Ibope Zogby International and sponsored by the Foundation for Community 
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Association Research claims that 70% of American homeowners polled would rate the 
overall experience of living in a community association as positive; further, that 44% 
absolutely and 44% for the most part thought that the members of their elected governing 
board strove to serve the best interests of the community as a whole.1 The conflicting 
accounts of life in homeowners’ associations raise three questions: 1) How common is 
intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations; 2) What are the sources of 
intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations; and 3) What makes some 
homeowners’ associations more and less conflicted? 
These questions are complicated, loaded, and not easily answered. They are also 
very important: the Community Associations Institute estimates that homeowners’ 
associations governed 25.9 million American homes and 63.4 million residents in 2012.2 
Concomitant with the steady increases in the number of communities, housing units, and 
residents is the increase in the number of homeowners’ association managers and 
homeowners’ association management companies. In 2012, the Community Associations 
Institute estimated there were over 55,000 homeowners’ association managers and 8,000 
homeowners’ association management companies. The dual rise in homeowners’ 
associations and management companies is in no doubt linked to the governance issues 
inherent in homeowners’ associations. According to the same source, more than 1.65 
                                                        
1 The findings from this survey, in addition to similar surveys conducted in 2005, 2007, and 2009 with 
comparable findings, were based on telephone interviews with random, nationally representative samples 
of adults residing in homeowners’ associations, condominiums, cooperatives, and other planned 
communities. A summary of the results of these surveys may be found on the Community Associations 
Institute Website: (http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Documents/national_homeowner_research.pdf). 
2 The United States Census historically has not and currently does not collect information on homeowners’ 
associations. The Community Associations Institute (CAI) is the leading source of data on these 
communities. They report that the number of homeowners’ association communities has steadily increased 
for the last thirty years and is expected to continue to rise in the future. 
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million Americans serve on a homeowners’ association board, with close to 600,000 
participating as committee members. These ‘volunteers’ (homeowners’ association board 
members are usually elected or appointed to the position by their community) are tasked 
with developing, managing, and protecting the value of the homes and the community. 
How board members choose to preserve and enhance the homeowners’ association’s 
value, however, is highly variable, largely unregulated, and usually subjective. Their 
practices are dependent upon personal perceptions about the role of the organization and 
the purpose of homeownership—it really is no wonder there are so many media reports of 
conflict. 
The conflict present in homeowners’ associations may be symptomatic of the 
conflict experienced in other types of organizations. Indeed, conflict is a familiar theme 
in much of organization theory, and some theorists, such as Georg Simmel, view conflict 
as both natural and necessary, similar to the need for stability and order. He states: “a 
certain amount of discord, inner divergence and outer controversy, is organically tied up 
with very elements that ultimately hold the group together; it cannot be separated from 
the unity of the sociological structure” (Simmel, 1908/1955: 17-18). Conflict is seen as 
an organic and important component of human interaction. When two or more social 
entities (i.e., individuals, groups, organizations, nations, etc.) come in contact with one 
another in attaining their objectives, the relationship may become incompatible or 
inconsistent. The relationship among such entities may become inconsistent when two or 
more of them desire a similar resource when it is in short supply; have partially exclusive 
behavioral preferences regarding their joint action; or have different attitudes, values, 
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beliefs, and skills (Rahim, 2001: 1). From this perspective, conflict may—will—transpire 
in every type of social organizational unit—whether that is a family, a planning 
committee, a school board, a non-profit organization, a corporation, or a homeowners’ 
association. 
Though naturally occurring and to be expected, the scope, scale, and intensity of 
conflict in organizations and its sources varies and an abundance of literature suggests 
that it can have detrimental consequences for the functioning of the organization and its 
members. Despite this, there is very little research (or much less than would be expected) 
which identifies the antecedent sources or determinants of conflict in any type of 
organization, much less organizations like homeowners’ associations. Homeowners’ 
associations represent a hybrid form of organization; they provide services like the public 
sector, are incorporated as non-profit organizations, and have an organizational structure 
and mission very similar to for-profit corporations. As such, these organizations occupy a 
fuzzy space at the intersection of the three main institutional sectors of society. McKenzie 
(2003: 218-219) summarizes how homeowners’ associations are at once a part of society, 
the state, and the market: “As a nonprofit corporation that depends upon volunteers to 
serve as directors and officers and that aims to create a sense of community, the 
community association functions like a civil society institution. To the extent that the 
association is carrying out what would otherwise be local government functions, it is akin 
to an extension of the state. And an association’s duty to concern itself with property 
values is a market-based incentive”. 
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What’s more is the research that does exist—research on the determinants of 
conflict in private, public, and non-profit organizations—suggests that organizational and 
board structures would best predict the occurrence of intra-organizational conflict (Wall 
and Callister, 1995; Pfeffer, 1972; Cornforth, 2001; Brown, 2005; Grissom, 2010; 
Kochan, Huber, and Cummings, 1975) while scholarship in the area of hybrid 
organizations would intimate the importance of understanding its culture, particularly the 
nature and influence of its hybridity on its organizational vision, or set of expected goals 
and preferred modes of action. This scholarship suggests that hybrid organizations exist 
in “institutionally pluralistic” environments (Kraatz and Block, 2008) with access to 
multiple institutional logics that may be subject to different cultural and material 
characteristics and which may prescribe two or more different, and potentially 
conflicting, sets of expected goals and modes of action (Thornton, 2004; Haveman and 
Rao, 2006; Lounsbury, 2007; Ruef and Patterson, 2009; Battilana and Dorado, 2010). 
From this perspective, the occurrence of intra-organizational conflict would be best 
explained by the presence of multiple institutional logics. 
Given the presumption that there is variation in the amount of intra-organizational 
conflict in homeowners’ associations, is it then best explained by the structural attributes 
of the board and the organization or the congruity of its organizational vision? And, if it 
is the congruity of its organizational vision, how do the organizational actors on the 
ground, those homeowners who volunteer or who are elected to serve on the 
homeowners’ association board, factor in? How do their beliefs about homeownership 
and their perceptions and practices about how to preserve and enhance the value of 
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homeowners’ associations create the potential for both more and less intra-organizational 
conflict in homeowners’ associations? 
Drawing on an original survey of homeowners’ association board members, 
interviews with homeowners’ association board members and professionals, 
observations, and textual data, this dissertation seeks to answer the aforementioned 
questions. I use sociological studies of intra-organizational conflict, institutional theory, 
and literature on homeownership to uncover how homeowners’ associations’ hybrid 
organizational form and culturally embedded meanings of homeownership contribute to 
the development of two logics of homeownership. These logics of homeownership frame 
organizational actor’s understanding of homeowners’ associations and provide an 
organizational environment ripe for the development of intra-organizational conflict. 
Unlike the structural and cultural explanations of conflict, however, I will argue that it is 
organizations, in particular organizational actor’s, responses to these logics, as evidenced 
in their perceptions and practices, rather than just organizational attributes or the mere 
presence of multiple logics, which ultimately determines whether homeowners’ 
associations experience more or less intra-organizational conflict. This research broadens 
and deepens our understandings of intra-organizational conflict and homeownership and 
makes significant contributions to the sociological literature on institutional logics and 
hybrid organizations. 
This chapter establishes the framework for this dissertation. First, I will 
contextualize homeowners’ associations by defining them as an organization, discussing 
their organizational form, and examining how the nature of ownership in the organization 
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brings about the potential for organizational conflict. I will also establish them as a case 
worthy of study. Second, I will briefly review two existing explanations for intra-
organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations. This section will differentiate the 
“structural” explanation of conflict and the “cultural” explanation of conflict and discuss 
the theoretical underpinnings and review the extant literature of each explanation. Third, I 
will position my research alongside the structural and cultural explanations of conflict 
and establish my argument for why some homeowners’ associations are more and less 
conflicted than others. In this section I will draw upon recent scholarship in institutional 
theory and the concepts of institutional work and institutional ambidexterity to offer a 
third explanation of conflict. Finally, I will provide an overview of the methodology of 
my research and outline the remaining chapters of this dissertation.  
The Organization of Homeowners’ Associations 
 Definition and Purpose 
 A homeowners’ association is an organization of homeowners of a particular 
housing subdivision, planned housing community, or condominium community. It is a 
formal legal entity, originally created by real estate developers, which has the authority to 
make decisions, provide services, regulate activities, levy assessments, enforce rules, and 
impose fines. The purpose of the organization is to preserve, maintain, and enhance the 
“value and desirability of” their homes and property.3 Membership in the organization is 
mandatory for all property owners and requires the payment of monthly or annual fees 
which are used to manage and maintain the property. The homeowners’ association is 
                                                        
3 Figure1-1 is a prototypical introduction to the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) of a 
homeowners’ association. It establishes the legal character and purpose of the organization. 
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governed by a board of directors which is comprised of homeowners who either 
volunteer or are elected and whom manage all of the association’s business and 
community affairs. Board members meet on a regular basis to discuss community issues, 
maintenance projects, financial planning, and association rules. Homeowners’ 
associations are highly variable in their activities, they may do all or some of the 
following: levy and collect fees, fines, and assessments; maintain the property and 
landscaping; maintain recreational and common facilities; provide space for events and 
community and neighborhood functions; provide security; arrange for street maintenance; 
and enforce deed restrictions including, but not limited to, exterior and interior home 
maintenance, exterior and interior home décor, number and type of pets, noise, 
commercial use of properties, age requirements of residents, parking, storage of personal 
belongings like bikes, boats, and cars, use of the pool, exercise room, and other common 
amenities, and control of trash and blight. Though the type of deed restrictions and degree 
of stringency with the enforcement of deed restrictions varies from board to board and 
association to association the goal of such restrictions is to preserve the value and 
desirability of the property for all current residents and potential future residents (i.e., 
new homebuyers).  
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Figure 1-1: Introduction to Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) Expressing 
Legal Purpose of Homeowners’ Association 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The undersigned hereby certify that they are the President and Secretary, respectively of 
the association, Home Sweet Home Homeowners Association, and are authorized by the 
Board of Directors to execute this restated Declaration. 
The original Declaration created a planned development subdivision administered by the 
Association named above, for subdivisions and properties described herein. 
WHEREAS, the Association has heretofore been incorporated under the laws of the State 
of Massachusetts as a non-profit mutual benefit corporation, Home Sweet Home 
Homeowners Association for the purposes of exercising the functions hereinafter 
described; and, 
WHEREAS, Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, reservations, servitudes, easements and 
liens which affect the subject properties have heretofore been recorded; and, 
WHEREAS, the membership has tendered the requisite approval from not less than 
seventy-five percent (75 %) of the members to amend and restate the previously recorded 
Declarations of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions; and, 
WHEREAS, this Corporation hereby establishes these Restated Covenants, Conditions 
and Restrictions for the benefit of the Owners of all Lots at 123-456 Home Sweet Home 
Lane. 
NOW, THEREFORE, this Association hereby declares that all of the properties described 
above shall be held, sold and conveyed subject to the following easements, restrictions, 
covenants and conditions, which are for the express purpose of protecting the value and 
desirability of, and which shall run with the real property and be binding on all parties 
having any right, title or interest in the defined properties or any part thereof, their heirs, 
successors and assigns, and shall inure to the benefit of each Owner thereof. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*Names and location changed to preserve confidentiality 
**Emphasis added by author 
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 Organizational Form 
Homeowners’ associations represent a hybrid form of organization, or “an 
organization that mixes elements, value systems, and action logics of various sectors of 
society” (Karré, 2010). They are often legally incorporated as not-for-profit 
organizations, yet have an organizational structure and management style modeled after 
American business corporations (the shareholders are the homeowners), yet are 
geographically based around a common land area and provide services like public 
governments. They occupy a fuzzy and porous space at the intersection of the three main 
institutional sectors of society (Figure 1-2 depicts the institutional location of 
homeowners’ associations). As such, they act in ways that are characteristic of each of 
the three sectors of society. McKenzie (2003) further comments on their tendency to 
draw upon the incentives and characteristics multiple sectors: “Owners who serve as 
board members are influenced by market incentives when they contemplate using 
association funds in ways that advance their economic interests. They are at least quasi-
state actors when they administer what would otherwise be municipal services and 
enforce rules. Further when board members see themselves as volunteers donating 
considerable time to their community to make it a better place to live, they are thinking 
like civil society actors (219).” 
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Figure 1-2: Institutional Location of Homeowners’ Associations  
 
 
Law, public policy, and political science scholars caution, however, that such an 
organizational form straddles the neat political distinction between public and private life 
and may cause homeowners’ associations to act as “residential private governments” 
(McKenzie, 1994). In such a situation, “altruistic and materialistic motives [become] 
intertwined because of the nature of common property ownership” (McKenzie, 1994: 
183). Indeed, with the duty to govern the community to protect the value and desirability 
of homeowners’ association’s financial and community assets, homeowners’ associations 
Market:
For-profit State:
Public
Civil 
Society:
Non-profit Homeowners’ 
Associations 
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take on a position of power ultimately curbing individual freedoms and creating the 
conditions for incompatible or inconsistent objectives and partially exclusive behavioral 
preferences regarding the business of the organization and the nature of individual 
property ownership. Their hybrid organizational form thus primes the organization to 
deal in multiple dualities: private and public, individual and communal, and economic 
and social. These organizations expand the range of opportunity for a group of people to 
join with others to live together in a neighborhood community grounded in common 
concerns, values, and interests; however, at the same time it restricts individual freedoms, 
emphasizes uniformity, and may prefer business and financial objectives rather than 
community concerns. To be operationally functional, homeowners’ associations must 
strike a balance between its distinct organizational purposes, objectives, and codes of 
action and learn to act democratically in meeting the interests of all of its members. 
Nature of Ownership 
Political scientists Barton and Silverman (1994) argue that homeowners’ 
associations and other common interest developments are doomed to fail because of the 
nature of ownership in the organization. They argue that the private property character of 
common interest developments predominates and obscures their public role and 
functions. Their case and international comparison studies suggest that the complex 
combination of individual and common ownership negatively influences issues of 
governance and the quality of private and public life in homeowners’ associations, and 
that residents of common interest developments cannot truly engage in democratic 
decision-making. Essentially, common property ownership makes residents financially 
  
13
and otherwise interdependent, yet residents will use their property rights and their own 
economic self-interests against one another. One neighbor’s right to freedom from certain 
land use necessarily interferes with another’s freedom to use the property as desired. 
They conclude that the complex interplay of the private and public obscures the role of 
community and creates a “me” (the individual homeowner) versus “them” (the governing 
board) mentality. 
Martirossian (2001) echoes this sentiment, instead finding an “us” (the governing 
board) versus “them” (the larger community) relationship. Her social-psychological 
research on the decision-making process of communities reveals that “smart people 
sometimes make bad decisions,” particularly in common interest communities like 
homeowners’ associations where  board members “often have no doubts about the 
inherent morality of their decisions; and hence, [are] rather unconcerned about possible 
moral or ethical consequences imposed on the “crazies” and “troublemakers” and are 
prone to “mistake a sense of cohesion and peace of the board for a sense of well-being for 
the entire community” (36-41). She finds that community association boards have the 
“natural” inclination to make decisions based on their own best interests; decisions which 
can be to the detriment of the group. She blames this largely on the psychological 
phenomenon of group think and identifies community association boards as a prime 
location for its occurrence because of the nature of ownership in and the governance 
structure of these organizations. 
The tension between the governing board and the larger homeowners’ association 
community that both Barton and Silverman (1994) and Martirossian (2001) insinuate 
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signal the importance of understanding the nature of homeownership in shared living 
environments. Homeowners’ associations are situated against the backdrop of the 
American ideology of homeownership and the organizational actors that populate 
homeowners’ associations (board members and non-board members) are culturally 
embedded within in it.4 The ideology frames organizational actors’ understandings of 
homeownership and provides them with symbolic structures to understand and construct 
their environments. It imbues homeowners’ associations with meaning and purpose. The 
problem that homeowners’ associations face is that this ideology often frames property 
and homeownership as a private and singular experience; it does not consider public 
shared ownership structures, making the organization, its democracy and its governance, 
problematic. The organization must adapt its structure and culture to meet the multiplicity 
of demands caused by its private and public interests. 
Homeowners’ Associations as a Case 
Homeowners’ associations represent an ideal case for the analysis of intra-
organizational conflict in hybrid organizations for at least three reasons. First, while the 
legal, economic, and organizational form and status of homeowners’ associations is 
unique, it is not altogether abnormal. Many other types of organizations, such as schools, 
hospitals, public utility companies, and social enterprises, merge the public and the 
private and behave in ways inconsistent with just one sector of society. Second, it is an 
organization within a field of organizations that is grossly understudied. Despite the 
                                                        
4 The American ideology of homeownership refers to the pervasive belief, communicated via government 
programs and policies and American culture, that homeownership “matters” and that it confers both 
economic and social benefits to the individual. 
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growing number and types of hybrid organizations, we still know surprisingly little about 
the effects of hybridity on organizations. This is likely due to the relatively narrow and 
dichotomous perspective that pervades the study of organizations. This perspective sees 
organizations as either part of the market, the state, or of society, but not simultaneously 
of two or all of them. Homeowners’ associations clearly exist at the intersections of the 
three institutional sectors of society and are a good starting point to understand the effects 
of hybridity on organizational functioning. And third, it is an organization that is 
exponentially increasing in both number and influence and the rampant reports of conflict 
in the media suggest that there is something important to be learned about the structure 
and culture of these organizations and the people that populate them. 
Conflict in Organizations 
Organizations are widely acknowledged to be the site of much conflict and 
contestation. And although conflict is a fundamental fact of life within organizations, a 
good deal of research identifies a wide variation in the kind as well as the intensity of 
conflict in organizations. This research notes the importance of understanding the 
antecedent sources of conflict in organizations. Scholarship in this area, however, is 
divided between two perspectives; what I will call the “structural” perspective and the 
“cultural” perspective. These two perspectives differ on how they explain the occurrence 
of intra-organizational conflict. The structural perspective suggests that organizational 
and board structures best predict the occurrence of intra-organizational conflict while the 
cultural perspective suggests the congruity of organizational vision (via perceptions and 
practices) best predicts the occurrence of intra-organizational conflict. The following 
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sections provide an overview and review of the extant literature for each of these 
perspectives. 
Definition of Conflict 
Conflict is generally defined as a process in which “one party perceives that its 
interests are being opposed or negatively affected by another party” (Wall and Callister, 
1995: 517) and a conflict situation is generally defined as a situation in which: 1) there 
are sets of individuals exhibiting some level of organization; 2) there is some level of 
interaction among group members; 3) there are different levels of positions to be 
occupied by group members; and 4) there is a scarcity of needed or desired resources and 
a general dissatisfaction among group members about how these resources are being 
distributed (Dahrendorf, 1958).5 Conflict occurs when the relationship between two or 
more social entities (i.e., individuals, groups, organizations, etc.), who come in contact 
with one another in attaining their objectives, becomes incompatible or inconsistent. This 
happens when those social entities desire a scarce resource, have partially exclusive 
behavioral preferences regarding joint action, or have different attitudes, values, beliefs, 
and skills. It is manifested in social-behavioral interactions marked by tension, 
frustration, annoyance, interference, and rivalry (Rahim, 2001). 
Structural Explanations of Conflict 
In keeping with this fairly broad definition, early research on organizational 
conflict proposed many different causes of conflict and contestation in organizations 
including differences in individual personalities, values, goals, and interests and 
                                                        
5 There are many definitions of conflict; none are universally agreed upon. 
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differences in cultures, values, goals, interests, and opinions about the proper allocation 
of organizational resources (Clark, 1988; Pfeffer, 1981). Seeking to bring order to the 
breadth and complexity of this research, analysts identified three major domains of 
organizational conflict: relationship-based, task-based, and process-based (Coser, 1956; 
Guetkow and Gyr, 1954; Jehn, 1992, 1995, 1997; Pinkley, 1990). Relationship-based 
conflicts focus on interpersonal tensions, usually sparked when two people have 
incompatible values, perceptions, or expectations. These conflicts are usually emotionally 
driven and relate more to personality differences than disagreements about organizational 
tasks. Task-based conflicts focus on which substantive tasks should be pursued. This type 
of conflict is often cognitive and centers on an analysis of what organizational tasks 
should and should not be done. Finally, process-based conflicts focus on disagreements 
about how selected organizational tasks should be accomplished. Although organizational 
members agree about which tasks to perform, they do not agree about the procedures or 
methods to use to accomplish the task. For a time, research in the field focused almost 
exclusively on type-casting conflict and discovering the positive or negative effects of the 
various kinds of conflict. The bulk of scholarship produced was meant to suggest either 
the function or dysfunction of organizational conflict. Jehn (1992, 1995, 1997), for 
example, found that task-based conflict can be beneficial to organizations, while 
relationship-based and process-based conflicts are mostly detrimental. 
While straightforward and useful in many ways this three domain typology has 
been criticized for obscuring, conflating, and oversimplifying the true causes of conflict 
and moving the discussion from identification of causes to outcome treatment and 
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conflict management. To suggest that a conflict is relationship-based, for example, is 
largely to note that the conflict has become apparent through interpersonal differences. 
Whether this is true or not ultimately depends upon whether organizational conditions set 
the stage for such disagreements. For example, if one long-term member of a 
homeowners’ association governing board argues with a newly elected board member 
over whether to levy a special assessment for a new roof or a new boiler, which matters 
more: whether this incident is classified as one of those three domains of conflict (namely 
interpersonal or task) or whether the conflict was caused by underlying organizational 
attributes related to the complexity of the organizational environment or the composition 
of the board? Hearn and Anderson (2002), drawing from Merton’s (1968) propositions 
that (a) underlying conditions of conflict in social systems may produce manifest conflict 
episodes or remain latent, and (b) the behavioral manifestation of underlying conflict 
(e.g., an argument over an individual’s proposed use of funds) does not necessarily 
redress the underlying conflict condition, suggest the latter. They argue that the truest 
way to rectify the discussion and truly understand conflict is to take a “structural” 
approach. This involves, in part, studying how organizational attributes, such as 
organization age, organization size, degree of heterogeneity, and access to resources, 
prime an organization for intra-organizational conflict in any form. 
Structural explanations of conflict thus suggest that organizational and board 
attributes best predict the occurrence of conflict in organizations (Wall and Callister, 
1995; Pfeffer, 1972; Cornforth, 2001; Brown, 2005; Grissom, 2010; Kochan, Huber, and 
Cummings, 1975). This perspective contends that organizational structures underlie all of 
  
19
the perceptions and practices that take place in an organization; if there is conflict, it is 
because of the characteristics of the organization itself. Scholarship in this area draws 
from multiple strands of literature on intra-organizational conflict in private, non-profit, 
and public organizations and a broad body of work which assesses the relations of groups 
and governing boards and finds that external and internal attributes of organizations and 
governing boards are significantly related to organizational performance. This 
relationship sets the stage for conflict and contestation. Research in this field finds that 
intra-organizational conflict derives from external organizational attributes like 
organizational age, organizational size, degree of heterogeneity, and availability of 
resources and internal organizational attributes like size of governing board, length of 
board term, and degree of structural differentiation; each of which can be connected to 
both positive and negative organizational performance outcomes. 
In the literature on private, non-profit, and public organization board governance, 
for example, there is a great deal of research which links structural characteristics of 
governing boards to organizational performance outcomes. Scholars have assessed 
linkages between such organizational characteristics as board size (Grissom, 2010; 
Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 1998; Pfeffer, 1972), board composition and structure 
(Coles, McWilliams, and Sen, 2001; Dalton et al., 1998; Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; 
Kula, 2005; Pfeffer, 1972), board member training (Anderson, 1992), and board practices 
(Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; Kula, 2005) and both positive and negative organizational 
performance outcomes, including intra-organizational conflict. In one recent study on the 
determinants of conflict on governing boards in public organizations Grissom (2010) 
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found that external characteristics of public school boards play a large role in predicting 
intra-board conflict; heterogeneous school districts were significantly more likely to 
experience intra-board conflict than more homogenous school districts. 
In a similar study of conflict in academic departments, Hearn and Anderson 
(2002) found demographic factors such as faculty size, gender composition, seniority 
composition; disciplinary base factors such as level of consensus and codification of 
knowledge in the field; and organizational factors such as instructional volume, level of 
specialization, research funding, and faculty involvement were related to departmental 
conflict over faculty promotion and tenure. Conflicts over tenure and promotion votes 
were overall more likely in departments with larger instructional volume, departments 
whose disciplinary bases were soft, departments with less specialization, and departments 
that were larger in size. The authors concluded that understanding the structural factors 
that may predict conflict were important to minimizing overall negative impacts on 
organizational performance than other types of predictors. 
In sum, structural explanations of conflict use external and internal attributes of 
organizations to predict organizational performance outcomes, including the occurrence 
of intra-organizational conflict. This perspective sees external and internal attributes of 
organizations as underlying all practices of the organization and as significant 
contributory elements of intra-organizational conflict. External organizational attributes 
include measures of organizational structure and the complexity of the organizational 
environment (including such factors as organizational age, organizational size, degree of 
heterogeneity, and access to resources) and internal organizational attributes include 
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measures of board structure and composition (including such factors as board size, length 
of board term, and degree of structural differentiation). 
Cultural Explanations of Conflict 
 Scholarship in the area of hybrid organizations intimates the importance of 
studying cultural attributes of organizations, rather than structural attributes of 
organizations, because the nature of their organizational form may create multiple 
organizational visions, or sets of expected goals and preferred modes of action. This 
scholarship draws from institutional theory and suggests that hybrid organizations exist in 
“institutionally pluralistic” environments (Kraatz and Block, 2008) with access to 
multiple institutional logics that may be subject to different cultural and material 
characteristics and which may prescribe two or more different, and potentially 
conflicting, sets of expected goals and modes of action (Thornton, 2004; Haveman and 
Rao, 2006; Lounsbury, 2007; Ruef and Patterson, 2009; Battilana and Dorado, 2010). 
From this perspective, conflict would be likely to occur when there is evidence of 
institutional pluralism, or the presence of multiple institutional logics. Institutional 
pluralism is expected to cause conflict because it breeds different attitudes, values, 
beliefs, and skills and partially exclusive behavioral preferences regarding joint action. 
Logics are “cultural toolkits” (Swidler, 1986) that contain different languages, 
values, associations, and meaning systems that social actors draw upon selectively or 
habitually as a situation requires. Applied to organizational life, institutional logics are 
cultural beliefs and rules that shape the cognitions and behaviors of social actors in 
organizations (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004; Lounsbury, 2007). They are 
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socially shared, deeply held assumptions and values that form a framework for reasoning, 
provide criteria for legitimacy, and help organize time and space (Friedland and Alford, 
1991; Thornton, 2004; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). In practice, they shape “the rules of 
the game” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: 112) and produce “a stream of discourse that 
promulgates, however unwittingly, a set of assumptions” (Barley and Kunda, 1992: 363). 
These sets of “material practices and symbolic constructions” exist at the societal level 
and are “available to organizations and individuals to elaborate” within organizations and 
fields of organizations (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 248).  
 Thornton and Ocasio (2008) advance a meta-theory of the institutional logics 
approach by identifying five elements of the approach that provide additional clarity into 
the institutional logics construct.6 First, society should be understood as an “inter-
institutional system” comprising theoretically distinct sectors of society, each with its 
own institutional logic. These sectors are derived from Alford and Friedland’s (1985) 
social theory which identified market capitalism, state bureaucracy, democracy, nuclear 
family, and Christian religion as the major institutions of Western society.7 Later on, and 
                                                        
6 Their meta-theory is based on their reading of Friedland and Alford’s (1991) critique of the rational 
choice perspective which presumes that individuals act according to the universal logic of utility 
maximization and is best understood in contrast to this perspective. Friedland and Alford (1991: 233) 
critique this perspective because it fails to explain how utilities are formed. In contrast to the universalistic 
approach adopted by neoclassical economists, they argue that “interests, identities, values and assumptions” 
are institutionally specific and that the logic of utility maximization may be consistent with the market but 
not all institutions or sectors of social life. 
7 Alford and Friedland (1985: 248) define the core logics associated with the major institutions of Western 
society as follows: “The institutional logic of capitalism is accumulation and the commodification of 
human activity. That of the state is rationalization and the regulation of human activity by legal and 
bureaucratic hierarchies. That of democracy is participation and the extension of popular control over 
human activity. That of the family is community and the motivation of human activity by unconditional 
loyalty to its members and their reproductive needs. That of religion, or science for that matter, is truth, 
whether mundane or transcendental, and the symbolic construction of reality within which all human 
activity takes place.” 
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in less contextually specific terms, scholars identified seven social institutions—the 
family, the community, religion, the state, the market, the professions, and the 
corporation—whereby individuals and organizations order their values, beliefs, identities, 
and rationales for action (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1983; Friedland 
and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012).8 9 Each 
major institution essentially represents a different belief system or worldview, an 
encompassing way of thinking about one’s environment that links purpose and process, 
ends and means, and that helps interpret and assign meaning to behavior. It is often at the 
sector, or institutional or field, level that institutional orders, logics, or rationalities are 
elaborated. 
 A consequence of the inter-institutional system is “institutional pluralism” (Kraatz 
and Block, 2008), or the elaboration of multiple rationalities or logics. Institutional 
pluralism creates the space for agency. Agency, in particular “embedded agency,” is the 
second, and arguably most important, element of Thornton and Ocasio’s meta-theory. 
Dominant logics enable and constrain activity and establish core principles for organizing 
activities and channeling interests, thus social action is culturally embedded in 
institutional logics.10 For example, Thornton and Ocasio (1999), in their study of 
executive succession in the publishing industry, describe how, over time, the criteria for 
selecting publishing firm executives shifted from a professional logic to market logic  
                                                        
8 Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012) added the community logic to those previously advanced in 
Thornton’s (2004) typology and other scholar’s renderings. 
9 Table 1-1 provides an overview of Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s (2012) Revised Inter-institutional 
System Ideal Types. 
10 Although embedded agency is typically viewed as a source of institutional constraint (Holm, 1995; Seo 
and Creed, 2002), it can also enable action and allow for significant change (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; 
Thornton, 2002, 2004). 
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Table 1-1: Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s (2012) Revised Inter-institutional System 
Ideal Types 
 
 
Institutional Orders 
Family Community Religion 
Root metaphor Family as firm Common boundary Temple as bank 
Sources of 
legitimacy 
Unconditional 
loyalty 
Unity of will 
 
Belief in trust & 
reciprocity 
Importance of 
faith & 
sacredness in 
economy & 
society 
Sources of 
authority 
Patriarchal 
domination 
Commitment to 
community values & 
ideology 
Priesthood 
charisma 
Sources of identity Family reputation 
Emotional 
connection 
 
Ego-satisfaction & 
reputation 
Association with 
deities 
Basis of norms Membership in household Group membership 
Membership in 
congregation 
Basis of attention Status in household 
Personal investment 
in group 
Relation to 
supernatural 
Basis of strategy Increase family honor 
Increase status & 
honor of members & 
practices 
Increase 
religious 
symbolism of 
natural events 
Informal control 
mechanisms Family politics Visibility of actions 
Worship of 
calling 
Economic system Family capitalism 
Cooperative 
capitalism 
Occidental 
capitalism 
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Table 1-1: Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s (2012) Revised Inter-institutional System 
Ideal Types (continued) 
 
 
Institutional Orders 
State Market Profession Corporation 
Root metaphor State as redistribution Transaction 
Profession as 
relational 
network 
Corporation 
as hierarchy 
Sources of 
legitimacy 
Democratic 
participation Share price 
Personal 
expertise 
Market 
position of 
firm 
Sources of 
authority 
Bureaucratic 
domination 
Shareholder 
activism 
Professional 
association 
Board of 
directors 
 
Top 
management 
Sources of 
identity 
Social & 
economic 
class 
Faceless 
Association 
with quality of 
craft 
 
Personal 
reputation 
Bureaucratic 
roles 
Basis of norms Citizenship in nation Self-interest 
Membership in 
guild & 
association 
Employment 
in firm 
Basis of attention 
Status of 
interest 
group 
Status in 
market 
Status in 
profession 
Status in 
hierarchy 
Basis of strategy 
Increase 
community 
good 
Increase 
efficiency 
profit 
Increase 
personal 
reputation 
Increase size 
& 
diversificatio
n of firm 
Informal control 
mechanisms 
Backroom 
politics 
Industry 
analysts 
Celebrity 
professionals 
Organization 
culture 
Economic system Welfare capitalism 
Market 
capitalism 
Personal 
capitalism 
Managerial 
capitalism 
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because of environmental and cultural changes. The shift in dominant logics changed 
outcomes by 1) shaping “the meaning, appropriateness, and legitimacy of various sources 
of power”; 2) determining “what issues to attend to in controlling and rewarding political 
behavior”; and 3) deciding “what answers and solutions are available and appropriate in 
controlling economic and political activity in organizations” (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999: 
806). 
 The third element of Thornton and Ocasio’s meta-theory is the assumption that 
each of the institutional orders of society has both material and cultural components. An 
institutional logic provides a normative framing which allocates worth or value 
differently and thus affects the cultural and material circumstances of individuals and 
groups. For example, the family is a predominantly cultural institution, nevertheless, it 
also has “material” components in that they “are directly involved in the production, 
distribution, and consumption of goods and services” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: 105). 
Similarly, the market logic emphasizes the accumulation of personal wealth and income 
but it also functions as a cultural mechanism by which actors achieve symbolic value. 
Thus, institutions have cognitive, normative, and symbolic dimensions. 
 Another element of the institutional logics approach is that it incorporates 
multiple levels of analysis. In Friedland and Alford’s (1991) formulation, logics, as 
shared cognitions, are relevant at both the individual and societal levels.11 Scholars have 
since broadened their relevancy to the multiple levels of society (individual, 
                                                        
11 Friedland and Alford’s (1991: 242) initial formulation of the institutional logics approach presupposed 
the partial autonomy of individuals, organizations, and institutions and viewed individual behavior as 
“nested” within organizations and institutions. 
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organizational, field, and societal) and a variety of different levels of analysis including 
markets, industries, inter-organizational networks, and geographical communities 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). The institutional logics perspective assumes that 
institutions operate at multiple levels of analysis and that individual actors are nested in 
higher order levels (individual, organizational, field, and societal). This element 
contributes to the Thornton and Ocasio’s (2008) assertion that the institutional logics 
approach is also a method of analysis. Researchers can measure the effects of content, 
meaning, and change in institutions using the institutional logics approach. The 
organizational field, or sector or industry, has served as the primary unit of analysis in a 
number of studies employing the institutional logics approach and is open to both 
deductive and inductive research strategies.12 
 The fifth and final element of the institutional logics meta-theory is “historical 
contingency.” The dominant form of logic, its manifestation in an organizational form, 
the space it provides for agency, and its material and cultural components are all 
historically situated and contingent to a particular spatial and temporal setting. This 
element is an acknowledgement that the relative influence of the seven major institutions 
                                                        
12 Although the organizational field has often served as the unit of analysis (see: Bacharach and Mundell’s 
(1995) analysis of the educational sector, Bacharach et al.’s (1996) study of the airline industry, Haveman 
and Rao’s (1997) investigation of the thrift industry, Scott et al.’s (2000) focus on the healthcare industry, 
or Thornton and Ocasio’s (1999) study of the publishing industry), it is not the only unit of analysis 
available under the institutional logics framework. Further, although foundational studies have combined 
event history and interpretive methods into their research designs (see: Haveman and Rao, 1997, Thornton 
and Ocasio, 1999, or Scott et al, 2000), other research designs have similarly incorporated the institutional 
logics framework as a method of analysis. 
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identified by scholars shift over time—whereas market logics currently dominate many 
organizational fields, religion dominated during an earlier era.13 
 The main function of institutional logics, then, is to define what an institution 
means and to provide a set of associated perceptions and practices. They establish the 
rules that structure cognition, guide decision-making and behavior, and focus the 
attention of key decision-makers on a set of issues and solutions (Marquis and 
Lounsbury, 2007). Scholars have shown that institutional logics shape attention strategies 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 1999), contractual practices with clients (Lounsbury, 2007), 
investment decisions (Hallen, 2008), and downsizing behaviors (Greenwood et al., 2010). 
These studies and others have shown the pluralistic attributes of institutional logics, 
going beyond the early unitary isomorphism arguments, to show the behavioral outcomes 
of multiple institutional logics. Institutional logics, therefore, are supra-organizational 
and abstract, but become observable in the concrete social relations of actors who utilize, 
manipulate, and reinterpret them. 
 The plurality of institutional logics and their availability for utilization by actors 
within organizations make this approach highly amenable to understanding intra-
organizational conflict in hybrid organizations. This approach conceptualizes hybrid 
organizations as carriers of multiple institutional logics, rather than as organizations 
which merely operate in or combine different characteristics of more than one sector of 
society. Haveman and Rao (2006: 974) confirm this broader view: “Hybrid organizations 
combine institutional logics that are materialized in two or more organizational forms.” 
                                                        
13 This element distinguishes Thornton and Ocasio’s (2008) from Meyer and Rowan (1977) who believed 
there would be a long-term trend toward market rationalization that left little room for agency. 
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As such, hybrid organizations arise from and are subject to the politics of contestation 
between institutional logics. The contestation of or conflict between the presence of 
multiple logics is an often unintended consequence of institutional pluralism. Friedland 
and Alford (1991: 256) acknowledge this outcome: “Some of the most important 
struggles between groups, organizations, and classes are over the appropriate 
relationships between institutions, and by which institutional logic different activities 
should be regulated and to which categories of person they apply.” This contestation 
results from the way in which institutional logics shape the “rules of the game” and 
“promulgate assumptions” about organizational vision, purpose, and behavior. As Kraatz 
and Block (2008: 243) note: “An organization confronting institutional pluralism plays in 
two or more games at the same time.” Because of this, institutional pluralism is deemed 
problematic; it is implicitly presumed to create intra-organizational conflict marked by 
fragmentation, incoherence, goal-ambiguity, and organizational instability as the contests 
between logics, or perceptions and practices, play out (Kraatz and Block, 2008; Stryker, 
2000; Heimer, 1999). 
 In sum, cultural explanations of conflict use the presence of multiple institutional 
logics to predict the occurrence of intra-organizational conflict. This perspective views 
multiple logics as a “threat” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009: 306) and characterizes pluralistic 
organizations as existing in “turmoil” (Hallet, 2010: 52). Multiple institutional logics 
promulgate incongruent organizational visions which may prescribe two or more 
different, and potentially conflicting, sets of expected goals and modes of action. As 
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such, this perspective sees intra-organizational conflict as a somewhat inevitable outcome 
of institutional pluralism. For conflict to lessen, a dominant logic must emerge. 
In this dissertation I will assess the political dimensions of governance and 
conflict in homeowners’ associations by documenting the existence of conflict in 
homeowners’ associations and assessing the relative value of the structural and cultural 
explanations of conflict for explaining the variability of significant intra-organizational 
conflict in homeowners’ associations. I will use original survey, interview, observational, 
and textual data to show that homeowners’ associations, like other organizations, are 
indeed sites of much conflict and contestation. I will provide evidence of the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of both the structural and cultural explanations of conflict and 
offer an argument for why these existing explanations of conflict fall short of fully 
explaining why some homeowners’ associations are more and less conflicted. I will 
ultimately develop and advance a third explanation for intra-organizational conflict; this 
explanation attributes the variability in intra-organizational conflict to individual and 
organizational responses to institutional pluralism and complexity. 
“Doing Logics”: The Logics of Homeownership and the Politics of Conflict 
 The theory and literature on the relative unavoidability and inevitability of 
conflict in organizations isn’t a lie: my original Homeowners’ Association Survey reports 
much intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations (nearly half of the 
homeowners’ associations I surveyed reported having experienced at least one significant 
instance of conflict in the last 12 months). So, as predicted by the literature, homeowners’ 
associations, like other organizations, do experience significant intra-organizational 
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conflict. As to the sources of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations, 
my complete statistical model, which assesses the relative strength of both external and 
internal and “structural” and “cultural” predictors of intra-organizational conflict, reveals 
two particularly strong and statistically significant predictors: organization size (an 
external and structural predictor) and ideological homogeneity (an internal and cultural 
predictor). I find that homeowners’ associations of a large size and homeowners’ 
associations who report sharing a common vision about the purpose of a homeowners’ 
association are less likely to experience a significant instance of conflict when compared 
to those homeowners’ associations of a small size and homeowners’ associations who do 
not report sharing a common vision about the purpose of a homeowners’ association. 
Interestingly, then, I find some empirical support for both the structural and the cultural 
explanations of conflict. The strongest statistical predictor, however, is cultural. My 
measure of the presence of institutional pluralism, ideological homogeneity, is the most 
statistically robust determinant of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ 
associations. This measure, however, does not directly or fully measure the presence of 
institutional logics and does not identify what institutional logics may be present. 
 Through interviews with board members of homeowners’ associations and other 
related organizational actors I confirm the initial findings of my survey. I do indeed find 
that there are multiple institutional logics culturally embedded in the hybrid 
organizational and institutional environment of homeowners’ associations. I identify and 
define two logics of homeownership: the economic logic of homeownership and the 
social logic of homeownership. I argue that these two logics stem from the American 
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ideology of homeownership and prove to complicate the organizational imperative of 
homeowners’ associations by creating institutional pluralism and complexity. The 
economic logic of homeownership corresponds to the market and corporate interests of 
homeowners’ associations’ hybrid organizational form. This logic primes homeowners’ 
association board members to act in their personal best interests and to mainly concern 
themselves with property values and other financial performance indicators. The social 
logic of homeownership corresponds to the civil and public interests of homeowners’ 
associations’ hybrid organizational form. This logic primes homeowners’ association 
board members to act in the best interests of the community and to mainly concern 
themselves with shared values, communal governance, and other social performance 
indicators. Because these two logics of homeownership exist in opposition to one 
another, they create ideological heterogeneity, incongruous organizational visions, and 
prescribe different goals and modes of action, and, as my survey data strongly suggests, 
do have the potential to cause significant intra-organizational conflict.  
 But while the dual presence of the economic logic of homeownership and the 
social logic of homeownership may partially explain the existence of intra-organizational 
conflict in homeowners’ associations, it does not explain the variability in intra-
organizational conflict that homeowners’ associations experience. Neither the structural 
nor the cultural explanations of conflict explain why some homeowners’ associations are 
more and less conflicted than others. I argue that the structural and cultural explanations 
of conflict cannot fully explain the variability of intra-organizational conflict in 
homeowners’ associations because they completely or almost completely ignore the role 
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of organizational participants and their agentic potential to both cause more and less 
conflict. Indeed, as explained in the previous section, the structural explanation of 
conflict focuses solely on structural attributes of the organization—not on the perceptions 
and practices of the people within it. The primary concerns of this approach are to 
categorize and classify conflict and to link organizational and board structures to 
organizational performance outcomes and manifestations of relationship-based, task-
based, and process-based conflicts. The cultural approach moves somewhat closer to 
addressing the role of organizational participants, but falls short of truly embracing the 
importance of how organizational actors impact the organization itself.  As detailed in the 
last section, this approach, while cognizant of “embedded agency” and applicable to 
multiple levels of analysis, still mainly focuses on the top-down role that dominant 
institutional logics play in promoting conformity within fields and organizations. 
Scholarship in this area generally prefers to show how institutional forces structure 
organizational behavior rather than examining how individual and organizational 
perceptions and practices affect the nature of these forces. Save for some very recent 
research on micro-level processes, this literature currently lacks a clear, empirically based 
understanding of how social actors translate logics into action as they engage in everyday 
organizational activities or how individual-level activities help reproduce or transform 
organizational structures.14 As such, both the structural and cultural explanations of 
conflict omit the concern for individual agency. 
                                                        
14 This shortcoming has recently been recognized by institutional and institutional logics theorists (Powell 
and Colyvas, 2008; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Zucker, 1991). 
Powell and Colyvas (2008: 277) address this gap: “In our view these macro lines of analysis could also 
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 I ultimately offer and develop a third explanation for conflict. My explanation 
draws from recent scholarship in the institutional work and ambidexterity literatures and 
addresses how individual and organizational decisions and activities affect the variability 
of conflict in homeowners’ associations. I argue that organizational actors’ responses to 
institutional pluralism and complexity, as evidenced in their perceptions and practices, 
determine whether a hybrid organization is subject to more or less intra-organizational 
conflict. I will show that all homeowners’ associations are subject to institutional 
pluralism and complexity but will argue that less conflicted homeowners’ associations 
respond by ambidextrously maintaining both the economic logic of homeownership and 
the social logic of homeownership while more conflicted homeowners’ associations 
respond by eliminating one of the logics or compartmentalizing logics. Board members in 
ambidextrous homeowners’ associations perceive institutional pluralism and complexity 
as routine and thoughtfully “do” logics by making adjustments, improvising, and 
switching. Board members in non-ambidextrous homeowners’ associations perceive 
institutional pluralism and complexity as novel and automatically contest or separate 
logics. 
 Central to my alternative explanation for the variability in intra-organizational 
conflict in homeowners’ associations are the concepts of institutional work and 
institutional ambidexterity. Each of these concepts draws from an institutional 
                                                                                                                                                                     
profit from a micro motor. Such a motor would involve theories that attend to enaction, interpretation, 
translation, and meaning. Institutions are sustained, altered, and extinguished as they are enacted by 
individuals in concrete social situations.” Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012) echo this sentiment in 
their recent synthesis of the institutional logics perspective; they advance a new theory on the micro-
foundations of the institutional logics perspective which advocates an understanding of the relationship 
between micro- and meso-levels of analysis (individuals and organizations). 
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perspective and recognizes that institutions have enduring and profound effects on the 
thoughts, feelings, and behavior of individual and collective actors, yet also understands 
that individual and collective actors are similarly able to have enduring and profound 
effects on institutions. The concept of institutional work, for example, describes “the 
purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining, and 
disrupting institutions” (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006: 215) and the concept of 
institutional ambidexterity, in the same vein, describes the ability of individuals and 
organizations to “simultaneously perform contradictory processes when both are critical 
to organizational success” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013: 45).15 These two concepts are at the 
forefront of efforts by institutional theorists to establish a broader vision of individual 
agency in relationship to organizations and institutions. 
 The concept of institutional work depicts institutional actors as reflexive, goal-
oriented, and capable, and focuses on actors’ actions, and strives to capture structure, 
agency, and their interrelations (Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum, 2009). Scholarly work 
in the area is oriented around discovering how institutions are created, maintained, and 
disrupted through institutional actors’ purposeful action; recent studies have connected 
these processes to situations of institutional pluralism and complexity. Jarzabkowski, 
Matthiesen, and Van de Ven (2009), for example, studied how different organizational 
actors grappled with opposing institutional logics in a utility company. They found that 
                                                        
15 Ambidexterity literally means the ability to use one’s hands equally well. Organizational and 
management scholars have appropriated this term and leveraged this metaphor to deal with paradoxes; such 
as how organizations can simultaneously engage in both “exploitation” and “exploration” (March, 1991; 
Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). Exploitation refers to an organization’s ability to be “aligned and efficient” 
with current business demands while exploration refers to an organization’s ability to be “adaptive to 
changes in the environment” (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008: 685). 
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organizational actors purposefully engaged with market and regulatory logics and 
actively did creation work, maintenance work, and disruption work in their day-to-day 
activities and decisions. They suggest that actors frequently engaged in the “politics of 
logics” to influence organizational outcomes. The type of institutional work actors 
engaged in often determined organizational outcomes like intra-organizational conflict or 
adjustment. 
 The concept of institutional ambidexterity has most recently been used to show 
how organizations can develop the simultaneous capacity to engage in two (or more) 
predominant beliefs and practices and with two (or more) institutional logics. Scholarly 
work in this area is oriented around discovering how organizations cannot only regularly 
and consistently engage with multiple institutional logics but also potentially benefit from 
the presence of multiple, and potentially contradictory, institutional logics. Ambidexterity 
can be realized in hybrid organizational structures like blended or structurally 
differentiated hybrid organizations (Greenwood et al., 2011), but is ultimately about 
organizational practices (Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Bednarek, 2013). This approach 
recognizes that “institutions themselves cannot be ambidextrous; rather, people do 
institutional ambidexterity in their everyday actions and interactions as they work within 
and enact multiple logics” (Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Bednarek, 2013: 11). 
 These two concepts, and their respective scholarship, have developed separately 
for the most part. I join together these two bodies of literature and incorporate the two 
concepts to establish my explanation of intra-organizational conflict. I propose that in 
situations of institutional pluralism and complexity, organizational actors either “do” or 
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“don’t do” logics and that it is their doing or not doing of logics, rather than just the mere 
presence of multiple institutional logics, that creates the potential for more and less intra-
organizational conflict. When organizational actors “do” logics they act ambidextrously 
to engage in a politicized process of maintaining multiple logics (a form of institutional 
work) via context-specific and purposeful practices including adjustment, improvisation, 
and switching. Because organizational members perceive institutional complexity as 
routine they are better able to anticipate conflict and meet the institutional demands of 
their organization’s hybrid organizational form. As a result ambidextrous organizations 
are less conflicted. Organizational actors who “don’t do” logics eliminate and 
compartmentalize multiple logics by disrupting (another form of institutional work) one 
or more institutional logics via instinctual and automatic practices including contestation 
and separation. Because organizational members perceive institutional complexity as 
novel they view it problematically and are unable to meet the institutional demands of 
their organization’s hybrid organizational form. As a result non-ambidextrous 
organizations are more conflicted.  
Summarily, both the structural and cultural explanations of conflict hold weight. 
Each perspective is able to empirically explain some of the conflict in homeowners’ 
associations. These perspectives, however, are greatly limited by their inability to fully 
explain the conflict that homeowners’ associations experience; they are unable to do so 
because the structural and cultural approaches do not connect to the micro-level 
experiences of individuals on the ground, those homeowners who volunteer who are 
elected to serve on the homeowners’ association board. In this dissertation, I will offer 
  
38
and develop a third explanation. My explanation suggests organizational actors, in this 
case primarily homeowners’ association board members, create the potential for both 
more and less intra-organizational conflict in hybrid organizations like homeowners’ 
associations. It is their responses to institutional pluralism and complexity, as evidenced 
in their perceptions and practices and their relative ability to “do” logics, which 
determines the variability of intra-organizational conflict. 
Research Design 
 To review, this dissertation seeks to address three main questions: 1) How 
common is intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations; 2) What are the 
sources of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations; and 3) What makes 
some homeowners’ associations more and less conflicted? To answer these questions I 
engaged in a two-step, mixed method research process. The first step was quantitative. I 
created an original survey to gather descriptive and categorical information on 
homeowners’ associations in the Greater Boston-area. The Homeowners’ Association 
Board Member Survey was mailed to board members of approximately 250 homeowners’ 
associations in the spring of 2011 and consisted of a series of closed-ended questions 
which were designed to gather data on the frequency of conflict in homeowners’ 
associations and the external and internal organizational attributes of homeowners’ 
associations. More information about data collection and analysis for this step of my 
research process can be found in Chapter Two: Structure v. Culture: The External and 
Internal Determinants of Conflict. A copy of my survey instrument can be found in 
Appendix A. The second step was qualitative. I conducted 56 semi-structured interviews 
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with board members of homeowners’ associations, made observations of homeowners’ 
association meetings, events, and professional events, and analyzed documents (e.g., 
CC&Rs, board minutes, and memorandums) from homeowners’ associations that are 
more and less conflicted. More information about data collection and analysis for this 
step of my research process can be found in Chapter Three: Identifying, Explaining, and 
Defining the Logics of Homeownership and Chapter Four: “Doing” Logics to Lessen 
Conflicts. A copy of my board member interview schedule can be found in Appendix B. 
Organization of Dissertation 
The next chapter, Chapter Two: Structure v. Culture: The External and Internal 
Determinants of Conflict, examines the influence of “structural” and “cultural” and 
external and internal organizational attributes on the presence of intra-organizational 
conflict in homeowners’ associations. Using survey data from approximately 250 
homeowners’ association board members in Massachusetts, I investigate the degree to 
which various external and internal characteristics associated with organizational and 
board structure and culture predict whether this type of hybrid organization experiences 
division among its governing members and the larger community. The findings provide 
support for several of the structural and cultural and external and internal organizational 
attributes hypothesized to predict intra-organizational conflict in private, nonprofit, and 
public organizations; however, a cultural and internal measure of the presence of multiple 
institutional logics emerges as the key predictor of intra-organizational conflict in 
homeowners’ associations. Homeowners’ associations whose board members report 
congruity of organizational vision experience intra-organizational conflict at substantially 
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lower rates than homeowners’ associations whose board members do not report congruity 
of organizational vision.  
In Chapter Three, “Identifying, Explaining, and Defining the Logics of 
Homeownership,” I use institutional theory and the institutional pluralism and 
institutional complexity constructs to confirm the hybrid organizational form of 
homeowners’ associations. I build upon the suggestion of the previous chapter that 
multiple institutional logics are present in homeowners’ associations and draw upon 
qualitative interviews with homeowners’ association board members, observations of 
homeowners’ associations, and textual analysis of homeowners’ association documents to 
identify, explain, and define the existence of two institutional logics in the hybrid 
institutional environment of homeowners’ associations: an economic logic and a social 
logic. The economic logic of homeownership views homeownership as a financial 
investment and appeals to an individual’s pursuit of self-interest. The social logic of 
homeownership views homeownership as a civil investment and appeals to a collective’s 
pursuit of community. I argue that the American ideology of homeownership generates 
and institutionalizes these logics and that institutional complexity results from the 
problematic intersection of the American ideology of homeownership and homeowners’ 
associations’ hybrid organizational form. Homeowners’ associations’ and their 
organizational actors’ cultural embeddedness in the American ideology of 
homeownership generates conflicting visions about the purpose of homeownership, the 
nature of the identity of homeowner, and the purpose of a homeowners’ association. 
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In Chapter Four, “Doing Logics to Lessen Conflicts,” I use recent micro-
theorizing in institutional theory and the concepts of institutional ambidexterity and 
institutional work to explain the presence of and variability in intra-organizational 
conflict in homeowners’ associations. I argue that it is not the mere presence of multiple 
institutional logics in an organizational environment that causes intra-organizational 
conflict as the institutional logics literature often presumes, but instead organizational 
actors’ responses to institutional pluralism and complexity. Organizational responses to 
institutional pluralism and complexity, in particular those actualized in organizational 
actors’ perceptions and practices, create the potential for more and less intra-
organizational conflict. Once again drawing upon my qualitative interviews with board 
members of homeowners’ associations, observations of homeowners’ associations, and 
textual analysis of documents from homeowners’ associations that are more and less 
conflicted, I will show that all homeowners’ associations are subject to multiple and 
contradictory logics (i.e., exhibit the conditions of institutional pluralism and 
complexity), but will provide evidence that the homeowners’ associations that respond to 
institutional pluralism and complexity by eliminating or compartmentalizing institutional 
logics are more conflicted. Eliminatory and compartmentalizing (i.e., non-ambidextrous) 
homeowners’ associations respond to institutional pluralism and complexity by adhering 
to a single institutional logic either by contesting or separating new or alternative 
institutional logics. This response creates a cycle of problem and contestation that 
ultimately results in an incongruous organizational vision and more intra-organizational 
conflict. Homeowners’ associations that respond to institutional pluralism and complexity 
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ambidextrously are less conflicted. Organizational actors in ambidextrous homeowners’ 
associations are able to move between the economic and social logics of homeownership. 
They actively maintain both logics, use their logics as a cultural and practical “toolkit”, 
and draw upon the economic logic of homeownership or the social logic of 
homeownership as a decision, activity, or practice requires; they thoughtfully “do” logics 
by making adjustments, improvising, and switching between logics on a context-specific 
basis. This response creates a self-reinforcing cycle of ambidextrous action that 
ultimately results in a congruous organizational vision and less intra-organizational 
conflict. 
The concluding chapter revisits and summarizes my argument and then explores 
its implications for the sociology of organizations, institutional theory and the 
institutional logics perspective, the public and policy discourses surrounding 
homeowners’ associations, and future research in the area of intra-organizational conflict, 
hybrid organizations, and homeownership. 
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CHAPTER TWO: STRUCTURE V. CULTURE – THE EXTERNAL AND 
INTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF CONFLICT 
 
Introduction 
 Hybrid forms of organizations are increasingly populating all sectors of society.16 
The increased presence of forms of hybrid organizations in recent years reflects basic 
changes in the institutional structure of modern societies and the blurring of the 
boundaries between the roles of business, civil society, and government. Institutional 
theory suggests that hybrid organizations exist in “institutionally pluralistic” 
environments (Kraatz and Block, 2008) and must negotiate institutional complexity due 
to the presence of multiple, and potentially competing, institutional or action logics. In 
such an environment, intra-organizational conflict is assumed to arise from the presence 
of multiple institutional logics and their underlying rationales and value dispositions. 
Incongruent organizational visions and different manners of governance may result in 
unclear organizational goals and preferred modes of action (e.g., is the organizational 
goal of a homeowners’ association to increase property values, to provide services, or to 
create a sense of community?) and instability. The determinants of conflict in hybrid 
organizations, however, have not been empirically studied, and such an explanation 
contrasts much research in the area which identifies organizational attributes associated 
with organizational and board structures, rather than its culture, as significant predictors 
of conflict in private organizations (Wall and Callister, 1995; Pfeffer, 1972), non-profit 
                                                        
16 A hybrid organization is any organization that “mixes elements, value systems, and action logics of 
various sectors of society” (Karré, 2010).  
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organizations (Cornforth, 2001; Brown, 2005), and public organizations (Grissom, 2010; 
Kochan, Huber, and Cummings, 1975). 
This chapter assesses the explanatory power of organizational attributes 
associated with traditional “structural” explanations of intra-organizational conflict and 
newer “cultural” explanations of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ 
associations. It draws from disparate strands of literature on private, nonprofit, public, 
and hybrid organizations to form hypotheses about potential external and internal 
determinants of intra-organizational conflict and then tests their predictive power based 
on an original survey of approximately 250 homeowners’ association board members in 
Massachusetts. As I explained in the last chapter, homeowners’ associations are a type of 
hybrid organization: they provide services like the public sector, are often incorporated as 
nonprofits, and have a management style similar to for-profit corporations. These 
organizations occupy a fuzzy and porous space at the intersection of the three 
institutional sectors of society (the market, the state, and civil society) and have been 
likened to “residential private governments” (McKenzie, 1994) because of their hybrid 
organizational form. My findings provide some support for both the “structural” and 
“cultural” explanations of conflict; several of the external and internal organizational 
attributes hypothesized to predict intra-organizational conflict in private, nonprofit, and 
public organizations are found to be statistically significant predictors of intra-
organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations. An internal and cultural measure of 
the presence of multiple institutional logics, however, emerges as the key predictor of 
intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations. Homeowners’ associations 
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whose board members report congruity of organizational vision experience intra-
organizational conflict at substantially lower rates than homeowners’ associations whose 
board members do not report congruity of organizational vision. This outcome suggests 
that cultural explanations of conflict may be better suited for hybrid organizations like 
homeowners’ associations. 
Predicting Conflict in Organizations 
 This section will draw upon multiple strands of literature to identify the elemental 
rationale of and organizational attributes associated with traditional “structural” 
explanations of intra-organizational conflict. Structural explanations of intra-
organizational conflict suggest that organizational and board attributes best predict the 
occurrence of conflict in organizations. This perspective contends that organizational 
structures underlie all of the perceptions and practices that take place in an organization; 
if there is conflict it is because of the characteristics of the group or organization itself. 
Scholarship in this area principally draws from three broad bodies of literature. The first 
is literature on group decision-making, including work on the three domains of conflict 
and the role of conflict in influencing the quality of group decisions and its outcomes for 
organizational effectiveness. The second is a large body of work which assesses the role 
of governing boards in private, nonprofit, and public organizations. And the third is 
literature that focuses on categorizing the determinants of intra-organizational conflict in 
organizations of all institutional sectors. In this last section I will adapt and advance a 
typology of determinants of intra-organizational conflict to form hypotheses about 
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potential external and internal contributory factors of intra-organizational conflict in 
homeowners’ associations. 
Conflict and Group Decision-Making 
 Rahim (2001) suggests that intra-group conflict is likely to occur in organizations 
where independent social actors are required to engage in activities that are incongruent 
with individual interests; hold behavior preferences which are incompatible with 
another’s preferences; want some resource that is in short supply; and possess attitudes or 
goals which compete with another’s attitudes or goals. Conflict, in this view, is rooted in 
social interactions between entities where there are misaligned interests and as 
manifested in social-behavior interactions marked by tension, frustration, annoyance, 
interference, and rivalry. Intra-group conflict is thus likely to emerge in the process of 
group decision-making. 
A common objective in the literature on group decision-making is to identify 
different domains of conflict. As discussed in the previous chapter, researchers have 
generally identified three domains of organizational conflict: relationship-based conflict, 
task-based conflict, and process-based conflict. Relationship-based conflict, also called 
affective or interpersonal conflict, refers to conflicts usually sparked when two people 
have incompatible values, perceptions, and expectations. Priem and Price (1991) assert 
that interpersonal conflict is emotionally-based and oftentimes does not relate to 
organizational tasks, but rather reflects personality differences. Task-based conflict, or 
substantive conflict, involves disagreements about which substantive tasks should be 
pursued. This type of conflict is cognitive, and often centers on an analysis of what work 
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should and should not be done. Process-based conflict, also called procedural conflict, 
involves disagreements about how selected tasks should be accomplished.  
Because of the emphasis on this three domain typology, much of the scholarship 
on group decision-making processes centers on evaluating the functional or dysfunctional 
outcomes of each domain on conflict. This scholarship in particular has a tendency to 
evaluate conflict based on its “functionality”, framing it as either a negative or a positive 
force. Amason (1996), for example, studied management teams in food processing and 
furniture production. He found conflict to be multidimensional, taking both functional 
(cognitive and task-oriented) and dysfunctional (interpersonal) forms. Using survey data, 
he directly linked both negative and positive outcomes to intra-group conflict: 
dysfunctional conflict lowered decision quality due to lack of consensus among group 
members and functional conflict improved decision quality due to a synthesis of 
perspectives. In a similar qualitative study, Jehn and Mannix (2001) observed 51 teams of 
MBA students from three universities as they engaged in the consultation process with 
local firms. As in the Amason study, the authors hypothesized a negative role for 
interpersonal or relationship conflict, but a potentially positive role for task conflict. They 
concluded that high-performing work groups tend to have lower degrees of both task and 
relationship conflict; a finding which counters that of Amason.  
This two-dimensional view of conflict appears quite frequently in the literature on 
group decision-making in the private sector. The common theme is that one domain (i.e., 
relationship-based conflict) is detrimental and the other domains (i.e., task-based conflict 
and process-based conflict) are, potentially, beneficial (see Jehn, 1995; Simons and 
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Peterson, 2000). In a meta-analytic review of thirty studies from this literature, however, 
De Dreu and Weingart (2003) concluded that there is little evidence to support the 
assertion that interpersonal and task conflict correlate differentially with team 
performance: “for team performance, task conflict and relationship conflict are equally 
disruptive” (746). This finding supports Hearn and Anderson’s (2002) critique that a sole 
emphasis on this three domain typology obscures, conflates, and oversimplifies the nature 
of intra-group conflict. To suggest that a conflict is relationship-based, for example, is 
largely to note that the conflict has become apparent through interpersonal differences. 
Whether this is true or not ultimately depends upon whether organizational conditions set 
the stage for such disagreements. For example, if one long-term member of a 
homeowners’ association governing board argues with a newly elected board member 
over whether to levy a special assessment for a new roof or a new boiler, which matters 
more: whether this incident is classified as one of those three domains of conflict (namely 
interpersonal or task) or whether the conflict was caused by underlying organizational 
attributes related to the complexity of the organizational environment or the structure and 
composition of the board? Hearn and Anderson, drawing from Merton’s (1968) 
propositions that (a) underlying conditions of conflict in social systems may produce 
manifest conflict episodes or remain latent, and (b) the behavioral manifestation of 
underlying conflict (e.g., an argument over an individual’s proposed use of funds) does 
not necessarily redress the underlying conflict condition, suggest the latter.  
Scholarship in this area, including Amason’s (1996), Jehn and Mannix’s (2001), 
and De Dreu and Weingart’s (2003) aforementioned studies, strongly suggest that 
  
49
foundational organizational attributes contribute to the development of intra-group 
conflict during the decision-making process and can negatively affect organizational 
performance. Hearn and Anderson (2002) in their study of conflict during the tenure 
decision-making process in academic departments, for example, found that conflicts over 
tenure and promotion votes were overall more likely in departments with larger 
instructional volume, departments whose disciplinary bases were soft, departments with 
less specialization, and departments that were larger in size. They conclude, in part, that 
the structural conditions of the academic departments primed the group for conflict. 
They, and other scholars, have thus identified intra-group and group decision-making 
conflict as an important area for study because of its tendency to result from underlying 
structural attributes of the organization and the potential it has to interfere with 
organizational performance. 
Conflict and Board Governance 
Governing boards provide oversight to many kinds of organizations, including 
private organizations like corporations, non-profit organizations like public charities and 
community foundations, and public organizations like municipal governments and 
schools. The board members of these organizations play key roles in setting policies, 
monitoring performance, formulating organizational strategy, and defining organizational 
goals; this places them at the frontlines of an organization, so how they work together has 
important implications for the functioning of the organization, the management of the 
organization, and for the organization’s performance (i.e., its ability to meet its goals). 
Not surprisingly then, the effects of conflict and division among leaders and 
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organizational participants serving on governing boards has been studied extensively, 
particularly in private, market-based organizations.17 
Like in the group decision-making literature, conflict and division among leaders 
and organizational participants on governing boards is also generally viewed as a 
negative force in organizations, especially in terms of organizational performance and 
satisfaction (March and Simon, 1958; Pondy, 1967; Blake and Mouton, 1984). Research 
on the topic in the corporate management literature indicates that while some conflict is 
inherent in social processes, a large amount of intra-board conflict can lower decision 
quality, make boards less effective, and undermine organizational performance. And 
although a summary review by Korac-Kakabadse, Kakabadse, and Kouzmin (2001) 
concluded that research has generally failed to uncover any “universal” associations 
between board attributes and organizational performance, there is a great deal of research 
from all sectors which does link various characteristics of boards to organizational 
performance. Scholars have assessed the linkages between such characteristics as board 
size (Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 1998; Pfeffer, 1972), board composition and 
structure (Coles, McWilliams, and Sen, 2001; Dalton et al., 1998; Dulewicz and Herbert, 
2004; Kula, 2005; Pfeffer, 1972), and board practices (Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; 
Kula, 2005) and firm performance18. Herman and Renz (1999, 2000), for example, found 
a connection between the effectiveness of nonprofit board decision-making and the 
effectiveness of the overall organization. In this sector, board of directors members’ 
                                                        
17 For a review of theoretical and empirical studies of conflict among leaders and team members in private 
organizations (i.e., firms), see Wall and Callister (1995). 
18 Firm performance was primarily measured by financial outcomes. 
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interpersonal and strategic competencies (Brown, 2005), commitment to the organization 
(Preston and Brown, 2004), and intentional efforts to improve board management 
(Brudney and Murray, 1998) have all been associated with organizational performance. 
Finally, board conflict and organizational effectiveness have also been shown to be 
related in public organizations (Merz, 1986; Danzberger, Kirst, and Usdan, 1992; 
Danzberger, 1994). Here, scholars have found linkages between characteristics such as 
board size (Grissom, 2010), board member training (Anderson, 1992), and goal 
compatibility (Watson and Hassett, 2003) and organizational performance. In one recent 
study on the determinants of conflict on governing boards in public organizations 
Grissom (2010) found that external characteristics of public school boards play a large 
role in predicting intra-board conflict; heterogeneous school districts were significantly 
more likely to experience intra-board conflict than more homogenous school districts. 
Few studies have examined group decision-making conflict in the context of the 
corporate boards of trustees. Data limitations are likely a cause of the closed-door nature 
of most corporate boards and the reticence of board members to discuss confidential 
decision-making processes. Work on boards of trustees in the nonprofit and public 
sectors, however, suggests that the detrimental impacts of conflict observed on the 
decision-making process by private sector work teams extends to the decision-making 
process of governing boards. For example, Bradshaw, Murray, and Wolpin (1992) found 
an inverse relationship between board conflict and effectiveness; CEOs of Canadian 
nonprofit organizations rated their boards more effective when board conflict was lower. 
Similarly, Cornforth (2001) found that nonprofit boards in Great Britain who reported 
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being able to manage conflict among themselves were also judged to be more effective. 
Brown (2005) drew on data from nonprofit board members and executives in Los 
Angeles and Phoenix to conclude that boards characterized by collegial group processes 
and strong interpersonal relationships tended to be more effective than boards that did not 
exhibit these characteristics. In the public sector, Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) linked 
political conflict and instability on city councils to negative organizational outcomes, 
namely higher turnover among managers in municipal governments. In a similar study of 
city councils, Watson and Hassett (2003) found that city council stability and support of 
management were associated with positive organizational outcomes like low attrition of 
city managers. Qualitative work on school boards also supports the idea that board 
conflict can lead to negative outcomes. Carol et al. (1986) cite board factionalism and an 
inability to manage differences among members as hindrances to board effectiveness. 
Poor interpersonal relations between board members and with the superintendent were 
markers of poor governance based on a series of case studies by Goodman, Fulbright, and 
Zimmerman (1997). By extension, Hill, Wise, and Shapiro (1989) also find that intra-
group conflict in the decision-making process of governing boards of schools is a 
predictor of organizational effectiveness.  
Determinants of Conflict 
 Taken together, the research on private, nonprofit, and public sector decision-
making, governance, management, and work teams suggests that identifying the sources 
of conflict in hybrid organizations and their governing boards is an important area for 
study because it matters for overall organizational effectiveness. Yet, no studies have 
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attempted to identify the determinants of intra-organizational conflict in any type of 
hybrid organization and scholarship on hybrid organizations implicitly assumes any 
conflict is due solely to the mere presence of multiple institutional logics. This is a 
significant omission from the literature, particularly in an age when the number of hybrid 
forms of organization continues to grow and the sectorial lines of demarcation continue 
to blur. My research guided by prior work in the private, nonprofit, and public sectors, 
tests predictions for whether organizational attributes associated with organizational and 
board structure or culture best predict the occurrence of intra-organizational conflict in 
homeowners’ associations. I do this by adapting and advancing a typology of potential 
external and internal determinants of intra-organizational conflict developed in prior 
research. 
 While acknowledging that the focus of most literature on intra-organizational 
conflict has been on the outcomes rather than the causes of intra-organizational conflict, 
Wall and Callister (1995) enumerate a long list of potential antecedents that prior 
research has either assumed or examined specifically.19 In adapting this list and other 
research studying intra-organizational conflict I utilize a typology proposed by Hung 
(1997) and tested by Grissom (2010) which makes a useful distinction between external 
and internal organizational and board attributes that shape board dynamics and 
                                                        
19 It has been observed that the causes of conflict emphasized by scholars seldom pertinently addressed the 
organizational level; earlier and more recent accounts of the sources of conflict in many instances 
addressed the subject at the macro-structural rather than the micro-organizational level (Dahrendorf, 1976; 
Marx, 1965; Mayer, 2000). Those who did consider the causes of conflict at the organizational level 
identified a multitude of potential sources of conflict including differences in knowledge, beliefs or basic 
values; a drive for autonomy; personal dislikes; and differing perceptions or attributes brought about by the 
organizational structure, different role structures, heterogeneity of the workforce, environmental changes, 
differences in goals, diverse economic interests, loyalties of groups, and value discrepancies (Weider-
Hatfield and Hatfield, 1995). 
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organizational orientations to develop hypotheses about potential contributory factors 
consistent with traditional structural explanations of intra-organizational conflict and 
newer cultural explanations of intra-organizational conflict.20 External factors refer to 
those that are beyond the control of the organization but which affect its structure and 
development. They come from the environment or are structural characteristics that the 
board must take as a given. These might include organizational context variables, the 
relationships to other organized groups, or pre-existing and/or unchangeable structures of 
the organization. Internal factors are under the control of the organization and often 
derive from institutional choices, organizational culture, board practices, or 
characteristics of the board members themselves.21 For the most part, any organizational 
attributes that structure, form, or arrange the organization and its environment are 
considered consistent with the “structural” explanation of conflict. This includes external 
organizational attributes including measures of organizational structure and the 
complexity of the organizational environment and internal organizational attributes like 
board structure and composition. Organizational attributes that derive from organizational 
culture, choices, and practices are considered consistent with the “cultural” explanation 
                                                        
20 Hung (1997) and Grissom (2010) refer to external characteristics as “extrinsic” and internal 
characteristics as “intrinsic”. 
21 The distinctions between external and internal factors are sometimes arbitrary. For example, board size 
might be categorized as external because it is codified in the legal documents of the association and 
therefore is unchangeable; however, it also could be categorized as internal because its real impact on 
conflict is as a characteristic of the norms of the group itself. Another example may be availability of 
resources. These are external in the sense that they are a part of the organization’s environment and 
therefore structure its activities, but internal in the sense that board members, particularly in a homeowners’ 
association, can choose how strongly they value saving or spending and may impact the availability of 
resources because of their decision-making practices. 
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of conflict. This includes internal organizational attributes related to organizational and 
board ideology and manners of governance. 
 External Factors 
 Studies in private firms commonly assume that the complexity of the environment 
predicts greater conflict. As Wall and Callister (1995: 522) note, the complexity of the 
problems with which a group or organization must deal is “more likely to generate 
misunderstanding, to tap divergent interests or unearth dissimilar goals.” Increasing 
uncertainty and complexity in the operating environment of organizations provide fertile 
ground for the onset of conflict in the organization; an increase in the incidence of 
conflict is to be expected (De Dreu, Dierendonck, and Dijkstra, 2004).   The complexity 
of an organizational environment can include any number of factors and generally 
comprises the specific environment (e.g., that which is directly relevant to the 
achievement of an organization’s goals) and the general environment (e.g., the broad 
external conditions that might affect the organization and its achievement of its goals). 
Applied to homeowners’ associations, the complexity of the environment may include 
such factors the age of the community, the size of the community, the amount of 
heterogeneity in the community, and the availability of economic resources.  
 Ecological studies have consistently reported that the age of an organization is an 
important structural feature of organizations and directly relates to its functioning. While 
these studies primarily view age through the lens of organizational mortality and survival, 
the theorists understand the liabilities associated with being “new” or “aging” contribute 
to the complexity of the organizational environment and are ultimately a culmination of a 
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variety of structural conditions, problems, and characteristics which may be associated 
with conflict. Stinchcombe (1965), for example, cites four underlying reasons for why 
young organizations in particular are more susceptible to intra-organizational conflict: (1) 
the difficulties that new organizations experience in reproducing roles, settling on 
operating procedures, creating a culture and learning skills; (2) the high costs or 
inefficiencies associated with inventing roles and structuring relations; (3) problems 
inherent in establishing working relationships; and (4) the uncertainty associated with 
establishing ties to those in the organizational environment. Hannan and Freeman (1989), 
by extension, state that young organizations will flounder until the organization has 
established routines, control systems, and institutionalized roles; the organization must 
prove its stability and reliability to its stakeholders. Thus there are liabilities to newness 
that create complexity in the organizational environment. And although this type of risk 
decreases as the organization ages, other risks, such as the liability of senescence 
(Ranger-Moore, 1997) and the liability of obsolescence (Carroll, 1983; Baum, 1989), 
may increase the complexity of the organizational environment later in organizational 
life. In sum, this literature suggests that organizational age strongly influences the 
structural arrangements (i.e., the rules, resources, and practices) of organizations: 
younger organizations lack established organizational and governance structures, while 
older organizations may either have the advantage or disadvantage of established 
organizational and governance structures. Based on this literature, it is hypothesized that 
younger homeowners’ associations will report having experienced conflict more 
frequently than older homeowners’ associations. 
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 Organizational research generally supports the notion that size is associated with 
intra-organizational conflict. Corwin (1970) found a positive relationship between 
organization size and conflict in his study of schools, but suggested that this relationship 
was mediated by other organizational attributes. Beck and Betz (1975) and Gmelch and 
Carroll (1991) also found some evidence to support the proposition that larger 
organizations experience more conflict, with the former adding that this may be due to 
increasing heterogeneity in the organizational environment, and the latter adding that 
increasing size leads to increasing ambiguity in terms of organizational goals and 
mission. Those organizations with larger numbers of organizational participants face a 
more complex organizational environment both because the number and difficulty of 
issues they confront are increasing and because there is increasing diversity amongst 
organizational participants regarding their goals, values, and preferences.  
Relatedly, organizational literature unfailingly sets forth the proposition that, 
controlling for other factors likely to influence organizational functioning, conflict in 
organizations increases in tandem with increasing heterogeneity (Carroll and Harrison, 
1998; Haveman, 1995; Hearn and Anderson, 2002). Heterogeneity is tied to multiplicity: 
the more diversity there is in an organization the more opportunity there is for difference 
and dissonance. In practice, then, organizational size and heterogeneity are often related 
to the extent that an increase in one results in an increase in the other. Here they are both 
hypothesized to be associated with increased reports of conflict: it is expected that larger 
homeowners’ associations will report having experienced conflict more frequently than 
smaller homeowners’ associations and that more heterogeneous homeowners’ association 
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communities will report having experienced conflict more frequently than less 
heterogeneous homeowners’ association communities. 
Resource dependency theory argues that the key to organizational survival is to 
acquire and maintain resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). It follows then that 
economic and budgetary resources are a key feature of an organization’s environment; in 
homeowners’ associations budgetary resources derive from fees and special assessments 
which are used to maintain common areas of the property and to fund community 
reserves.22 Organizational performance is intricately tied to the availability and 
appropriate utilization of resources; conflict may emerge during the process of resource 
acquisition and maintenance. It is not clear, however, in what direction the association 
will run: fewer resources may lead to more or less conflict. Pondy (1967) identified 
scarce goods within an organization as one of three types of conflict-producing situations 
which provide the necessary environment for the development of conflict. Because there 
are scarce resources, board members are more likely to compete, bargain, and jockey for 
a power position in decision-making. Thus action becomes a structured activity and fewer 
resources will lead to more instances of conflict. Alternatively, when resources are scarce 
there may be less conflict because organizational priorities will be more apparent and 
institutional choices will be shaped, and likely narrowed, by the budgetary environment. 
With fewer choices to be made, there are fewer opportunities for disagreement. 
                                                        
22 A reserve fund is the money paid as part of the homeowners’ association dues and held in reserve by the 
homeowners’ association to pay for routine but sometimes expensive maintenance such as replacing roofs, 
resurfacing parking lots, or installing new sprinkler systems. If the association does not have enough money 
in the reserves then the maintenance either doesn’t get done or a special assessment is levied against all of 
the owners. It is recommended by the Community Associations Institute (CAI) that the reserve of any 
association is funded at 70% or more of the recommended level to avoid having “insufficient” funds. 
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Nonetheless, research has generally shown that conflict increases when resources are 
scarce; thus this research hypothesizes that those homeowners’ associations who report 
having insufficient reserve funds (i.e., fewer available resources) will report experiencing 
conflict more frequently than those homeowners’ associations who report having 
sufficient reserve funds (i.e., greater available resources). 
 Internal Factors 
 Many studies in the group decision-making and governing board literatures have 
demonstrated that characteristics of the group itself are significant predictors of 
intragroup conflict. The structure and composition of the board contribute to the 
functioning of the organization. Member diversity in the structure and composition of the 
board increases the number of different preferences and alternative viewpoints brought to 
the decision-making process, making reaching a consensus more difficult (Amason and 
Schweiger, 1994). Moreover, people with different backgrounds, levels of experience, 
and/or perspectives may have trouble socially integrating to approach a common problem 
(Horwitz and Horwitz, 2007). Consistent with this view, Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin 
(1999) found that group heterogeneity can predict emotional conflict on work teams. 
Ancona and Caldwell (1992) and Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale (1999) similarly link 
heterogeneous group characteristics with experiences of interpersonal conflict. Three 
indicators of the heterogeneity of board structure and composition in homeowners’ 
associations are size of board, length of term, and type of management. 
Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin (1999), in their study of work teams in the electronics 
industry, find group size to be positively correlated with both task and emotional conflict 
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in the work groups they observed. Because larger decision-making bodies must aggregate 
the preferences of a larger number of decision-makers, it is possible that larger governing 
boards may tend to experience greater intra-board conflict than smaller governing boards. 
Other studies, however, suggest that group size may reduce conflict. For example, Cox’s 
(2003) study of nurses organized into subunits within a hospital found that larger groups 
were less likely to report conflict. This finding was tempered by the fact that Cox could 
not identify why this was true. Board size is hypothesized here to be positively associated 
with organizational conflict; homeowners’ associations with larger board sizes are 
expected to report experiencing conflict more frequently than homeowners’ associations 
with smaller board sizes. 
Board term length is an important characteristic of the board. One survey of 
nonprofit governance procedures found that one third of the organizations surveyed 
reported having no set term limits for board chairs and/or members or not enforcing set 
term limits for board chairs and/or members (BoardSource, 2010). Without set or 
enforced term limits, board members may be more likely to serve on the board for a long 
period of time, resulting in a more uniform, practiced, and homogeneous board. Other 
research has shown that an abundance of long-serving board members decreases the 
likelihood of debate and increases the likelihood of groupthink (Martirossian, 2001). In 
homeowners’ associations, the legal documents of the association often dictate the term 
length of elected representatives. In practice, however, board members are often 
volunteers from the homeowners’ association community who serve indefinite terms. 
Thus, this research hypothesizes those homeowners’ associations who report having 
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many long-serving members will report experiencing conflict less frequently than those 
homeowners’ associations who report having few long-serving members. 
 Conflict has been closely associated with the general concept of structural 
differentiation, or the specialization and/or differentiation of organizational units (Beck 
and Betz, 1975; Corwin, 1970; Thomson, 1961). The degree of organizational 
complexity, or the hierarchical division of authority, is a dimension of structural 
differentiation and is linked to organizational conflict. Corwin (1970) noted that the 
centralization of authority increases organizational complexity and creates the conditions 
for conflict because it spurs both the creation of different positions, and the establishment 
of differential control over decisions. Homeowners’ associations are increasingly hiring 
contract managers and private management companies, increasing the number of 
administratively distinct but functionally interdependent sub-units, thereby increasing the 
complexity of the organizational governance structure and further specializing the role of 
the board. March and Simon (1958) see structural differentiation as increasing the 
amount of tension and the potential for intra-organizational conflict between 
organizational groups because of the need for the division of labor and joint decision-
making. The type of management (self-management or private-management) utilized by 
homeowners’ associations represents degree of structural differentiation: those 
associations who choose to self-manage are less structurally differentiated than those 
associations who choose to hire a private manager or management company. It is 
proposed then that those homeowners’ associations that employ a manager or a private 
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management company will report experiencing conflict more frequently than 
homeowners’ associations that do not employ a manager or management company. 
 Board decision-making practice variables, such as sharing of information, 
attentiveness to rules, and ideological homogeneity, represent internal and cultural factors 
of organizations that can influence experiences of intra-organizational conflict. It is these 
institutional decisions that often shape the identity, culture, and governance practices of 
the organization. Multiple studies have shown the importance of “good governance” 
practices for board and organizational effectiveness in the private, nonprofit, and public 
sectors (Herman and Renz, 2000; Conforth, 2001). Boards, and ultimately organizations, 
may experience less conflict because professionalization may serve to bring regularity, 
procedure, and routine to the decision-making process. These practices frame the 
manners of board governance and allow the board to deal more straightforwardly with 
dissension (Carol et al., 1986) and ultimately help to avoid future conflicts. 
 Research supports the notion that group information sharing practices are related 
to group performance (Devine, 1999). The amount and quality of information shared is 
directly and positively related to group effectiveness. It follows then that organizational 
information sharing practices are related to organizational performance and overall 
effectiveness. In private organizations, the board of directors is required to share 
information with its shareholders; in nonprofit and public organizations, the board of 
directors is required to share information with its constituents. While some information 
the board of any organization discusses must remain confidential, there is the general 
expectation that an organization will share budgetary and discretionary information with 
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organizational participants. When there is a lack of information sharing among board 
members or when boards fail to disclose information to appropriate parties intra-
organizational conflict is likely to occur.  Like corporate boards, which have a fiduciary 
responsibility to make disclosures to shareholders, a homeowners’ association board is 
supposed to disclose and share budgetary and decision-making information with its 
members. Thus, this research hypothesizes that those homeowners’ associations who 
regularly sharing information with organizational participants will also report 
experiencing conflict less frequently than homeowners’ associations who do not report 
regularly sharing information with organizational participants. 
Research also shows that attentiveness to rules, procedures, and standardization 
can have differential outcomes for organizations. Kahn (1964) found that organizational 
conflict was highest where there was low emphasis on rules and less close supervision. 
Gouldner (1959), however, found that when rules are too prohibitive, organizational 
members might withdraw their loyalty or rebel from the organization. In homeowners’ 
associations, legal documents (including bylaws; covenants, conditions, and restrictions; 
and rules and regulations) set forth rules for the structural organization of the governing 
board and good governance procedures.23 In practice, however, boards often fluctuate in 
                                                        
23 Bylaws are the guidelines for the operation of the non-profit corporation. The bylaws may define the 
duties of the various offices of the  board of directors, the terms of the directors, the membership’s voting 
rights, required meetings and notices of meetings, and the principal office of the association, as well as any 
other specific items that are necessary to run the association as a business. The Covenants, Conditions, and 
Restrictions (CC&R’s) are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for the operation of the 
planned community as a non-profit corporation. CC&R’s are included in the title to the property and failure 
of the homeowner to abide by the CC&R’s may result in a fine or other legal actions. Rules and 
Regulations are provided for in the CC&R’s and adopted by the board of directors. Rules are established to 
provide direction to homeowners for common courtesies with regard to parking, vehicles, pets, pool use 
and hours, etc. Associations may also choose to adopt regulations regarding procedures for making exterior 
changes to the home (including landscaping, exterior color choices, etc.). These rules and regulations are 
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how frequently and strongly they enforce and/or adhere to the Bylaws, CC&R’s, and 
Rules and Regulations of the association. This research supposes that homeowners’ 
associations who report less frequently adhering to the legal documents of the association 
(Bylaws, CC&R’s, and Rules and Regulations) will report experiencing conflict more 
frequently than homeowners’ associations who report more frequently adhering to the 
legal documents of the association (Bylaws, CC&R’s, and Rules and Regulations). 
 Another measure of board practices relates to individual ideology. Recently 
scholars have begun to emphasize the importance of shared organizational vision and 
goals in their analyses of organizational conflict. Research on board governance has since 
repeatedly shown that when individual goals for board action are incompatible, conflict is 
likely to arise (Grissom, 2010; Cornforth, 2001; Carol et al., 1986; Danzberger, 1994; 
Kochan, Huber, and Cummings, 1975). Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997), in their research 
on nonprofit organizations, found that organizational identity shapes the governance 
practices of organizations and can influence organizational performance. In their study on 
consulting work groups, Jehn and Mannix (2001) identified group value consensus as a 
predictor of conflict. Similarly, Merz’s (1986) analysis of school board members linked 
conflict on school boards to expectations about board members’ roles.  
The potential for conflicting, incongruous, and incompatible individual ideologies 
may be even greater in hybrid organizations, which institutional theory suggests may be 
due to “institutional pluralism” (Kraatz and Block, 2008), or the presence of multiple, and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
set up to maintain the aesthetic value and integrity of the community to protect the market value of the 
community. Violations or failure to comply with rules and regulations may result in a fine or other legal 
actions. 
  
65
potentially competing, institutional logics. Institutional logics are “the socially 
constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and 
rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize 
time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999: 
804). This newer cultural explanation for intra-organizational conflict is most closely 
associated with organizations like homeowners’ associations whose hybrid organizational 
form infers multi-sector interests. In homeowners’ associations, board members may 
have different criteria or multiple rationales for manners of governance which may result 
in incongruent organizational visions and unclear objective functions (e.g., is the 
organizational goal of a homeowners’ association to increase property values (a private 
interest), to provide services (a public interest), or to create a sense of community (a civil 
interest)?) The lack of a shared vision, or differing individual ideologies, about the 
purpose of an organization may therefore indicate the presence of multiple, and 
potentially competing, institutional logics; the presence of which has been likened to a 
“battlefield” wrought with conflict and struggles over power (Reay and Hingings, 2005). 
It is assumed then that those homeowners’ associations who report sharing a common 
vision about the purpose of the association (i.e., congruity of organizational vision or 
ideological homogeneity) will report experiencing conflict less frequently than those 
homeowners’ associations who do not report sharing a common vision about the purpose 
of the association (i.e., incongruity of organizational vision or ideological heterogeneity). 
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Data and Methods 
 Data 
 The primary data source for this chapter comes from an original survey of a 
sample of sitting Greater Boston-area homeowners’ association board members.24 The 
Homeowners’ Association Board Member Survey was mailed to board members of 
approximately 250 homeowners’ associations in the spring of 2011 and consisted of a 
series of closed-ended questions which were designed to provide a description of the 
structural characteristics of the organization and its experiences with conflict.25 The 
2011-2012 board membership directory of the New England Chapter of the Community 
Associations Institute (CAI-NE) provided the sampling frame for this study.26 27 
Consistent with the survey methodology used in previous board member surveys, 
homeowners’ association boards were randomly sampled and then a representative board 
member of each board was selected to complete the survey.28 Such a methodology has 
significant shortcomings, most notably its inability to capture the diversity of 
                                                        
24 The Greater Boston-area was selected because it represents the “typical” urban/suburban HOA setting: 
the state of Massachusetts, like most states, has virtually no homeowners’ association laws. Some states, 
like Florida, Utah, and Colorado, are more regulated by state law. 
25 All elements in the sample were mailed a hard-copy of the survey along with a cover letter and a return-
addressed and postage-paid envelope. In the cover letter, respondents were also given the option of 
completing the survey online. Of those that completed the survey approximately 64% completed the mailed 
version while the other 36% completed the web version. A copy of the survey instrument can be found in 
Appendix A. 
26 Homeowners’ associations are not required to register with any state agency, so a complete list of all 
homeowners’ associations in the Greater-Boston area (Essex, Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, and Suffolk 
counties) was not available. The researcher recognizes that this creates a bias in the sample.  
27 Approximately 700 homeowners’ associations listed on CAI-NE’s 2011-2012 membership roster were 
located in the Massachusetts counties chosen for inclusion in this study; 250 of them were randomly 
selected using probability sampling procedures for inclusion in this study. 
28 If only one currently-serving board member was registered with CAI-NE, he/she was selected to 
participate by default, where more than one currently-serving board member was registered with CAI-NE 
random sampling procedures were used to select which board member would be selected to participate and 
included in the sample. 
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characteristics, attitudes, and experiences on the board. This methodology, however, is 
useful for obtaining objective information about structural and cultural characteristics of 
organizations, such as that which was collected here. The survey ultimately received a 
71.6% response rate. 
 Measures 
 Dependent Variable 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to test whether external or internal factors 
associated with “structural” and “cultural” explanations of conflict better predict the 
presence of intra-organizational conflict in a hybrid organization. To measure conflict I 
used responses given to the following survey question: “Did your board and/or 
homeowners’ association experience at least one significant instance of conflict (e.g., 
incompatibility, disagreement, or dissonance) in the last 12 months?” 29 Responses were 
binary (coded as 0 = no and 1 = yes). Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable are 
shown in Table 2-1. The mean response is 0.46, indicating that roughly half of the 
associations reported having experienced at least one significant instance of conflict in 
the last 12 months. Although this particular measure does not capture the degree or 
intensity of conflict, I argue that it is a sufficient measure for an initial explanatory study 
and captures the general scope and presence of conflict in homeowners’ associations as it 
relates to organizational and board structures and culture.30 
                                                        
29 Significant was defined as an especially important, meaningful, memorable, or notable disagreement. 
30 Previous research has shown that most organizational and board decisions are made fairly routinely and 
by near-unanimity (Polinard et al., 1994); therefore the presence of conflict is what is important to capture 
and a single more directed survey question about conflict would unlikely show significant variability in 
type, degree, or intensity. Additional questions and measures were used to indicate possible variability in 
the type, degree, or intensity of conflict. 
  
68
 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables included in this analysis follow directly from the 
external and internal factors discussed in the last section of the chapter. Data on all of the 
independent variables derive from responses to the Homeowners’ Association Board 
Member Survey; descriptive statistics for all independent variables are shown in Table 2-
1.  
External measures of the complexity of the organizational environment stem from 
questions regarding the age, size, relative heterogeneity of the community, and 
availability of resources. Association age and size were measured with dummy variables 
(0 = young, 1 = middle-aged, and 2 = old) and (0 = small, 1 = medium, and 2 = large) 
respectively; young and small served as the reference categories.31 32 Community 
heterogeneity was measured as either “mostly similar/homogeneous” (coded 0) or 
“mostly dissimilar/heterogeneous” (coded 1). This measure relied on self-reported data 
from survey respondents who reported whether or not the social makeup (i.e., individual 
characteristics/demographics) of their community was mostly similar or dissimilar. Board 
member respondents were also asked whether or not their reserve fund contained 
sufficient available resources to pay for routine association maintenance, an 
“insufficient/few available resources” reply (coded 0) indicated that the association  
 
                                                        
31 Respondents were originally provided with a series of ranges within which to report age (in years) and 
size (in units) of the association; they were later recoded to provide sufficient category sizes. 
32 Categorical instead of continuous measures were used for both variables for reasons of category number 
and category size. 
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Table 2-1: Homeowners’ Association Board Member Survey Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables +/- n Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
 
       
 
Dependent variable       
Presence of conflict n/a 179 0.46 0.49 0 1 
 
       
 
Independent variables 
 
      
External factors       
Complexity of environment       
     Age of community - 179 1.11 0.68 0 2 
     Size of community + 179 0.91 0.84 0 2 
     Community heterogeneity + 179 0.58 0.49 0 1 
     Availability of resources - 179 0.53 0.50 0 1 
 
       
Internal factors       
Board composition       
     Size of board + 179 0.97 0.67 0 2 
     Length of term - 179 0.59 0.49 0 1 
     Type of management + 179 0.76 0.42 0 1 
 
       
Board practices       
     Information-sharing - 179 0.76 0.42 0 1 
     Attentiveness to rules - 179 0.52 0.50 0 1 
     Ideological homogeneity - 179 0.18 0.38 0 1 
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lacked sufficient budgetary resources while a “sufficient/many available resources” reply 
(coded 1) indicated the association possessed sufficient budgetary resources.  
Measures of all internal factors are also taken from survey responses and include 
measures of board structure and composition and board practices. The size of the board 
was measured with a dummy variable (0 = small, 1 = medium, and 2 = large).33 The 
reference category was small. Another measure of board composition was length of term 
of board members. Respondents were asked whether or not their board members 
frequently served short-terms or long-terms in office on the board. Short-term board 
length (coded 0), was defined as board terms of less than six years. Long-term board 
length (coded 1), was defined as board terms of six years or more. Type of management 
was measured as “self-managed/little structural differentiation” (coded 0) and “privately-
managed/great structural differentiation” (coded 1). 
Measures of board practices and organizational culture included questions 
regarding information-sharing, attentiveness to rules, and ideological homogeneity. 
Survey respondents were asked whether or not the board “regularly shared board meeting 
minutes and budgetary information” with homeowners; respondents answered “no/did 
not regularly share” (coded 0) or “yes/regularly shared” (coded 1). Board member 
respondents were also asked whether or not the association’s legal documents (Bylaws, 
CC&R’s, and Rules and Regulations) “regularly guided decision-making” with response 
choices of “no/infrequently” (coded 0) and “yes/frequently” (coded 1). Finally, 
respondents were also asked about the homogeneity or heterogeneity of board member 
                                                        
33 Respondents were originally provided with a series of ranges within which to report board size (total 
number of individuals serving on the board); it was later recoded to provide sufficient category sizes. 
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ideology. This question was intended to measure the possible presence of multiple 
institutional logics.34 Toward that end, survey respondents were asked whether or not 
board members “regularly expressed a common vision about the purpose of the 
homeowners’ association during the decision-making process;” respondents answered 
“no” (coded 0) or “yes” (coded 1). A response of “no” was taken to indicate incongruity 
of organizational vision and a response of “yes” was taken to indicate congruity of 
organizational vision. 
Statistical Analysis 
 Logistic regression, being one special class of regression models, and as 
compared to linear regression, is well suited to explain relationships between a 
categorical outcome variable and a mixture of continuous and categorical predictors or 
just categorical predictor variables.35 Logistic and linear regression are both based on 
many of the same assumptions and theory; however, since the outcome is dichotomous in 
logistic regression, predicting unit change has little or no meaning. As an alternative to 
modeling the value of the outcome, logistic regression focuses instead upon the relative 
                                                        
34 This variable is merely meant to indicate the possible presence of multiple institutional logics. I do not 
claim that this variable directly or fully measures institutional logics. 
35 Analyzing a dichotomous dependent variable using linear regression would be inappropriate for two 
important reasons: 1) it violates the assumption of linearity in normal regression and 2) linear regression 
makes predictions that do not make sense for dichotomous dependent variables. To overcome the limitation 
in handling categorical variables, a number of alternative statistical techniques have been proposed. These 
include: logistic regression, discriminant function analysis, log-linear models, and linear probability 
models. Compared to the other three alternative techniques, logistic regression is superior because it 1) can 
accept both continuous and discrete predictors; 2) is not constrained by normality or equal 
variance/covariance assumptions for the residuals; and 3) is related to the discriminant function analysis 
through the Bayes theorem (Flury, 1997: 558). Furthermore, in terms of classification and prediction, 
logistic regression has been shown to produce fairly accurate results (Fan and Wang, 1999; Lei and Koehly, 
2000; Peng et al, 2002). 
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probability (i.e., odds) of obtaining a given result category.36 This analysis used the 
logistic regression model and proceeded in three steps. The first step was to check the 
suitability of the data by examining descriptive statistics and doing preliminary tests on 
the potential explanatory variables. The second step was to fit logistic regression models 
predicting the occurrence of conflict in homeowners’ associations. Three models were 
produced: one which included just the external factors, one which included just the 
internal factors, and one which included both external and internal factors. The third step 
was to perform a series of tests to assess the fit of each of the models.37 
Results 
 Three models were produced to assess the explanatory power of the “structural” 
and “cultural” explanations of conflict on hybrid organizations and to test the relative 
predictive power of external and internal organizational attributes associated with 
organizational and board structure and culture. These models used external and internal 
factors associated with both types of explanations to determine which explanation was 
best able to predict intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations. Model (1) 
includes only external organizational attributes. Model (2) includes only internal 
organizational attributes. Model (3) includes all of the external and internal factors 
associated with both the “structural” and “cultural” explanations of conflict. Table 2-2 
displays all three models and summarizes the effects of all external and internal factors 
on the outcome variable. 
                                                        
36 The “logit” command in Stata, the statistical program used in this analysis, yields the logit coefficient, 
while the “logistic” command yields odds ratios. The odds ratios will be reported in the Discussion section; 
coefficients are reported in Table 2-2. 
37 Post-estimation logistic regression diagnostics, including tests of specification, goodness-of-fit, 
multicollinearity, were performed to assess the validity of all three models.  
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Table 2-2: Logistic Regression Predicting Intra-Organizational Conflict in Homeowners’ 
Associations 
 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses      * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
External Only Internal Only External & Internal 
 
       
External factors       
Complexity of environment       
     Age       
          Middle-aged 0.038 (0.09)   0.016 (0.03) 
          Old 0.366 (0.74)   1.074 (1.59) 
     Size       
          Medium 1.465 (3.16)**   0.991 (1.45) 
          Large 1.257 (2.47)**   1.530 (2.08)* 
     Community heterogeneity 0.310 (0.92)   -0.336 (0.70) 
     Availability of resources -0.141 (0.32)   0.203 (0.35) 
       
Internal factors       
Board composition       
     Size of board       
          Medium   0.570 (1.41) 0.106 (0.19) 
          Large   0.110 (0.23) -1.794 (2.23)* 
     Length of term   -0.296 (0.89) -0.396 (0.93) 
     Type of management   0.669 (1.77)* -0.329 (0.59) 
       
Board practices       
     Information-sharing   0.355 (0.93) 0.681 (1.24) 
     Attentiveness to rules   -0.201 (0.62) -0.729 (1.65)* 
     Ideological homogeneity   -1.026 (2.46)** -2.596 (2.38)** 
 
       
Constant -0.676 (1.59)* -0.312 (0.62)* -1.701 (1.99)** 
Observations 179 179 179 
Pseudo R-squared 0.079 0.064 0.185 
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External Factors and Presence of Conflict 
Model (1) includes only external factors; all of these factors are associated with 
“structural” explanations of conflict. Previous research in the area identified four 
important measures of the complexity of the organizational environment (organization 
age, organization size, community heterogeneity, and availability of resources). Of the 
four external measures hypothesized to predict intra-organizational conflict in private, 
nonprofit, and public organizations, only one was shown to significantly predict conflict 
in homeowners’ associations: organization size. 
When controlling for other external factors associated with structural explanations 
of conflict, homeowners’ associations of a medium and large size are expected to have 
four and three times the odds of experiencing a significant instance of conflict when 
compared to homeowners’ associations of a small size. Both findings are statistically 
significant (p < 0.01) suggesting that there is a positive relationship between organization 
size and the presence of conflict that is not due to chance alone. The fairly wide 
confidence interval, however, indicates some variability and leaves open the possibility 
that other variables may impact this relationship. This relationship is consistent with the 
literature and confirms the hypothesis that larger homeowners’ associations will report 
having experienced conflict more frequently than smaller homeowners’ associations 
 The three other external predictor variables included in this model and associated 
with structural explanations of conflict, age, community heterogeneity, and availability of 
resources, were not shown to have a statistically significant association with the 
dependent variable and, in some cases, did not vary as expected. Although the effects are 
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weak and not statistically significant, the data indicate that middle-aged and older 
homeowners’ associations will have greater odds of conflict than younger homeowners’ 
associations; more heterogeneous (i.e., dissimilar) homeowners’ associations will have 
greater odds of conflict that mostly homogeneous (i.e., similar) homeowners’ 
associations; and homeowners’ associations with insufficient reserve funds (i.e., fewer 
available resources) will have greater odds of conflict than those homeowners’ 
associations have sufficient reserve funds (i.e., greater available resources). The lack of 
explanatory power of these variables is largely inconsistent with the bulk of literature on 
organizational and board conflict which suggests that variables associated with greater 
complexity in the organizational structure and its external environment will consistently 
and strongly predict intra-organizational conflict in private, nonprofit, and public 
organizations. 
Internal Factors and Presence of Conflict 
Model (2) includes only internal factors including measures of board structure and 
composition and board practices; this model thus contains factors consistent with both 
“structural” and “cultural” explanations of conflict. Of the six internal variables (board 
size, length of board term, type of management, information-sharing practices, 
attentiveness to rules, and ideological homogeneity), drawn from the literature and 
hypothesized to predict conflict in private, nonprofit, public, and hybrid organizations, 
two were shown to significantly predict conflict in homeowners’ associations: type of 
management and ideological homogeneity. 
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When controlling for other internal factors associated with “structural” and 
“cultural” explanations of conflict, homeowners’ associations who report being more 
structurally differentiated (i.e., hiring a contract manager or management company) are 
expected to have nearly two times the odds of experiencing a significant instance of 
conflict when compared to homeowners’ associations who report being less structurally 
differentiated (i.e., self-managed). This finding is statistically significant (p < 0.05), 
initially suggesting that there is a positive relationship between type of management and 
the presence of conflict that is not due to chance alone. This relationship is ultimately 
rendered insignificant, however, because the 95% confidence interval contains the null 
value. Thus, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected because there is not enough support to 
make the claim that the odds of experiencing conflict are significantly different for more 
and less structurally differentiated organizations. 
There is a negative association between ideological homogeneity and the presence 
of conflict: when controlling for other internal factors associated with “structural” and 
“cultural” explanations of conflict, those homeowners’ associations who report sharing a 
common vision about the purpose of a homeowners’ association are less likely to 
experience a significant instance of conflict when compared to those homeowners’ who 
do not report sharing a common vision about the purpose of a homeowners’ association. 
The odds of conflict decrease as ideological homogeneity increases. This is a statistically 
significant relationship (p < 0.01) and the factor of change is 0.35. The strong statistical 
significance of this relationship suggests that there is a relationship between ideological 
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homogeneity and the presence of conflict that is not due to chance alone, and the narrow 
confidence interval indicates that there is little variability in this relationship.38 
The four other internal predictor variables associated with “structural” and 
“cultural” explanations of conflict and included in this model, board size, length of board 
term, information-sharing practices, and attentiveness to rules, are not shown to have a 
statistically significant association with the outcome variable and some did not vary as 
expected. Although the effects are weak and not statistically significant, the data indicate 
that homeowners’ associations with larger board sizes, shorter term lengths, more regular 
information-sharing practices, and more frequent following of rules have greater odds of 
experiencing conflict when compared to homeowners’ associations with smaller board 
sizes, longer term lengths, less regular information-sharing practices, and less frequent 
following of rules respectively. The lack of explanatory power of these variables is 
largely inconsistent with much recent literature on organizational and board conflict 
which suggests that variables associated with internal organizational structures like board 
structure and composition and organizational practices like institutional decisions will 
significantly predict intra-organizational conflict in private, nonprofit, public, and hybrid 
organizations. 
 External and Internal Factors and Presence of Conflict 
 Model (3) includes all of the external (measures of environmental complexity) 
and internal (measures of board structure and composition and board practices) factors 
                                                        
38 With such a relationship there is the potential for reverse causality (i.e., did ideological homogeneity 
cause conflict or did conflict cause ideological homogeneity). At this time, I can show that there is a 
correlative relationship between ideological homogeneity and the presence of  intra-organizational conflict. 
In the next two chapters I will more fully develop the relationship between these two variables through the 
collection and analysis of qualitative data. 
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associated with both the “structural” and “cultural” explanations of conflict. Of the ten 
variables included in this model (organization age, organization size, community 
heterogeneity, availability of resources, board size, length of board term, type of 
management, information-sharing practices, attentiveness to rules, and ideological 
homogeneity), two variables (one external and one internal) associated with structural 
explanations of conflict and two variables (both internal) associated with cultural 
explanations of conflict are shown to significantly predict conflict in homeowners’ 
associations. The statistically significant factors associated with structural explanations of 
conflict include organization size (external) and board size (internal). The statistically 
significant factors associated with cultural explanations of conflict include attentiveness 
to rules (internal) and ideological homogeneity (internal). The most statistically 
determinant is found to be an internal and cultural factor, ideological homogeneity. 
 When controlling for other external and internal factors associated with both 
structural and cultural explanations of conflict, homeowners’ associations of a large size 
are expected to have nearly five times the odds of experiencing a significant instance of 
conflict when compared to homeowners’ associations of a small size. This finding is 
statistically significant (p < 0.05) suggesting that there is a relationship between 
organization size and the presence of conflict that is not due to chance alone, however, 
the confidence interval is fairly wide indicating more variability and the possibility that 
other variables may impact this relationship. This finding is consistent with the literature 
which supports the notion that size is associated with intra-organizational conflict, but 
cautions that other variables may mediate the relationship. Organizational heterogeneity 
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was not shown to be significantly related to the presence of conflict and did not vary as 
expected; this is a significant departure from the literature which often sees 
organizational size and heterogeneity as related phenomenon. 
 There is a negative association between board size and the presence of conflict: 
when controlling for other external and internal factors associated with both structural 
and cultural explanations of conflict, those homeowners’ associations who report having 
a large-size board are less likely to experience a significant instance of conflict when 
compared to homeowners’ associations who report having a small-size board. The odds 
of conflict decrease as board size increases. This is a statistically significant relationship 
(p < 0.05) and the factor of change is 0.16. The level of statistical significance coupled 
with the relatively narrow confidence interval suggests that there is relationship between 
board size and the presence of conflict is not due to chance alone and that there is little 
variability in this relationship. 
 Internal and cultural factors, those factors that derive from institutional beliefs, 
choices, practices, and manners of governance, were also shown to be significantly 
related to the presence of conflict in homeowners’ associations. The two internal and 
cultural factors that were found to be statistically significant predictors of intra-
organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations were attentiveness to rules and 
ideological homogeneity. 
Attentiveness to rules, a measure of organizational control and a manner of 
governance, was found to have a negative association with intra-organizational conflict. 
When controlling for other external and internal factors associated with both structural 
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and cultural explanations of conflict, those homeowners’ associations who report 
frequently adhering to the legal documents (Bylaws, CC&R’s, and Rules and 
Regulations) of the association in their decision-making process are less likely to 
experience a significant instance of conflict when compared to homeowners’ associations 
who do not report frequently adhering to the legal documents (Bylaws, CC&R’s, and 
Rules and Regulations) of the association in their decision-making process. This is a 
statistically significant finding (p < 0.05) and the factor of change is 0.48. This finding is 
consistent with organizational literature which suggests that organizational control may 
be related to conflict and other governance variables. This relationship, however, is 
ultimately rendered statistically insignificant because the confidence interval includes the 
null value; therefore there is not enough support to make the claim that the odds of 
experiencing conflict are significantly different for homeowners’ associations who are 
less and more attentive to rules. 
The most statistically significant predictor of intra-organizational conflict in 
homeowners’ associations in this model is ideological homogeneity. There is a negative 
association: when controlling for other external and internal factors associated with both 
structural and cultural explanations of conflict, those homeowners’ associations who 
report sharing a common vision about the purpose of a homeowners’ association are less 
likely to experience a significant instance of conflict when compared to those 
homeowners’ associations who do not report sharing a common vision about the purpose 
of a homeowners’ association. The odds of conflict decrease as ideological homogeneity 
increases. This is a statistically significant relationship (p < 0.01) and the factor of change 
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is 0.36. The strong statistical significance of this relationship suggests that there is a 
relationship between ideological homogeneity and the presence of conflict that is not due 
to chance alone, and the narrow confidence interval indicates that there is little variability 
in this relationship. This result is consistent with the literature which suggests that group 
value consensus and congruity of organizational vision is a predictor of conflict.39 
 The other predictor variables included in this model (age, community 
heterogeneity, availability of resources, length of board term, type of management, and 
information-sharing practices) are not shown to have a statistically significant association 
with the outcome variable and some did not vary as expected. Although the effects are 
weak and not statistically significant, the data indicate that older, more homogeneous, 
more financially sufficient homeowners’ associations and homeowners’ associations with 
shorter term lengths, less structural differentiation, less regular information-sharing 
practices have greater odds of conflict than younger, more heterogeneous, less financially 
sufficient homeowners’ associations and homeowners’ associations with longer term 
lengths, more structural differentiation, and more regular information-sharing practices 
respectively. The lack of explanatory power of these variables is largely inconsistent with 
the bulk of literature on organizational and board conflict which suggests that variables 
associated with organizational structure and culture will strongly predict intra-
organizational conflict in private, nonprofit, and public, and hybrid organizations. 
 
                                                        
39 As mentioned in Footnote 38 with such a relationship there is the potential for reverse causality. At this 
time, I can show that there is a correlative relationship between ideological homogeneity and the presence 
of intra-organizational conflict. In the next two chapters I will more fully develop the relationship between 
these two variables through the collection and analysis of qualitative data. 
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Structural v. Cultural Explanations of Conflict 
The primary aim of this chapter was to assess the explanatory power of the 
“structural” and “cultural” explanations of conflict in hybrid organizations by testing the 
predictive power of external and internal organizational attributes associated with both 
explanations on the presence of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ 
associations. Understanding the sources of conflict and whether external (structural) or 
internal (structural or cultural) determinants of conflict can predict the presence of 
conflict in a hybrid organization is a step toward understanding a new type of 
organizational form and choosing organizational and institutional structures and practices 
that help reduce it or mitigate its negative effects on governance quality and 
organizational performance. This chapter identifies several important predictive 
characteristics of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations, but 
concludes that purely external or structural explanations of conflict are incomplete and 
insufficient for explaining the presence of intra-organizational conflict in a hybrid 
organization. The outcome of this research highlights the need for internal and cultural 
explanations of conflict and more research into how multiple, and potentially competing, 
institutional logics may impact the presence of significant intra-organizational conflict in 
hybrid organizations. 
 External Expectations and Explanations 
 Organization size is the only external and structural factor that is found to be 
significantly associated with the presence of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ 
associations in the External Only Model (Model 1) and the External and Internal Model 
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(Model 3). The other external and structural measures hypothesized to predict intra-
organizational conflict in private, nonprofit, and public organizations, including 
organization age, community heterogeneity, and availability of resources, are found to be 
statistically insignificant predictors in both models suggesting that these variables are 
either poor measures of intra-organizational conflict in hybrid organizations like 
homeowners’ associations or that other factors are implicated in the relationship between 
these variables and organizational and board conflict in hybrid organizations. 
 Organization size is found to be a statistically significant predictor in both the 
External Only (Model 1) and the External and Internal Model (Model 3) and varied as 
expected based on the literature. It makes logical sense that larger organizations would 
have greater odds of experiencing conflict due to increasing complexity and multiplicity 
in the organizational environment. The statistical significance of organization size 
decreased from Model (1) to Model (3) as more variables were added to the model. This 
is to be somewhat expected, but while the difference between small-size and medium-
size organizations is no longer statistically significant, the difference between small-size 
and large-size organizations remains statistically significant in the full model suggesting 
that to some extent organization size is a valid predictor of intra-organizational conflict. 
Community heterogeneity is not found to be a statistically significant predictor of 
intra-organizational conflict in Models (1) or (3), and, surprisingly, did not vary as 
suggested by the literature in Model (3). A bulk of literature suggests that organizational 
size and heterogeneity are related phenomenon (Beck and Betz, 1975) and further that 
increasing organizational size and organizational heterogeneity in tandem will lead to 
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increasing organizational conflict (Carroll and Harrison, 1998; Haveman, 1995; Hearn 
and Anderson, 2002). It seemed likely then that those homeowners’ associations who 
reported their communities were “mostly heterogeneous (dissimilar)” as opposed to 
“mostly homogenous (similar)” would more frequently report the presence of conflict. 
The data presented in Model (3), although weak and not statistically significant, indicates 
the opposite: that those communities who reported being more dissimilar/heterogeneous 
had decreased odds of experiencing a significant instance of conflict than those 
homeowners’ association communities who reported being more similar/homogeneous. 
This is a surprising suggestion mainly because it does not comply with theoretical 
expectation; its impact is tempered, however, by the acknowledgement that homeowners’ 
association communities, perhaps more so than other organizations, are more likely to 
draw together people with similar, rather than dissimilar, demographic characteristics 
(e.g., financial and social positions). Thus, the incorrect expectation for this variable may 
be due to poor and/or imprecise measurement; the question as it was asked may not have 
been able to tease out the more nuanced differences between community members which 
may make them more dissimilar and susceptible to conflict. In future studies, the Blau 
index of variability (Blau, 1977) may be a better suited measure to address the 
multidimensional nature of heterogeneity. 
Organization age and availability of resources are also found to be weak and 
statistically insignificant in both the External Only Model (Model 1) and the External and 
Internal Model (Model 3). The data indicates that organization age did vary as expected 
in both models (middle-aged and older homeowners’ associations have greater odds of 
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conflict when compared to younger homeowners’ associations); however, availability of 
resources did not. In the External Only Model (Model 1) homeowners’ associations’ with 
fewer available resources have greater odds of conflict, while in the External and Internal 
Model (Model 3) homeowners’ associations with greater available resources have greater 
odds of conflict. This finding suggests that the internal variables may interact with this 
variable, or that other factors are implicated in the relationship between this variable and 
organizational conflict. Collectively, the lack of explanatory power provided by 
organization age, community heterogeneity, and availability of resources, especially in 
the full model (Model 3), strongly suggests that purely structural or external explanations 
of conflict may not be sufficient for explaining intra-organizational conflict in all types of 
organizations, particularly hybrid organizations like homeowners’ associations. 
Internal Expectations and Explanations 
 Four internal factors in the Internal Only Model (Model 2) and External and 
Internal Model (Model 3) were found to be significantly associated with greater intra-
organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations, including type of management 
(structural factor), board size (structural factor), attentiveness to rules (cultural factor), 
and ideological homogeneity (cultural factor). The two remaining internal factors, length 
of term (structural factor) and information-sharing practices (cultural factor), were not 
found to be statistically significant predictors of the presence of conflict in homeowners’ 
associations in either model. The relative number of statistically significant internal and 
cultural predictors and their relative robustness indicates that understanding the role of a 
hybrid organization’s institutional beliefs, choices, practices, and manners of governance 
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is important to comprehending the presence of intra-organizational conflict in a hybrid 
organization. 
Type of management, an internal and structural factor, is found to be a 
statistically significant predictor of intra-organizational conflict in the Internal Only 
Model (Model 2). Based on the previous literature (March and Simon, 1958), I expected 
that more structurally differentiated organizations (i.e., those that employed a 
professional manager or management company) would be more likely to report 
experiencing conflict than those that reported less structural differentiation (i.e., self-
management). The data presented in Model (2) confirm this expectation; however, the 
relationship is ultimately rendered statistically insignificant because the confidence 
interval contains the null value. Interestingly, the opposite relationship is found to be true 
in the External and Internal Model (Model 3). Although the relationship is weak and type 
of management is not found to be a meaningful predictor, this model suggests that more 
structurally differentiated homeowners’ associations (i.e., professionally managed) have 
decreased odds of experiencing a significant instance of conflict when compared to less 
structurally differentiated homeowners’ associations (i.e., self-managed). The sign 
change from the partial model to the full model indicates that external factors may 
mediate the relationship between type of management and intra-organizational conflict. 
This study finds a negative association between board size, an internal and 
structural factor, and the presence of conflict in the External and Internal Model (Model 
3) when it expected a positive association. Previous research has demonstrated that larger 
governing bodies or groups may experience elevated levels of conflict because of the 
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necessity to aggregate the preferences of more decision-makers (Pelled, Eisenhardt, and 
Xin, 1999; Grissom, 2010). This study, however, finds that compared to homeowners’ 
association who reported having a small board size, those homeowners’ associations who 
reported having a large board size have decreased odds of experiencing a significant 
instance of conflict. This finding suggests that the presence of more decision-makers may 
actually be beneficial in a hybrid organization. Martirossian’s (2001) research on 
homeowners’ associations and Cox’s (2003) study of nurses similarly suggest that larger 
groups were less conflicted, and while Cox was unable to identify why this was true, 
Martirossian argues that larger board sizes may have less conflict because there is less 
pressure for conformity and more expectation for debate. 
Homeowners’ associations who report frequently adhering to the legal documents 
(Bylaws, CC&R’s, and Rules and Regulations) of the association in their decision-
making process are less likely to experience a significant instance of conflict when 
compared to homeowners’ associations who do not report frequently adhering to the legal 
documents of the association in their decision-making process. A similar direction of 
association is found in both models, but attentiveness to rules, an internal and cultural 
factor, is only found to be a significant predictor of intra-organizational conflict in the 
External and Internal Model (Model 3). This relationship, however, is ultimately rendered 
insignificant and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Still, the implication that 
organizational control, via the mechanism of attentiveness to rules, may be implicated in 
the presence of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations is consistent 
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with Kahn’s (1964) study of corporations which found that organizational conflict was 
highest where there was low emphasis on rules.  
Ideological homogeneity is found to be the most statistically significant predictor 
of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations in the Internal Only Model 
(Model 2) and the External and Internal Model (Model 3), suggesting that there is, at the 
very least, a correlative relationship between ideological homogeneity and the presence 
of intra-organizational conflict, and, perhaps, a causal relationship between the two 
variables.40 The statistical significance of ideological homogeneity maintains over both 
models, significantly reducing the concern that this result might be driven by some other 
factor.41 The measure of ideological homogeneity is used in this analysis to indicate the 
possible presence of multiple institutional logics. Institutional theory implies that 
organizational members, especially leaders and decision-makers, play an important role 
in shaping organizational responses to multiple and potentially competing institutional 
logics; however, the extent and implications of the role of organizational members’ 
interests in shaping responses to conflicting institutional demands remains poorly 
understood (Pache, 2011; Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, and Van De Ven, 2009; Kraatz & 
Block, 2008; Kraatz & Moore, 2002). This research, although preliminary and limited in 
scope, indicates that at least one of the implications of multiple institutional rationales 
                                                        
40 As I have indicated previously, at this time I can only claim a correlative relationship between 
ideological homogeneity and the presence of intra-organizational conflict. In the next two chapters I will 
more fully develop the relationship between these two variables through the collection and analysis of 
qualitative data. 
41 Indeed, in additional statistical models that evaluate organizational attributes associated with only 
“structural” explanations of conflict and “cultural” explanations of conflict, ideological homogeneity is 
consistently the most statistically significant predictor of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ 
associations. This outcome bolsters the suggestion that cultural explanations of conflict may be better 
suited for hybrid organizations like homeowners’ associations. 
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and demands is the presence of significant intra-organizational conflict. This finding 
echoes previous research in the area which finds that private, non-profit, and public 
boards and organizations that are made up of members with diverse ideological 
preferences are likely to face greater difficulties in working out their collective 
preferences (Grissom, 2010; Cornforth, 2001; Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997).  
The relative robustness of ideological homogeneity as a predictor of intra-
organizational conflict underlines the importance of understanding the internal and 
cultural dimensions of hybrid organizations. It may be especially important to understand 
the internal and cultural dimensions of hybrid organizations for several reasons. First, 
there is a greater potential for members of hybrid organizations to have competing and 
incongruous organizational visions, values, expectations, and rationales for action 
because of the institutionally complex nature of these organizations. To that point, the 
majority homeowners’ association board members surveyed (approximately 80%) report 
not sharing a common vision about the purpose of homeowners’ associations. Second, 
hybrid organizations, unlike other types of organizations, face the unique problem of 
defining organizational purpose. Organizational purpose is often ingenerate in non-hybrid 
organizations; for example, the purpose of a corporation is to earn money and the purpose 
of a non-profit organization is to serve the community; so while intra-organizational 
conflict may emerge from any number of structural or cultural conditions in these 
organizations it is less likely to emerge from problems regarding a shared vision about 
the purpose of the organization. Third, to some extent a “shared vision” is something that 
is under the control of organizational members; it is not like an external structural 
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condition that must be taken as a given – there is agency. Individual agency may be 
embedded in an institutional structure, however, there is likely to be interplay between 
the two. Insofar as this is true, the internal dimensions of a hybrid organization and its 
organizational culture may take on special importance as it is the place where board 
members, and other organizational members, construct and re-construct the notion of 
organizational purpose. 
Overall, internal and cultural factors are found to better predict the presence of 
intra-organizational conflict in a hybrid organization such as a homeowners’ association. 
This is especially reflective in the relative number of important internal and cultural 
predictors in the External and Internal Model (Model 3), which is the most statistically 
robust of the three models produced in this analysis. Further, ideological homogeneity 
emerged as the key predictor of intra-organizational conflict, a somewhat surprising 
finding given the number of studies which identify organizational and board structure, 
rather than culture, as the significant predictor of conflict in private organizations (Wall 
and Callister, 1995; Pfeffer, 1972), non-profit organizations (Cornforth, 2001; Brown, 
2005), and public organizations (Grissom, 2010; Kochan, Huber, and Cummings, 1975).  
Summary and Conclusion 
The findings presented in this chapter imply that some amount of conflict is 
endemic in organizations – all types of organizations. That is, some degree of conflict is 
bound to arise from the macro-structural characteristics of an organization itself, 
particularly from external and structural characteristics like size which must be taken as a 
given. Yet the results also show that several factors associated with greater conflict are 
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under the purview of the board and organizational members themselves and thus can be 
addressed, and potentially minimized, by the institutional choices of the organization. For 
example, the results strongly suggest that sharing a common vision may help the overall 
functioning and performance of the organization. This may be particularly true in hybrid 
organizations like homeowners’ associations who must manage multi-sector institutional 
demands. These unexpected findings coupled with the relative robustness of ideological 
homogeneity as a predictor of intra-organizational conflict is compelling evidence of not 
only the empirical existence of multiple institutional logics in hybrid organizations, but 
also of the problem of applying traditional structural explanations and measures of 
conflict to hybrid organizations. I conclude then, that structural explanations of conflict 
are incomplete and insufficient for explaining intra-organizational conflict in a hybrid 
organization. Because of its mixed organizational structure, predicting conflict in a 
hybrid organization may be more difficult, and may require a more qualitative 
examination of its culture (i.e., the interests, identities, values, and assumptions) and its 
members’ action-logics. 
In the next chapter I will build upon the findings of this chapter to more fully 
explore the relationship between ideological homogeneity and the presence of intra-
organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations. I will seek to qualitatively conclude 
whether there are multiple institutional logics present in homeowners’ associations and, if 
there are, to identify and define what institutional logics are present, explain where they 
derive from, and explore how and why they may cause intra-organizational conflict in 
homeowners’ associations. 
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CHAPTER THREE: IDENTIFYING, EXPLAINING, AND DEFINING THE 
LOGICS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP 
 
Introduction 
Institutional pluralism is “the situation faced by an organization that operates 
within multiple institutional spheres” (Kraatz and Block, 2008: 243). Institutional theory 
presumes that a hybrid organization, by nature of its organizational form, exists in an 
institutionally pluralistic environment and thus is “subject to multiple regulatory regimes, 
embedded within multiple normative orders, and/or constituted by more than one cultural 
logic” (Kraatz and Block, 2008: 243). These regimes, orders, or logics are “imposed 
upon” the organization by the broader institutional environment and are believed to 
generate “persistent and deep-rooted tensions” within the organization (Kraatz and Block, 
2008: 243). But while previous research has uncovered a vast swath of organizations 
existing in institutionally pluralistic environments, few of these studies have explicitly 
identified the sources of these regimes, orders, or logics, explained their existence, and 
defined the nature of their influence on the organizational actors whom reside within 
these organizations. How do these regimes, orders, or logics become present and/or 
accessible in an organization and how are they enacted in the everyday beliefs, decisions 
and activities of organizational actors? 
 This chapter confirms the hybrid organizational form of homeowners’ 
associations by identifying and explaining the existence of multiple institutional logics in 
homeowners’ associations. It builds upon the suggestion of the last chapter that multiple 
institutional logics are present in homeowners’ associations and draws upon qualitative 
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interviews with homeowners’ association board members in Massachusetts, observations 
of homeowners’ associations, and textual analysis of homeowners’ association 
documents to identify, explain, and define the existence of two institutional logics in the 
hybrid institutional environment of homeowners’ associations: an economic logic and a 
social logic. The economic logic of homeownership views homeownership as a financial 
investment and appeals to an individual’s pursuit of self-interest. The social logic of 
homeownership views homeownership as a civil investment and appeals to a collective’s 
pursuit of community. I argue that the American history and ideology of homeownership 
generates and institutionalizes these logics and that institutional complexity results from 
the problematic intersection of the American history and ideology of homeownership and 
homeowners’ associations’ hybrid organizational form. Homeowners’ associations’ and 
their organizational actors’ cultural embeddedness in the American history and ideology 
of homeownership generates conflicting visions about the purpose of homeownership, the 
nature of the identity of homeowner, and the purpose of a homeowners’ association. 
Institutional Pluralism in Hybrid Organizations 
 Institutional theory suggests that institutional environments provide meaning and 
stability to social behavior, shaping and constraining organizational actions. Institutional 
influences are imposed and exerted on organizations through rules and regulations, 
normative prescriptions, and social expectations (Scott, 2001). They are also 
communicated through institutional logics (Thornton, 2004; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; 
Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012). The operation of organizations in multiple 
social sectors creates “pluralistic” (Kraatz and Block, 2008) institutional environments 
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and the opportunity for organizations to interface with multiple institutional logics. The 
following sections explore the theoretical foundations of the institutional logics 
perspective and the organizational implications of institutional pluralism. 
 Institutional Logics 
As I explained in the introductory chapter of this manuscript, institutional logics 
shape the “rules of the game” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: 112) and provide 
organizational actors with cultural templates and organizing principles (Friedland and 
Alford, 1987, 1991).  They are the practices, beliefs, and rules which guide an 
institutional order and provide organizational actors with sets of expected goals and 
modes of action. Logics emerge from the seven major social institutions of society (the 
family, the community, religion, the state, the market, the professions, and the 
corporation) and represent a different cultural belief system or worldview which 
encompasses a way of thinking about one’s environment that links purpose and process, 
means and ends, and helps organizational actors to interpret and assign meanings to 
organizational behavior (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012).42 Institutional logics 
are available to individuals, groups, and organizations to further elaborate and use to their 
own advantage (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). As such, institutional logics are “embodied 
in practices and sustained and reproduced by cultural assumptions and political struggles” 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
Thornton and Ocasio (2008) advance a meta-theory of the institutional logics 
approach by identifying five elements of the approach that provide clarity into Friedland 
                                                        
42 For a full summary of the seven institutional orders proposed by Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 
(2012) see Table 1-1 in Chapter One: Introduction. 
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and Alford’s (1987, 1991) institutional logics construct. First, society should be 
understood as an “inter-institutional system” comprising the seven theoretically distinct 
social institutions identified above. Second, social action is culturally embedded in 
institutional logics. Third, institutional logics have both material and cultural 
components. Fourth, this perspective is relevant to multiple levels of analysis. And fifth, 
institutional logics are historically situated and contingent to a particular spatial and 
temporal setting. Hence, the main functions of institutional logics are to define what an 
institution means, focus the attention of key decision-makers, and to provide key 
decision-makers with a set of associated perceptions and practices. These qualities make 
institutional logics observable in the concrete social relations of actors who utilize, 
manipulate, and reinterpret them. 
Institutional Pluralism  
Institutional pluralism refers to situations whereby an organization “operates 
within multiple institutional spheres” or is marked by the presence of more than one 
dominating institutional logic (Kraatz and Block, 2008: 243-244). To date, much of 
institutional theory has been focused on explaining the role that dominant institutional 
logics play in promoting institutional conformity within fields and organizations (Tracey 
et al., 2011). This is because institutional theory frames organizations as “entities 
reproducing a single coherent institutional template in order to gain legitimacy and secure 
support from external institutional referents” (Pache and Santos, 2012: 975). 
Isomorphism in pursuit of institutional legitimacy is a core assumption of institutional 
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theory. In this context, institutional pluralism is inherently problematic because it 
complicates the institutional template by promulgating multiple “rules of the game”.  
Scholarship in this area has traditionally framed institutional pluralism as a 
problematic, but transitory, stage of organizational change. Institutional pluralism is 
believed to generate incompatible and contradictory prescriptions for organizational 
action (Greenwood et al., 2011), as well as conflict and contestation among groups that 
profess allegiances to different institutional logics as they jockey for control of an 
organization (Kraatz and Block, 2008; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007). It is for this 
reason that institutional pluralism came to indicate a transitional stage marking 
organizational change; consequently, contradictions among institutional orders have 
alternately been characterized as a “period effect”, a “jolt”, or a “shift” as organizations 
move from a dominant logic to another (Meyer, 1982; Dunn and Jones, 2010) and 
situations of institutional pluralism as full of “turmoil” (Hallet, 2010: 52), “threats” 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2009: 306), and “uneasiness” (Reay and Hinings, 2005: 364). 
Recently, however, it has been suggested that multiple institutional pressures on 
organizations may be a more lasting and sustained phenomenon and that institutional 
pluralism can exist in permanence. This is especially true for hybrid organizations, like 
homeowners’ associations, which operate in or combine different characteristics of more 
than one social sector of society and thus may be conceptualized as permanent or semi-
permanent carriers of multiple institutional logics. Homeowners’ associations exist at the 
intersection of the three main social sectors of society (private, public, and non-profit) 
and thus may draw institutional orders from each of these three sectors. McKenzie (2003, 
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1994) comments on their tendency to draw upon the incentives and characteristics of 
multiple social sectors: “Owners who serve as board members are influenced by market 
incentives when they contemplate using association funds in ways that advance their 
economic interests. They are at least quasi-state actors when they administer what would 
otherwise be municipal services and enforce rules. Further when board members see 
themselves as volunteers donating considerable time to their community to make it a 
better place to live, they are thinking like civil society actors” (2003: 219). Homeowners’ 
associations, while unique, are not an exceptional case. Trade unions, healthcare 
organizations, public schools, and non-profit organizations are among those organizations 
who are increasingly finding themselves in environments where multiple, and potentially 
conflicting, institutional logics are an everyday part of their organizational template.43 
Studies in this area often highlight the difficulty organizations face in meeting 
expectations, because “to comply with one set of demands requires them to defy a 
competing set” (Pache, 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This 
stream of research focuses on the nature of “embedded agency” (Thornton and Ocasio, 
2008) and “strategic choice” (Clemons and Cook, 1999; Dorado, 2005; Pache and Santos, 
2010; Greenwood et al., 2011; Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis, 2011; Pache, 2011) on the 
part of organizational actors who, in the context of institutional pluralism, have the ability 
                                                        
43 Indeed, prior empirical research has uncovered numerous instances of organizations existing in 
institutional environments which appear to impose pluralism. These include hospitals (D’Aunno, Succi, and 
Alexander, 2000; Denis, Lamothe, and Langley, 2001; neo-natal intensive care units (Heimer, 1999), rape 
crisis centers (Zilber, 2002), drug treatment centers (D’Aunno et al., 1991), non-profit and public 
organizations (Brunsson, 1989; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Stone and Brush, 1996), universities (Cohen 
and March, 1986; Albert and Whetten, 1985), public schools (Rowan, 1982), public broadcasters (Powell, 
1988), arts organizations (Mouritsen and Skaerbaek, 1995; Alexander, 1996), computer firms (Hung and 
Whittington, 1997), multi-national firms (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999), and small businesses (Pickle and 
Friedlander, 1967). 
  
98
to access multiple institutional logics and whom shape organizational responses to 
institutional pluralism. 
Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012) theoretically advance this stream of 
research in their recent synthesis of the institutional logics perspective. They offer a new 
theory which furthers their meta-theory of the institutional logics perspective and appeals 
to deeper understandings of the micro-foundations of the institutional logics perspective 
and the relationship between micro- and meso-levels of analysis (individuals and 
organizations), in addition to other cross-level relationships between the micro and macro 
(individuals and society), meso and macro (organizations and fields), meso and macro 
(fields and society) levels of analysis. Their elaboration of micro-mechanisms is meant to 
account for the ways in which institutional logics both enable and constrain an actor’s 
agency, thereby undoing the supposed “paradox of embedded agency” (Holm, 1995: 398 
in Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012: 82).44 Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s 
(2012: 80) central micro-mechanism to undo this paradox is “bounded intentionality”. 
Bounded intentionality refers to the ways in which an individual is culturally embedded 
in a social group with which they identify, that affords them not only an identity to which 
they are emotionally committed, but also a cognitive schema that focuses their attention 
on particular features of organizations and their environments, conditions their interests 
                                                        
44 Within institutional theory there is a long-standing structure/agency debate that is often referred to as the 
“paradox of embedded agency” (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Sewell, 1992; 
Holm, 1995; Seo and Creed, 2002). The paradox refers to the following theoretical puzzle: if actors are 
embedded in an institutional field and subject to regulative, normative, and cognitive processes that 
structure their cognitions, define their interests, and produce their identities (Friedland and Alford, 1991; 
Clemens and Cook, 1999), how are they enable to envision new practices and then subsequently get others 
to adopt them? In short, how can actors shape institutions if their actions, intentions, and rationality are all 
conditioned by the very institution they wish to change? 
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and goals, and provides them a distinctive repertoire of practices presumed to attain them 
(Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012: 79-81, 86-91). The three main features of 
bounded intentionality – social identity, goals, and cognitive limitations – are situated in 
time and place. The context (what Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012: 80 call 
“situationism”) structures and shapes individual behavior, but allows for variations and 
inconsistencies in behavior; this feature markedly differentiates this approach from the 
rational choice and structural determinism perspectives. Thus, their integrative model of 
the micro-foundations of institutional logics emphasizes not only how individual agency 
is culturally embedded in institutional logics, but also how individual agency is involved 
in the reproduction and transformation of organizations, thereby connecting the micro- 
and meso-levels of analysis to show that there are both enabling and constraining effects 
of institutional logics on social action. 
 A core feature of Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s (2012) model is that it 
recognizes that not all social actors are equally embedded in or committed to prevailing 
institutional logics.45 They state: “Institutional logics provide a network of accessible 
structures to guide the individual’s focus of attention. The activation of each aspect of 
institutional logics is contingent on the applicability of accessible knowledge structures to 
salient aspects of the situation and the environment. If no aspects of highly accessible 
institutional logics are viewed as applicable or relevant, individuals may rely on other 
available institutional logics to activate knowledge and information for further 
                                                        
45 Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012: 98-102) identify seven important features their integrative 
model of the micro-foundations of the institutional logics approach accounts for: 1) institutional 
reproduction, 2) individual differences in embeddedness, 3) differentiation and complexity in institutional 
logics, 4) exogenous and endogenous change, 5) top-down and bottom-up attention, 6) the role of language 
linking micro-cognition to culture and institutional logics, and 7) micro-interactions and macrostructures. 
  
100
information processing” (84). Drawing from previous research like Greenwood and 
Suddaby’s (2006) account of changing logics in Canadian accounting firms due to actor’s 
network position and Meyer and Hammerschmid’s (2006) analysis of changing logics in 
Austrian public administration because of professional identity and commitment, they 
show that social actors can vary in their cultural embeddedness in and commitment to 
pre-existing logics. The central insight is that social actors play a significant role in 
determining whether or not more than one logic is accessible to an organization, how 
meaningful one or multiple logics may be, and how, or in what ways, the logic or logics 
impacts actual behavior. How available, accessible, and actionable institutional logics are 
is variable and is contingent upon both institutional and organizational culture and an 
organizational actor’s agency. 
 A second core feature of their model is that it accounts for both top-down and 
bottom-up attention. The former is consistent with prior theory and research (Thornton 
and Ocasio, 1999, 2008) which views institutional logics at multiple levels of analysis 
(organizational, field, and society) and as a mechanism for focusing attention. Cho and 
Hambrick (2006), for example, in their examination of deregulation in the airline industry 
reported a shift from a government logic to a market logic that emanated from top 
management teams enforcing an entrepreneurial attention perspective. The shift in 
attention from operational management to entrepreneurial management was top-down; it 
depended upon the composition and communication of managerial attention. Bottom-up 
attention originates with organizational actors and is dependent upon the salience of 
environmental stimuli, or the relative importance of one stimulus in comparison to others. 
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Binder (2007: 568) states: “Logics are not purely top-down: real people, in real contexts, 
with consequential past experiences of their own, play with them, question them, 
combine them with institutional logics from other domains, take what they can from 
them, and make them fit their needs.” When activation of an institutional logic is not 
automatic, alternative institutional logics may serve as “toolkits” for individual action 
(Swidler, 1986), and can be drawn from other situational contexts, allowing for both 
automatic taken-for-granted behavior and agency.46 Both top-down and bottom-up 
attentional processes ultimately shape the focus of attention through availability, 
accessibility, and activation of identities, goals, and schemas (Thornton, Ocasio, and 
Lounsbury, 2012: 91-92). 
 The recognition on the part of institutional and institutional theorists that more 
individual-level understandings of institutions are important and necessary reflects the 
general critique of institutional theory that the individuals who populate it are portrayed 
as either cultural “dopes” (Garfinkel, 1967) or heroic “change agents” (Strang and Sine, 
2002). There is an absence of research which identifies and explains the existence of 
institutional logics, how they become present and/or accessible in an organization, and 
how “regular” organizational actors experience and manage institutions on the ground, 
particularly in pluralistic environments. And although there is a growing interest in multi-
institutional settings and “institutional complexity” (Pache and Santos, 2010; Greenwood 
et al., 2011), much of the research in the area focuses on organizational responses to 
                                                        
46 Swidler’s (1986) culture as “toolkit” perspective views culture as something to be used and drawn upon. 
People do not just passively live within a culture, but actively use elements of that culture to inform their 
behavior and decision-making. Culture is simultaneously constraining and enabling people’s behavior, 
choices, proclivities, etc. (Alexander, 2003; Hays, 2000). 
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conflicting institutional orders at the field level rather than on identifying, explaining, and 
defining the relevance and salience of institutional logics to organizational actors.47 
Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s (2012) concept of bounded intentionality and 
Swidler’s “cultural toolkit” approach could help to explain how organizational actors 
interface with multiple institutional logics by identifying what logics are available, 
defining the nature of their demands, and explaining how logics become accessible and 
inaccessible, and when and why certain logics are activated or inactivated  as these local 
actors go about their everyday activities creating and re-creating organizational life. 
 Collectively then, scholarship suggests that institutional logics stem from critical 
social sectors of society and impose a set of normative cultural expectations and practices 
upon organizations and organizational participants which are cultural embedded in these 
social sectors. The imposition of such cultural expectations and practices, communicated 
via institutional logics, are deemed problematic in hybrid organizations because of the 
pluralistic nature of their organizational form. This pluralism, however, creates the space 
for both top-down and bottom-up attention and the opportunity for organizational 
participants to exercise agency. 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will 1) identify the institutional 
location of homeowners’ associations in the context of the American history and ideology 
of homeownership; 2) review my data collection and analysis procedures; 3) use my 
                                                        
47 The constructs of institutional pluralism and institutional complexity are often used interchangeably in 
the institutional literature; they are seen as synonymous terms. I do not see them as synonymous. I 
differentiate the two constructs based on their influence in the organizational environment. For me, 
institutional pluralism refers to situations where multiple logics are present, but are not simultaneously 
accessible or do not exist in direct contradiction with one another and institutional complexity refers to 
situations where multiple logics are present, accessible, and contradictory. This view is in keeping with 
recent scholarship from Pache and Santos (2010) and Besharov and Smith (2013). 
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qualitative interviews with homeowners’ association board members in Massachusetts, 
observations of homeowners’ associations, and textual analysis of homeowners’ 
association documents to identify, define, and explain the institutional logics available 
and/or present in homeowners’ associations; and 4) advance my argument for how and 
why the American history and ideology of homeownership generates and institutionalizes 
two logics of homeownership which create institutional complexity in the organizational 
environment of homeowners’ associations. The two logics of homeownership generate 
conflicting visions about the purpose of homeownership, the nature of the identity of 
homeowner, and the purpose of a homeowners’ association. Ultimately I will show that 
the American history and ideology of homeownership produces a cultural rhetoric of 
homeownership that is mismatched to the organizational structure and composition of 
homeowners’ associations. This mismatch creates the potential for intra-organizational 
conflict between organizational actors at the individual and organizational levels as 
everyday organizational actors exercise bounded intentionality and respond to the 
demands of multiple logics of homeownership. 
Institutional Context: The American History and Ideology of Homeownership 
 Central to Thornton and Ocasio’s (2008) and Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s 
(2012) theories on the institutional logics perspective is the idea of cultural 
embeddedness – or the idea that all social action is culturally embedded in institutional 
logics and that institutional logics stem from normative material and cultural components 
historically situated in institutions. To the extent that this is true, homeowners’ 
associations are situated against the backdrop of the American ideology of 
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homeownership and the organizational actors that populate homeowners’ associations 
(board members and non-board members) are culturally embedded within it. The 
ideology frames organizational actors’ understandings of homeownership and provides 
them with symbolic structures to understand and construct their environments. It imbues 
homeowners’ associations with meaning and purpose and imposes upon these 
organizations a cultural template. Thus, it is important to understand homeowners’ 
associations’ placement within the American institution of homeownership. 
 The Origins of an Ideology 
For decades United States housing policy has focused on promoting 
homeownership because of the belief that homeownership is a “public good.”48 49 
Owning a home, it was, and is, communicated, is good for homeowners because it helps 
them accumulate personal wealth. It is good for the economy because it encourages 
people to work hard and save. And it is good for society because it encourages people to 
invest more in their communities, develop personal relationships, and engage more in 
civic activities. Homeownership should be every individual’s or family’s goal because it 
benefits everyone. The strength of this belief – that owning your own roof, walls, and 
                                                        
48 A public good is a good that is non-excludable and non-rivalrous. Homeownership is non-excludable 
because it is not possible to exclude other individuals from the benefits that homeownership provides. For 
example, the stability that widespread homeownership provides to a community cannot be limited to only 
homeowners; the stability would benefit renters in the community as well. Homeownership is non-rivalrous 
because changing the level for one in a neighborhood will change it for all. For example if one 
homeowner’s home is foreclosed upon it affects all house prices in the neighborhood. The government 
encourages homeownership, and reinforces the notion of homeownership as a public good, by allowing 
homeowners to deduct mortgage-interest payments from taxable income and promoting public policy 
programs designed to increase rates of homeownership. These programs are based on the belief that 
homeownership provides external benefits to society. 
49 A large variety of government programs have served over time to promote homeownership. Most of 
these policies work by reducing the cost of homeownership or by increasing the flow of capital to the 
housing market. 
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space matters in significant ways – is a strongly held American value and is a well-
defined part of the American Dream. 
The American ideology of homeownership dates back to Thomas Jefferson’s 
exaltation of the Yeoman Farmer. The Yeoman Farmer owned the land he labored on; 
Jefferson believed that this conferred upon him a special dignity and autonomy that was 
to be emulated.50  Not only would small-scale ownership of property—particularly 
homes, small businesses, and financial savings—improve economic autonomy, but it 
would also serve as a check on monopoly capital. Thus, it was very early on in America’s 
history that property ownership came to be imbued with economic value. 
The idea that owning property conferred some economic value endured during the 
19th century, yet it wasn’t until the early 20th century that the belief in the social value of 
homeownership first found expression. By then, the new accessibility to land outside of a 
crowded city brought about by the development of the streetcar as a mode of 
transportation had firmly established the single-family home as the ideal dwelling, and 
the government fearful of socialist and communist sentiment had come to support 
homeownership as a national value. After all, as one organization of realtors stated, 
“socialism and communism do not take root in the ranks of those who have their feet 
firmly embedded in the soil of America through homeownership” (Kelly, 1993: 49). The 
overture of government support for the social value of homeownership came in the form 
of a promotional “Own Your Own Home” campaign and a “Better Homes in America” 
                                                        
50 Jefferson believed that if individuals owned property they would be less likely to be obligated to support 
the politics of their employers or landlords. 
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campaign, both sponsored in part by the United States government.51 Together these were 
the first federal programs explicitly aimed at encouraging and promoting the social value 
of homeownership. 
The collapse of the economy and the wave of house foreclosures during the Great 
Depression hindered the success of these campaigns; however, the federal government 
continued to support homeownership. Herbert Hoover, inaugurated only months prior to 
the start of the Great Depression and a strong advocate of homeownership, created the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Act near the end of his presidency to increase the supply of 
money available to local institutions that made home loans.52 Franklin Roosevelt later 
supported this act by creating the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and establishing the 
30-year fixed rate mortgage as a part of his New Deal legislation.53 The creation of the 
30-year fixed rate mortgage put homeownership within the reach of many more 
American families who were still regaining their footing after the Great Depression. 
Following the lead of Hoover and Roosevelt, nearly every new president and 
administration since has championed the economic and social value of homeownership. 
George H.W. Bush’s Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Jack Kemp, 
                                                        
51 The “Own Your Own Home” campaign, originally launched by the National Association of Real Estate 
Boards and now known at the National Association of Realtors, was taken over by the U.S. Department of 
Labor in 1917. The campaign was largely promotional and included handing out “We Own Our Own 
Home” buttons to schoolchildren, sponsored lectures at universities, and distribution of posters and banners 
extolling the virtues of homeownership and pamphlets on how to get a home loan (Cannato, 2010: 71). The 
“Better Homes in America” movement, chaired by Vice President Calvin Coolidge, began in 1922 and was 
designed to celebrate homeownership, home maintenance, and home improvement. It is largely credited 
with expanding the market for household consumer products in the years immediately following World 
War I when there was a critical shortage of homes. 
52 Herbert Hoover was such a great promoter of homeownership as a social value that he once wrote that 
homeownership could “change the very physical, mental, and moral fiber of one’s own children.” 
53 Prior to the creation of the 30-year fixed rate mortgage, home mortgages were primarily balloon rate 
mortgages. 
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went so far as to say that homeownership as a public policy could “save babies, save 
children, save families, and save America” (Kiviat, 2010). Similarly, President Bill 
Clinton stated homeownership was an essential part of the American Dream and that he 
wanted to make the dream of homeownership a reality for all Americans. Toward that 
end, in 1995 he introduced the National Homeownership Strategy to boost the 
homeownership rate among low-income and minority Americans. Clinton expressed the 
importance and value of homeownership to the nation: “When we boost the number of 
homeowners in our country, we strengthen the economy, create jobs, and build up the 
middle class, and build better citizens” (United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, May 1995). President George W. Bush, who during his presidency hosted 
several conferences on homeownership, said that homeownership has the power to 
transform people. He referenced the importance of homeownership as an American value 
during the announcement of his homeownership initiative called The American Dream 
Down Payment Fund: “Owning something is a freedom, as far as I’m concerned. It’s part 
of a free society. And ownership of a home brings stability to neighborhoods. You own 
your home in a neighborhood, you have more interest in how your neighborhood feels, 
looks, whether it’s safe or not. It brings pride to people; it’s an asset to society. It helps 
people build up their own individual portfolio, provides an opportunity, if need be, for a 
mom or dad to leave something to their child. It’s … an important part of America” 
(United States Presidential Speech, 2002).  President Barack Obama, speaking several 
years after the financial crisis, reiterates these points: “But if we take the steps I put 
forward today, then I know we will restore not just our home values, but our common 
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values. We’ll make owning a home a symbol of responsibility and a source of security for 
generations to come, just like it was for my grandparents, and just like I want it to be for 
our grandchildren” (United States Presidential Speech, 2013).  Over the past 80 years, the 
United States government has devoted significant public resources to encouraging and 
promoting homeownership. Homeownership is the omnipresent public policy goal of 
every administration: whether they were looking to promote an economic or social 
political agenda, homeownership was the answer. No other issue has been met with more 
bi-partisan support than housing and no other social institution has been more popularly 
credited with providing so many benefits to individuals and to society than 
homeownership. 
The Benefits of Homeownership 
Prior to the 2009 sub-prime mortgage crisis and with few exceptions, 
homeownership has been popularly credited, in politics, public policy, and popular 
culture, as a social policy with only benefit for the individual and the public. It is viewed 
as a public good largely because it is believed to confer many types of benefits upon both 
the individual and society. These benefits can be divided into two broad categories: 
economic and social.54 Economic benefits refer to primarily financial benefits that might 
accrue to the individual homeowner, the larger community, or society. The reported 
economic benefits of widespread homeownership include wealth accumulation, financial 
and housing security, and a strengthened national economy. Social benefits refer to a 
variety of benefits that accrue mainly to those other than homeowners themselves. The 
                                                        
54 A great deal of literature assesses the relative “value” of homeownership by assessing its economic and 
social benefits (see: McCarthy, Van Zandt, and Rohe, 2001 and Rohe, Van Zandt, and McCarthy, 2001). 
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reported social benefits of homeownership include increased rates of neighborhood 
stability, social and civic involvement, and improved educational achievement. 
Economic Benefits 
Both U.S. policymakers and the public believe that homeownership provides 
significant economic benefits for the individual, the family and the country. The 2013 
National Housing Pulse Survey, sponsored by the National Association of Realtors 
(NAR), reports that Americans overwhelmingly believe owning a home is a good 
financial decision, and a majority of renters say homeownership is one of their highest 
priorities in the future.55 Wealth accumulation, borrowing power, stability, and freedom 
are the four most cited economic benefits of homeownership. 
The main economic argument cited by proponents of homeownership is that 
homeownership is the most important way in which families accumulate wealth and 
achieve financial security. Families accumulate wealth and achieve financial security in 
four basic ways. First, in preparation to buy a house, individuals and families go on a 
“voluntary” savings plan in order to acquire the minimum amount of wealth necessary to 
buy a house. Potential homeowners, advocates of homeownership reason, are more likely 
to be economically responsible by establishing good credit and saving for the explicit 
goal of putting down a substantial down payment for a home.56 57 Second, after the 
                                                        
55 The national telephone survey took place from May 28 – June 5, 2013 and consisted of 2,000 
respondents. Eighty percent of respondents reported believing that buying a home is a good financial 
decision. Seventy-nine percent of those who reported being currently renters reported that homeownership 
was a future priority, with 51 percent of those reporting that it was one of their highest priorities. 
56 There is some historical merit to this argument. A 1996 study by Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter 
found young householder’s decisions prior to buying their first home (e.g., deciding to live with one’s 
parents longer or delay fertility) led to savings which contributed to the minimum amount of wealth 
necessary to purchase their first house. This study, along with two others by Sheiner (1995) and Engelhardt 
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purchase of a home, homeowners go on a “forced” savings plan. Homeowners 
accumulate wealth because with each required payment on the principal on their 
mortgage they are increasing their equity and, ultimately, their net worth.58 The idea is 
that the mortgage payment mechanism effectively forces households to save more than 
they otherwise would have they not purchased a home. Wealth is accumulated to the 
extent that the constant-dollar value of the owner’s equity exceeds any decline in the 
home’s value. Third, homeowners enjoy tax advantages from owning their home, in 
effect reducing their housing costs and aiding their accumulation of wealth. These 
include tax deductions for mortgage interest and property taxes, as well as tax-exempt 
capital gains from the resale of the home. These tax benefits can be substantial.59 Lastly, 
proponents of homeownership also argue that homeownership is a “safe” investment that 
virtually guarantees the financial security of a household. This is because homeownership 
is a leveraged investment (even though only a small part of the purchase price is paid as a 
down payment, the buyer controls all appreciation—and absorbs any loss—in the value 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(1996), find a positive relationship between renter’s and householder’s wealth accumulation and home 
prices. In general, young households with or who aspire to greater home prices tend to save more. 
57 Critics of this argument point to rampant risky mortgage lending practices which advertise “no money 
down” mortgages. Prior to the financial crisis the average prospective homebuyer could easily obtain 100 
percent financing from nearly any bank or lender; the 80/20 combo loan, which is comprised of two 
mortgages, one for 80 percent of the selling price and a second for the remaining 20 percent of the selling 
price, were very common in the early 2000s. This type of loan is risky because it assumes endless 
appreciation of the home. Today, post-financial crisis, the average homeowner is generally expected to put 
down 20% of the total selling price of a home. 
58 Critics of the “homeownership as savings accrual” argument will point out that a true savings account 
earns interest and is accessible at any time. The savings accrued in the payment of a home can only be 
accessed by selling, refinancing, or taking out a loan or line of credit on the house, some of which may 
actually extend the length of the mortgage or cause the homeowners to pay more interest to the lender over 
time. 
59 The tax benefits for homeownership are more advantageous for high income households and less 
advantageous for low and moderate income households (McCarthy, Van Zandt, and Rohe, 2001). Capone 
(1995: 341) shows that since standard deductions were raised in 1986 with the introduction of the Tax 
Reform Act, “the homeowner tax subsidy from interest, discount, points, and property taxes is worth less 
than $50 the first year of ownership and zero after that” for low and moderate income households. 
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of the property). Over the long term, despite the potential for loss, proponents of 
homeownership argue that homeownership as an investment is less risky than other types 
of investments and “nonetheless, a critical factor in moving up the economic ladder” 
(United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, August 1995). Despite 
the fact that the effectiveness of each of these arguments has recently been called into 
question, proponents of homeownership still argue that owning a home is the single best 
investment a family can make and is one of the best ways to save and earn wealth.60  
 A second presumed economic benefit of homeownership is greater borrowing 
power. For homeowners who choose to sell their investment the benefit is accumulated 
equity and increased wealth; for those homeowners who choose to stay in residence the 
benefit is accumulated equity and increased borrowing power. The additional equity can 
be used to secure an additional loan or obtain another line of credit. The homeowner, 
advocates of homeownership argue, can use this greater borrowing power to fund home 
improvements or to assist with the purchase of an investment property.61 Studies by the 
Federal Reserve Board from the late 1990s indicate that about 40 percent of homeowners 
do use their increased borrowing power for home improvements, which potentially could 
                                                        
60 Li and Yang (2010), in their analysis of the benefits and costs associated with owning one’s residence, 
argue that in most circumstances owning one’s own home does not aid in wealth accumulation or pay off as 
a long run investment. One reason for the former is because for every dollar of household price 
appreciation homeowners take out “3, 4, or even 10 cents of their home equity for other consumption 
purposes” effectively “treating their house as an ATM”, never actually saving or accumulating money. One 
reason for the latter is that housing is just as susceptible to market conditions as are other investments like 
stocks. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) echo this sentiment. Their study reports that in most cases consumers 
purchase more housing than is optimal with regard to their investment, thus deflating the potential to a 
achieve a maximum return on their investment. Perhaps this is what led one recent Wall Street Journal 
article to declare that homeownership is a “lousy” investment (Bridges, 2011). 
61 Proponents of homeownership often emphasize its potential for additional use in the housing market; 
however, this additional borrowing power can also be used to fund emergencies, purchase big-ticket items, 
spend on vacations, or generally consume. 
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raise the value of a house and thus contribute to wealth accumulation; however updated 
statistics on the extent of such activity are not available and critics would point out that 
the majority of those homeowners who engage in refinancing strategies are not borrowing 
for the purpose of home improvement. Second homes and investment properties are 
similarly heralded by homeownership proponents as vehicles to accumulate wealth. The 
government supports this assertion by extending the same tax benefits it affords to 
primary residences to second homes as long as homeowners stay in the home at least 14 
days a year or rent the property for at least 10 percent of the time. Li and Yang (2010) 
note, however, that during tough financial times the foreclosure rates of investment 
properties rise at a much faster rate than that of loans for primary residences and are just 
as subject, if not more, to the whims of the market when compared to other medium-term 
investment strategies. 
 In addition to the increased financial security homeowners enjoy through wealth 
accumulation, homeownership also provides increased housing security and economic 
stability. McCarthy, Van Zandt, and Rohe (2001) report that homeownership increases 
housing security to families in three ways. First, homeowners are better able to customize 
their residences to suit their personal needs and tastes. Second, homeowners have access 
to higher-quality dwellings than do renters. For example, homeowners usually have 
larger and more private residences.  Third, homeowners enjoy diminishing housing costs 
over time. Further, because of their fixed-rate mortgages and forced savings plans, 
homeowners are better able to make long-term financial plans because they basically 
know what their month-to-month and year-to-year financial responsibilities are for a 
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period of 30 years. Renters, on the other hand, may be subject to unanticipated rent 
increases and over the long-term are more likely to pay more on housing costs because 
while homeowners mortgage payments remain constant as income increases rents usually 
rises at rates close to or above the general rate of price inflation.62 
 A final economic benefit lauded by homeownership enthusiasts is freedom. In 
particular, homeownership provides individuals freedom from paying rent, freedom from 
being confined by the restrictions of a landlord and/or other neighbors, and indefinite 
control of their living space. The decision-making autonomy that comes from owning 
their home gives individual homeowners the right to personalize and customize their 
residences to their own personal tastes and not answer to others about the use of their 
personal residence. This assurance is present in the introduction to President Clinton’s 
National Homeownership Strategy Brief: “Owning a home embodies the promise of 
individual autonomy” (United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
August 1995) and is valued as an implicit interest of individual homeownership.  The 
idea is that homeowners are able to control the value of their economic investment based 
on the personal decisions that they make. 63 
                                                        
62 Critics of this argument will note that renters are not subject to the additional home ownership and 
maintenance costs that homeowners are subject to such as closing fees, homeowners’ insurance, landscape 
costs, routine maintenance and upkeep costs, etc. Research shows that because homeowners often purchase 
larger and higher quality residences their “housing-intensive” preferences might result in more frequent and 
expensive maintenance (Rothenberg et al., 1991; Galster, 1987) that could negate the difference in housing 
costs between homeowners and renters. 
63 Critics of the promise of individual autonomy in homeownership would point out that to an extent the 
economic value of a home is determined by the value and condition of housing in the neighborhood; 
therefore homeowners must rely on one another to help maintain their position in the housing market and in 
home valuations. Rothenberg et al. (1991) notes that in most cases homeowners prefer to be surrounded by 
other homeowners (as opposed to renters) because owners have similar incentives, the main one of which is 
to maintain the investment values of their residences. 
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 From a macro-level perspective, homeownership is also credited with providing 
economic benefits to society. Due to its perceived stabilizing effect, policymakers and 
government officials often view increasing homeownership as a central strategy for 
successful economic development. This strategy assumes that homeownership establishes 
a common economic interest that creates a social network of mutually reinforcing 
relationships. Besides the labor market, the housing market is the most significant market 
and accounts for a large portion of production activity with many forward and backward 
linkages to the rest of the economy. It is for this reason that most policymakers, 
government officials, and advocates of homeownership believe that homeownership 
fosters widespread economic benefits through job creation and other economic stimuli. 
McCarthy, Van Zandt, and Rohe (2001: 34) caution, however, that homeownership can 
also stifle the economy: “Widespread homeownership makes the national economy 
inflexible—unable to respond quickly or efficiently to changing scenarios in the world 
economy.” The same authors, with discerning clairvoyance, further note: “While a 
vibrant housing sector might lead the national economy out of financial doldrums, 
instability in the housing sector can have devastating regional and local impacts. 
Bubbles—extreme events—in housing markets can distort local economies much like 
boom-and-bust cycles of energy markets. […] Housing value losses associated with job 
loss can put families in the untenable position of needing to sell to move, but being 
unable to sell because of negative equity”. 
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 Social Benefits 
In addition to economic benefits, U.S. policymakers also tout the social benefits 
of widespread homeownership for the individual, the family, and the country. The 
introduction to President Clinton’s National Homeownership Strategy (1995) includes the 
following passages: 
Homeownership is a commitment to strengthening families and good citizenship. 
Homeownership enables people to have greater control and exercise more 
responsibility over their living environment. 
 
Homeownership is a commitment to community. Homeownership helps stabilize 
neighborhoods and strengthen communities. It creates important local and 
individual incentives for maintaining and improving private property and public 
spaces. 
 
These passages indicate that the federal commitment to and subsidy of homeownership is 
justified because of the social betterment properties of homeownership. The 2013 NAR 
National Housing Pulse Survey reveals that the public echoes and even elevates the 
importance of the perceived social betterment properties of homeownership. Survey 
respondents, when asked to rate the reasons for why homeownership is important, gave 
some of the highest importance ratings to neighborhood stability and quality measures 
rather than wealth accumulation measures.64 The social benefits most often associated 
with widespread homeownership include: increased neighborhood stability, increased 
social and civic involvement, and increased commitment to social values. 
 One of the most persistent claims made for homeownership is that owners have a 
greater economic and emotional stake in their community and thus are more likely than 
                                                        
64 Of the five highest rated factors relayed to survey respondents, three were indicators of the social benefits 
of homeownership and two were indicators of the economic benefits of homeownership. 
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renters to act in ways that maintain and strengthen the community. This claim, however, 
is mostly conjecture; while there is a rich sociological literature on the social and political 
life of communities, surprisingly few studies have considered the explicit role of 
homeownership or housing tenure on community life.65 Those studies that have examined 
the role of homeownership on neighborhood stability have focused on homeowners’ 
length of residence, neighboring, preservation, and crime prevention. 
 Homeownership and neighborhood stability are correlated with one another: 
homeowners move less frequently than renters, and hence are embedded into the same 
neighborhood and community for a longer period of time. The U.S. Census Geographical 
Mobility survey confirms this relationship. It found that only 4.7 percent of owner-
occupied residents moved from 2011-2012, as compared to nearly 27 percent of renters.66 
These rates are heavily correlated with age (the “mover rate” is higher for younger 
individuals who are more frequently changing jobs, not yet married, and have fewer 
geographical commitments) and other variables such as income and marital status; 
however, the U.S. Census report, after controlling for these variables, found that 
homeownership does have a statistically significant impact on lowering the mover rate 
and increasing neighborhood stability. That is, among people of the same age, same 
income, and same marital status, a person was significantly more likely to change 
residence in a given year if he or she was a renter rather than a homeowner. This 
                                                        
65 Sociological studies have tended to concentrate on the importance of factors such as age, sex, socio-
economic status, presence of children, and residents’ attitudes about their neighbors and neighborhoods on 
the social and political life of communities. 
66 Rohe, Van Zandt, and McCarthy (2001) additionally report that homeowners stay in residence for a 
median duration of 8.2 years while renters only maintain their residences for a median duration of 2.1 
years. 
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relationship is important, homeownership advocates argue, because the longer individuals 
reside in a neighborhood, the more stable the neighborhood is. Thus homeownership 
signifies stability and a family’s commitment to a neighborhood and community.67 
The neighborhood stability that homeownership provides is associated with 
several other social benefits. Chief among them is increased “neighboring”. Because 
homeowners are much more likely to reside longer in a neighborhood, it is argued that 
homeowners, unlike more transient renters, will much more readily forge relationships 
with their neighbors and nurture a sense of community. Several studies have found 
evidence that homeownership is positively associated with higher levels of neighboring. 
Galster’s (1987) investigation of neighborhood upkeep in Minneapolis and Ohio, for 
example, revealed that homeowners’ sense of familiarity and solidarity with their 
neighbors was significant in determining their efforts to reinvest in their homes and 
neighborhoods.68 
Another benefit associated with neighborhood stability and homeownership is 
neighborhood preservation. Advocates of homeownership assert that homeowners are 
more likely than absentee landlords or their tenants to maintain and improve their 
properties. Galster’s (1987) research supports this proposition. After controlling for a 
                                                        
67 Rohe and Stewart (1996) suggest that homeownership impacts stability through two mechanisms. The 
first mechanism references the human capital that homeowners have acquired; homeowners tend to be 
higher-income, higher-educated, family households and thus can anticipate staying in a residence for a 
longer term. The second mechanism references the additional interest that owners have in their homes; 
homeowners are more likely to join organizations with other community members in order to protect the 
collective interests of the area. 
68 A 1996 study of General Social Survey data by Rossi and Weber, however, found conflicting accounts of 
owner and renter behaviors. On the one hand they reported that renters are “more likely to spend evenings 
with neighbors,” but on the other hand they reported that owners are more likely to “give help to others.” 
This finding casts some doubt upon the argument that owners are more likely to “neighbor”. 
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series of structural, household, and neighborhood characteristics, Galster shows 
homeowners who reside in their dwellings spend more on maintenance, are less likely to 
defer repairs, and report fewer housing problems than other groups. Rohe and Stewart 
(1996) also show the positive effects of homeownership on neighborhood preservation. 
Their research suggests that homeownership contributes to stable or increasing property 
values and that neighborhood stability encourages “participation in community 
organizations, local social interaction and attachment, property maintenance, 
neighborhood satisfaction, and positive expectations about the future of the 
neighborhood” (Rohe and Stewart, 1996: 54-55).69 
 Popular and academic research also supports the assertion that the behaviors 
associated with stable neighborhoods deter crime. The literature suggests two 
connections between stable housing and crime. First, long-term homeowners encounter 
significantly lower crime rates (Alba, Logan, and Bellair, 1984; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 
1999).70 Second, crime is reduced via informal social controls. To the degree that 
residential stability strengthens social ties with neighbors, crime is diminished (Warner 
and Rountree, 1997). Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) suggest that collective 
efficacy, or social cohesion and strong ties among neighbors (such as those developed in 
homeowner-occupied neighborhoods) combined with willingness to act on behalf of the 
common good, is an effective means of social control. Their study of over three hundred 
Chicago neighborhoods supports their hypothesis that residential tenure and 
homeownership promote collective efforts to maintain social control. Because 
                                                        
69 Rohe and Stewart believe that these benefits are a result of stability and extend beyond homeownership. 
70 This relationship remains true even after controlling for other variables like socioeconomic status. 
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homeowners have a lot more to lose, they have more of an incentive than renters to deter 
crime by forming and implementing voluntary crime prevention programs (National 
Association of Realtors, 2006). 
 Proponents of homeownership argue that homeowners are more civically and 
socially engaged, they are more willing to commit time and resources to organizations 
and activities that promote social cohesion or address community problems. Andrew 
Cuomo, former Secretary of Housing and Urban development, embodied this sentiment 
on the 50th anniversary of the Housing Act of 1949 when he said: “Housing is more than 
just bricks and mortar; it is the building block of community, it is powerfully tied to civic 
behavior—to working together with neighbors on shared concerns, to literally making us 
a part of a block, a neighborhood, a town, a country, a nation. Homeownership makes us 
stakeholders in something greater than ourselves” (Coulson, 2002). Several arguments 
have been advanced to explain why homeowners may be more likely than renters to 
participate in voluntary organizations and political activities. Rohe, Van Zandt and 
McCarthy (2001) summarize three of them: 1) homeowners may be more likely to be 
civic and social participants because they have an economic investment in their homes 
and they see participation in voluntary and political organizations as a means of 
protecting that investment (Baum and Kingston, 1984; Rohe and Stewart, 1996); 2) the 
transaction costs associated with moving are greater for homeowners so there is an 
economic incentive for owners to join community associations to maintain and preserve 
their neighborhoods (Cox, 1982); and 3) homeowners may develop an attachment to, 
pride in, and identification with their home and surrounding community that leads them 
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to be more civically and socially engaged (Baum and Kingston, 1984). Research supports 
these arguments; data has consistently shown that homeownership is associated with 
greater social and political participation (Ahlbrandt and Cunningham, 1979; Baum and 
Kingston, 1984; Cox, 1982; Lyons and Lowery, 1989; Guest and Oropesa, 1986; Rohe 
and Stegman, 1994; Rossi and Weber, 1996; DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Kingston 
and Fries, 1994).71 
 Homeownership is also believed to imbue a strong commitment to social values. 
In particular, advocates of homeownership suggest that there is a relationship between 
homeownership and socially desirable youth behaviors. Homeownership is thought to be 
directly or indirectly linked to better school performance, lower school dropout rates, and 
lower rates of teen parenthood (Green and White, 1997). Research has generally 
confirmed that access to economic and educational opportunities are more prevalent in 
neighborhoods with high rates of homeownership and community involvement (Ellen and 
Turner, 1997) and that homeownership has a positive effect on children. Green and White 
(1997) suggest that homeowners have a stronger incentive than renters to monitor their 
own children and their neighbors’ children because children’s bad behavior can threaten 
property values. The same authors also suggest that homeownership instills an “I-can-do-
it” type of attitude in homeowners that extends to children’s behavior. Other studies 
                                                        
71 As before, it is not clear if homeownership itself determines more civic and social engagement rather 
than an underlying propensity to be both an owner and more civically and socially involved. 
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report similar educational and non-educational benefits (Haurin, Parcel, and Haurin, 
2000; Boehm and Schlottman, 1999).72 
 In sum, supporters of homeownership credit homeownership with producing 
many economic and social benefits both for homeowners themselves and for society. 
While empirical research bears some of these benefits out, others are only weakly 
supported by data, and most are subject to questions of spuriousness. Although it is 
difficult to disentangle the causal impacts of homeownership and the outcomes it is 
purported to provide, it is clear that policy makers and the general public strongly believe 
in homeownership and affords it great economic and social meaning. The strong presence 
of the American ideology of homeownership strongly resonates in American politics, 
public policy, and popular culture, so it stands to reason that the institution of 
homeownership and its material, cultural, and symbolic ideological components impose 
upon homeowners and organizations associated with homeownership organizing beliefs, 
behaviors, expectations, and rules which guide the perceptions and practices of those 
culturally embedded within it. 
Data Collection & Analysis 
 Data Collection 
 To address the three main questions of this research required two steps.73 First, I 
had to measure how common intra-organizational conflict is in homeowners’ associations 
                                                        
72 Haurin, Parcel, and Haurin (2000) use panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to 
show that homeowners offer a youth a more stimulating and supportive home environment. This type of 
environment has a positive impact on cognitive and behavioral outcomes. Boehm and Schlottman (1999) 
use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to show that homeownership is a highly significant 
predictor of educational attainment. Children translate greater educational attainment into increased 
earnings and rates of personal homeownership. 
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by conducting a survey of Greater-Boston area homeowners’ association board members 
to ascertain whether conflict is common in homeowners’ associations (it is) and whether 
external or internal determinants of conflict were better able to predict the occurrence of 
significant intra-organizational conflict (my findings provide some support for several of 
the external and internal determinants of conflict predicted to explain conflict in 
organizations, however, an internal and cultural measure of the presence of multiple 
institutional logics emerges as the key predictor of intra-organizational conflict in 
homeowners’ associations).74 Second, I had to confirm the hybrid organizational form of 
homeowners’ associations by identifying, explaining, and defining the institutional 
context of homeowners’ associations. This second step assumes that institutional logics 
cannot be directly or fully measured through any one variable or set of variables.75 So 
while the first phase of this research (Chapter Two’s Homeowners’ Association Board 
Member Survey) provided necessary and useful empirical information, it alone was not 
sufficient to address the main questions of this research. It was a necessity that I also 
conduct qualitative interviews with board members of homeowners’ associations to 
assess whether or not there was evidence of different visions, assumptions, values, 
beliefs, or expectations about the purpose the homeowners’ association and, more 
                                                                                                                                                                     
73 See Chapter One: Introduction for a full description of my research agenda. In short, I sought to answer 
the following three questions: 1) How common is intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ 
associations; 2) What are the sources of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations; and 3) 
What makes some homeowners’ associations more and less conflicted?  
74 See Chapter Two: Structure v. Culture: The External and Internal Determinants of Conflict to read more 
about this phase of my research. 
75 In Chapter Two: Structure v. Culture: The External and Internal Determinants of Conflict I use a variable 
that measures whether or not homeowners’ association board members believe that its organizational 
members “share a common vision about the purpose of a homeowners’ association”. This variable is 
merely meant to indicate the possible presence of multiple institutional logics. I do not claim that this 
variable directly or fully measures institutional logics. 
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generally, of homeownership, and, if there was evidence of this, to ascertain what the 
prevailing logics were, where they originate from, and how and why they impact the day-
to-day actions and decisions of homeowners’ association board members and the larger 
organization. 
 To identify, explain, and define the available institutional logics and to understand 
their role and enactment in the everyday activities of organizational actors, I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with homeowners’ association board members.76 These 
interviews were conducted from the fall of 2011 through the spring of 2012 via 
telephone, Skype, or in-person, each lasting between 45 minutes to two and one-half 
hours in length.77 Interview respondents were purposively selected based on their 
participation in my Homeowners’ Association Survey and their willingness to talk. Of the 
176 respondents to this survey I followed up with 80 participants (40 respondents each 
from less and more conflicted associations).78 Of those 80 participants that I requested to 
interview, 56 consented to the interview (30 respondents from the most conflicted and 26 
respondents from the least conflicted associations).79 
                                                        
76 The semi-structured interview format allows for a much deeper exploration of the board members’ 
experiences than would have been possible using surveys alone (Charmaz, 2006). 
77 The average interview length was one and one-half hours. 
78 As noted in Chapter Two: Structure v. Culture: The External and Internal Determinants of Conflict, of 
the 176 board members responding to this survey, approximately 46% reported their association 
experienced at least one significant instance of conflict in the prior 12 months. I distinguished between 
“less conflicted” and “more conflicted” associations using responses to this question and several additional 
questions designed to measure different dimensions of conflict such as “How many times in the last year 
has your board experienced a significant instance of disagreement regarding the proper course of action for 
your association?”, “How many times in the last year has your association issued a notice of non-
compliance?” and “How many times has the association been threatened with or involved in a legal dispute 
in the last five years?” 
79 A table (C-1) detailing the descriptive characteristics of my interviewees may be found in Appendix C. 
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 I focused on homeowners’ association board members because they are the 
primary decision-makers and the individuals who on a day-to-day basis define the culture 
of the organization and structure and enact the everyday beliefs, activities, and practices 
of the organization. Others, such as non-board member unit owners, homeowners’ 
association managers, and financial and legal advisers, are all important players in the 
environment of homeowners’ associations; however, they do not “do” the work of the 
organization or have an active role in the day-to-day identification, elaboration and 
enactment of institutional beliefs and practices. 
 The initial interview protocol consisted of 40 open-ended questions which 
focused on general information about the interviewee and his or her association, the 
purpose of a homeowners’ association, personal experiences serving on the board, 
responsibilities of the board, the board’s decision-making process, rules, regulations, and 
governance, legal matters, and interactions with non-board members and management. 
After the initial set of interviews, the original interview protocol was winnowed down to 
approximately 30 open-ended questions in accordance with developing codes and 
themes.80 All of the interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed. I used Atlas.ti 6 
to code and analyze all interview transcripts. 
 On several occasions interview subjects invited me to make observations of their 
association. I was asked to attend both open and closed-door meetings as well as election 
nights and association activities. I was also invited to attend and give presentations at 
several regional and national community association events sponsored by the Community 
                                                        
80 The final interview schedule may be found in Appendix B. 
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Associations Institute (CAI). CAI events were well attended by both industry personnel 
(e.g., community association managers, contractors, etc.) and board members and non-
board member unit owners in associations. The conferences consisted of a mixture of 
speaker presentations, question-and-answer sessions, educational sessions, and vendor 
booths. When asked to attend these events (homeowners’ association and CAI), I sat in 
on these gatherings and took notes. My jottings were turned into fully fleshed-out and 
richly detailed field notes as soon as possible after leaving the observation site. These 
observations were important as they provide insights into relationships between board 
members and other groups and, in the cases of open and closed-door meetings at 
associations, into areas where problems in the association surface and reoccur, and are 
ultimately resolved (or not). Several interview subjects also offered to share copies of 
their association’s CC&Rs, board minutes, and other homeowners’ association records 
with me. These documents were similarly coded and analyzed along with my interview 
transcripts. Observational and textual data were considered supplemental to my interview 
data. 
 Data Analysis 
 My interview transcripts, observations, and documents were analyzed using an 
inductive, grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). As suggested by 
Suddaby (2006), I approached the coding process iteratively and sensitized by my survey 
data, literature regarding the American ideology of homeownership, and my reading of 
the extant literature on institutional theory and the institutional logics framework. I 
focused on theoretically salient themes and codes as discussed in the theory section while 
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keeping an open mind to emergent themes and codes in the data. I began with a strategy 
of open coding and in subsequent readings of the data developed a finite list of coding 
categories. I frequently alternated between reading theory and examining my data, 
looking for emerging patterns and themes, memoing, and then returning to theory and my 
data to refine and focus my codes and interpretively develop my concepts. As themes and 
concepts emerged I refined my data collection and recording process. When able to I also 
presented these codes, themes, and concepts to my interview participants and other board 
members, non-board members of homeowners’ associations, and others at homeowners’ 
associations and CAI events to clarify and verify my observations, insights, and 
conclusions.81 From this process I developed a theoretical typology, an abstract model of 
two ideal types of institutional logics: an economic logic and a social logic. Both logics 
reference the American history and ideology of homeownership and represent a 
combination of attributes emanating from different institutional sectors of society 
(private, public, and non-profit and theoretical sectors defined by Friedland and Alford 
(1987, 1991) and Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012)) and believed to create the 
potential for intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations. 
Institutional Logics in Homeowners’ Associations 
 Logics of Homeownership 
                                                        
81 I was able to do this four times; once three months into my interviewing process, once six months into 
my interviewing process, once after data collection was complete, and once after I started drafting this 
chapter and the next. 
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 My qualitative research reveals the concurrent presence of two types of 
institutional logics in homeowners’ associations: an economic logic and a social logic.82 
Strong and consistent evidence of the presence of both the economic logic of 
homeownership and the social logic of homeownership is found in all of the 
homeowners’ associations, regardless of whether the association was categorized as more 
or less conflicted. Both logics reference the cultural rhetoric of the American ideology of 
homeownership, draw from different institutional orders, and provide potentially 
conflicting information about the purpose of homeownership, the identity of the 
homeowner, and the purpose of a homeowners’ association. The economic logic 
primarily draws from the institutional orders of the market, the corporation, and the state 
and views homeownership as a financial investment, identifies the homeowner as an 
investor, and likens a homeowners’ association to a corporation. The social logic 
primarily draws from the institutional orders of the community, the family, and the state 
and views homeownership as an investment in community, identifies the homeowner as a 
neighbor, and likens a homeowners’ association to a family business. These two logics 
represent the available cultural repertoires that accompany the status of homeowner in 
homeowners’ associations. I find that board members in all homeowners’ associations 
regularly draw upon both of these logics in their day-to-day activities to establish identity 
                                                        
82 Based on the institutional location of homeowners’ associations I expected to identify three logics, one 
consistent with the market, one consistent with civil society, and one consistent with the state. My analysis, 
however, revealed only two logics. Characteristics consistent with the state were subsumed into the two 
other logics. For example, bureaucratic tendencies were found to best represent the economic logic of 
homeownership, while democratic tendencies were found to best represent the social logic of 
homeownership. 
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and purpose, identify interests and goals, and decide upon the practices to do the work of 
the organization. Table 3-1 summarizes the ideal-type characteristics of both logics.  
The Economic Logic of Homeownership 
The economic logic of homeownership broadly represents the manifestation of the 
institutional orders of the market, the corporation, and the state and the economic systems 
of market and managerial capitalism (Thornton, 2004; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 
2012). Homeownership is a rational, self-interested transaction with an emphasis on 
efficiency and financial gain. Wealth accumulation, increased borrowing power, financial 
stability, and financial freedom are among the supposed economic benefits that 
homeowners believe they will accrue in exchange for the costs of homeownership 
(McCarthy, Van Zandt, and Rohe, 2001). This logic imbues homeownership with an 
economic value—particularly that of a profit motive. As such, homeownership is framed 
as a financial investment, the homeowner is an investor, and a homeowners’ association 
is a corporation. 
Homeownership as a Financial Investment 
The idea that homeownership is a financial investment stems from the popularly 
held belief that homeownership provides significant financial benefits to the individual 
and the family.83 This belief is inscribed into the cultural fabric of America and can be 
seen in the public policies of the government, the aspirations of the public, and in popular 
culture. President Bill Clinton’s 1995 National Homeownership Strategy famously sought  
                                                        
83 As detailed earlier in this chapter, policymakers, nonprofit leaders, and housing experts often publically 
extol the economic benefits of homeownership. Many public reports and public policy initiatives have 
argued that homeownership drives individuals’ and families’ economic prosperity. President Bill Clinton’s 
1995 National Homeownership Strategy is an example of such initiatives. 
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Table 3-1: Ideal Types of Institutional Logics in Homeowners’ Associations 
 
Characteristic Economic Logic Social Logic 
   
Institutional orders Market, Corporation & State Community, Family & State 
Economic system Market capitalism & Managerial capitalism Cooperative capitalism 
Sources of identity Homeowners as investors Bureaucratic identification 
Homeowners as neighbors 
Ideological identification 
Sources of legitimacy Property values Democratic participation 
Sources of authority Board of directors System of administration 
Board of directors 
Commitment to values 
Basis of norms Self-interest Group membership 
Basis of mission Build economic value  Build social value 
Basis of attention Short-term governance Long-term governance 
Basis of strategy Increase efficiency/profit Increase community good 
Control mechanism Rigid adherence to the rules Personal relationships 
Nature of homeownership Individual Shared  
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to create eight million new homeowners in five years because “through homeownership, 
a family…invests in an asset that can grow in value and…generate financial security” 
(United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, May 1995).  Four years 
post sub-prime mortgage housing crisis, the 2013 National Housing Pulse Survey reports 
that Americans still overwhelmingly believe owning a home is a good financial decision, 
and a majority of renters say homeownership is one of their highest priorities in the 
future.84 And, in a scene from the classic film It’s a Wonderful Life, Jimmy Stewart, 
whose firm sold a happy couple a home mortgage, reflects that there is “a fundamental 
urge… for a man to have his own roof, walls, and fireplace.” He then offers them bread, 
salt, and wine so “joy and prosperity may reign forever.”  
Not surprisingly, then, the notion that homeownership is a significant financial 
investment trickled down to my interviewee’s expectations and understandings of 
homeownership and reverberated throughout their responses to the question of why they 
first decided to purchase a home. They often expressed the view that homeownership is 
the “biggest financial investment” they will ever make and frequently made reference to 
the economic rationales they drew upon when they were in the housing market. 85 86  The 
                                                        
84 The national telephone survey, sponsored by the National Association of Realtor (NAR), took place from 
May 28 – June 5, 2013 and consisted of 2,000 respondents. Eighty percent of respondents reported 
believing that buying a home is a good financial decision. Seventy-nine percent of those who reported 
being currently renters reported that homeownership was a future priority, with 51 percent of those 
reporting that it was one of their highest priorities. 
85 According to Sechrest and Sidani (1995: 79) qualitative researchers can extract more meaning out of 
their research by using word counts. They argue that qualitative researchers regularly use quantitative terms 
such as “many,” “most,” “frequently,” and “several” in their explanation of their research, but that these 
terms lack context. Word counts improve the vigor of qualitative data analysis and “can enhance verhesten” 
by preventing the researcher from overweighting or underweighting the importance of emergent themes 
and concepts (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2007; Sandelowski, 2001). 
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frame of homeownership as a financial investment is exemplified by one board member’s 
reasoning for purchasing a home and, in particular, purchasing a home in a homeowners’ 
association: 
Well the main reason I purchased a home was for my retirement. My parents 
always said this funny thing. They said that the best bank they had was their 
mortgage… because their mortgage was their mandatory savings plan and that 
it—all of those payments—would pay off when it was time to sell the house and 
retire. So as soon as I was financially able to I purchased a home so that I knew I 
had some sort of financial security. I didn’t want to waste my money paying rent 
because I knew that I would be paying for someone else’s Florida and not my 
Florida. 
 
Following up on this admission, I asked the same 40-something homeowner and board 
member whether the desire to achieve some financial security specifically factored in to 
her decision to buy a home in a homeowners’ association. She states: 
 Oh yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. At first I looked at both homes in associations and regular 
homes, but what I noticed was that the homes in HOAs were always more tightly 
kept up than regular homes. I knew that I was probably making the biggest 
financial investment of my lifetime and I wanted a nice profit. I wanted to grow 
my wealth. Get to that secure place for my retirement. And I just knew that I 
couldn’t depend on regular neighbors for that – for instance I looked at one house 
in the Nashoba Valley – it was a really nice house, great square footage, a nice 
backyard, you know… nice. It was a really great deal too. I probably would have 
made quite a hefty profit on that one. The thing was though that I looked to the 
left, to the neighboring house and it just… it just wasn’t nicely kept up. I don’t 
know why, but that observation stayed with me and a couple of days later I had a 
sort of epiphany, I didn’t want someone else to drag me down. I didn’t want to 
have to rely on someone else to get my profit. So I decided right then and there I 
was only going to look at homes in associations from then on. 
 
This homeowner’s reasoning for purchasing a home in general and a home in a 
homeowners’ association in particular is representative of the institutional orders of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
86 The word “investment” was recorded in 52 out of the 56 responses to my question asking about each 
interviewee’s reasons for purchasing a home. In 50 of the 56 cases the respondent specifically said 
“financial investment” or “economic investment”. 
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market and the economic logic of homeownership in three ways. First, she frames her 
process for selecting a home to purchase as a rational one by invoking a cost-benefit 
analysis (i.e., she reasons that although one home offered good square footage and re-sale 
value, the costs associated with worrying about the neighbor’s upkeep of an adjacent 
home were too high). Second, she is solely focused on her own financial interests (i.e., 
she reasons that paying rent is not in her own financial self-interest whereas 
homeownership is). Third, she places an emphasis on financial gain (i.e., she reasons that 
she is making a large financial investment and thus wants to see a short- and/or long-term 
payoff depending on when she is ready to sell her home).  
 Economic rationales such as the one offered by the above homeowner were 
common. With a focus on homeownership as a financial investment, property values 
come to indicate the legitimacy of an investment; property values should always be, at 
worst, stable and, at best, increasing. Property values are akin to share prices and are 
reflective of the relative worth of an investment. Higher property values signal a greater 
return on investment. A board member, responding to a question about what the short-
term and long-term responsibilities of the board are, acknowledges the pressure to keep 
property values high: 
 Property values. For both. Keeping them high. Thankfully we don’t have a lot of 
turnover in our building, but when someone is selling their place there is always a 
hushed gossip about what they are selling their unit for… and after the unit is sold 
what it sold for. If it is any less than what that individual paid we hear about it—
even if it is a different floor plan! It drives me nuts because I’m always trying to 
reassure everyone that our community is good, their investment is good… I mean 
we just had a lobby renovation, we added a gym a couple of years ago… but what 
is inside that door is theirs and what is outside of our property is outside of our 
control. I’m always like those things matters too you know. 
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This board member’s responsibility on both a short- and long-term basis was to reassure 
association members of their investment and to make sure that their association was 
competitive with other homeowners’ associations in their market environment. The 
mission of the homeowners’ association then is to maintain and enhance property values 
through enforcing the covenants of the association and maintaining the common areas of 
the association. It is the responsibility of board members to focus on building the 
economic value of the association. Many of the other board members I interviewed 
admitted to feeling this same type of pressure often commenting on the importance of 
property values and real estate “comps” (i.e., comparable homes and associations in the 
geographic area) as being a measure upon which their performance is often judged.87 This 
situation is very similar to how a corporation’s board of directors reports on market share 
and market position of the firm. Board members of homeowners’ associations are tasked 
on a day-to-day basis with assessing the financial well-being of their investment as it 
compares to others on the market. 
Homeowner as Investor 
The status of homeowner holds a venerable place in the psyche of the average 
American, and part of the reason why is that homeownership signals security and 
individual accomplishment. Data from the National Survey of Families and Households 
supports the assertion that homeowners are happier, have higher self-esteem, and are 
more autonomous (Rossi and Weber, 1996). Rohe and Stegman (1994) suggest that 
                                                        
87 In 48 out of my 56 interviews, board members referenced “property values,” “home values” or 
“comps/comparables” as one of the most important indicators they have about the relative financial health 
of their association. Others frequently noted included size of association reserves and operating budget. 
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homeownership contributes to an individual’s sense of self via three mechanisms: 
internalization, comparison, and self-assessment. Since homeowners are afforded a 
higher social status in American society (Doling and Strafford, 1989; Dreier, 1982; 
Marcuse, 1975; Perin, 1977) homeowners internalize their status as self-esteem 
appraising themselves as more autonomous, self-sufficient, and accomplished than non-
homeowners. In all, the status of “homeowner” becomes incorporated as an important 
part of one’s identity. 
To the extent that the status of homeowner informs an individual’s identity, the 
economic logic of homeownership imparts the identity of “homeowner as investor”. 
Capitalizing upon the notion that the purpose of homeownership is financial investment 
in pursuit of self-interest, this identity emphasizes one’s sense of self as a member of a 
social group, in this case a financially interested party. The importance of this identity 
can be read into my interviewees’ repeated distinctions between owners and renters. Take 
for example, this board member’s identification of one his association’s most persistent 
“problems”: 
We have too many renters. That’s what all the owners say at our open meetings. 
We constantly are looking for ways to reduce the number of renters we have and 
increase the number of present owners – we are really clamping down on absentee 
owners. We kind of eased up on that during the crisis you know because it was 
harder to sell a house then and now that we feel things are rebounding on that 
front we’ve been really trying to reduce the number of tenants we have—it just 
doesn’t look good you know. We want more owners than tenants in residence 
because you know… even though this really hasn’t been true here, we’ve been 
lucky with the quality of our renters because of our proximity to the Longwood 
medical area…renters are transient. They care less because they don’t own. 
 
Even though this board member admitted that the quality of renters in his association was 
high, the idea is that renters do not and will not care enough about the property they 
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reside in because they are not financially invested in it. The weight of this status is so 
important that it often overrides other personal characteristics that might make a renter a 
better neighbor than an owner (i.e., being polite, friendly, quiet, helpful, considerate, 
etc.). A non-board member unit owner that I chatted with at one of the CAI conferences 
echoed the importance of this identity. We were talking about why I chose this topic for 
my research and I responded that it emerged from my personal experience living within 
an embattled condominium association. She immediately asked me if I was an owner or a 
renter. I answered that I was a long-time renter in the building. She laughed and said 
rather affectedly “Oh my my, a renter.” This conversation struck me as significant 
because normally the people I converse with about my research want to share “their 
story,” or are interested to hear about what I learned from my research. This woman 
though, first in her immediate request to hear about my “status,” and then in her response 
to my status, leveled an assessment and made a value judgment about me based on what 
being an owner versus a renter meant to her. Because renters are not shareholders in the 
homeowners’ association community (i.e., investors in the “corporation”) their status is 
one of “less than” and their presence represents a “problem”.88 In-group and out-group 
designations like this signal not only the presence of a shared identity, but also the 
importance and significance of the shared interests that define them. 
Homeowners’ Association as a Corporation 
A homeowners’ association is typically a non-profit corporation that is created by 
a developer when a community is in the planning stages. The association is governed by a 
                                                        
88 The distinction between what it means to be an owner versus a renter was a common theme in my 
research. Demeaning identifications or descriptions of renters appeared in 38 of my 56 interviews. 
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board of directors that initially consists of the developer and his representatives and later 
consists of elected homeowners following the sale of a percentage of homes in the 
community.89 90 Thus, the structural origin of homeowners’ association is corporate in 
nature.91 There is a hierarchy, albeit a fairly flat one, that typically consists of an elected 
board of directors at the top, a manager or management company in the middle and non-
board member residents at the bottom. This hierarchical structure informs the work of the 
board of directors and defines their system of control. A long-time chairman of his 
homeowners’ association reflects on how this structure impacts the nature of control: 
This is a business, but it is a unique one. Board members are the same, but 
different. We volunteer to serve on the board and are elected to serve on the 
board, but are not paid. In this way we are less like a corporate advisory board and 
more like elected officials. We have control, but we don’t have control. We have 
to listen to the residents and go by the rules. It gets messy. That’s why I’ve kind 
of acquiesced to the realization that I am a bureaucrat and this is a bureaucracy. 
We follow the rules to a “T”.  
 
I asked the same board member to explain more about why he felt his association was 
bureaucratic in nature. He responded: 
 Here’s an example. A couple of weeks ago a resident of ours bought a bicycle. 
We have several bicycle racks in the garage, but they are full. So he saw that one 
of our other residents had bought a personal bicycle rack and placed it at the front 
of his parking spot. This other resident thought this was a good idea and 
purchased one as well. Not two days after he had placed his rack in his spot the 
person with the parking spot next to him complained. I went down to inspect it 
and he was still well within the confines of his parking space and his bike and car 
were not impinging on the adjacent spot at all. Well, long story short, it led to an 
inspection of the rules of the association and we ultimately had to have both 
residents remove their personal bicycle racks. Now they roll their bikes through 
                                                        
89 For more information about the organization of homeowners’ associations and a full description of the 
core characteristics of homeowners’ associations see Chapter One: Introduction. 
90 These positions are voluntarily filled by residents of an association and are unpaid. 
91 The origination of the organization and the basis of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions 
(CC&Rs) are economic. The association and its associative rules are presented as “rational” structures and 
documents meant to preserve the economic value of the property. 
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the lobby on the carpets and into their units. It makes no sense to me how this is 
better, but “thems the rules”. 
 
This board member’s example reflects the tendencies of corporations to be bureaucratic 
in nature and provides evidence of the “irrationalities” often associated with increasing 
rationality in organizations (Ritzer, 1993). Homeowners’ associations are governed by a 
series of “rational” documents (CC&Rs) meant to preserve the economic value of the 
property, but in practice these Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions often produce 
unintended irrationalities. In this case, rather than storing a bicycle in the garage where it 
posed no danger to the economic value of the association, now, by forcing these residents 
to wheel their bikes through the lobby and on the hallway carpets, it does. There is a 
greater potential for the lobby and hallway carpets to become dirty and muddied or torn 
and worn. This is a hazard that the board member recognizes, but feels he is helpless to 
control; he places the authority of the condominium trust into the CC&Rs.  Nonetheless, 
the bureaucratization of homeowners’ associations is still believed to preserve the 
economic value of the association because of the influence of the institutional orders of 
the corporation. 
 Recently more and more homeowners’ associations have chosen to employ 
managers or management companies to handle the day-to-day administrative functions of 
the association.92 This represents a shift to managerial capitalism whereby the capitalistic 
enterprise is administered by managers rather than by owners. The board of directors can 
                                                        
92 Of the 179 respondents to my Homeowners’ Association Survey, 76.4% reported that their association 
employed a manager or management company to handle administrative functions of the association. 
Although there isn’t any regional or national data available to confirm that this rate is increasing, the 
Occupational Employment Statistics shows a 1.2% increase in the number of community association 
managers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 2012). 
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hire managers or management companies to supervise a wide range of administrative 
functions including managerial services, financial services, communications services, and 
contractor/vendor services. The services can range from simple advisory services to full-
service management. The following board member of a very small association reflects on 
his decision to hire a part-time manager for the association: 
 It was a big decision for me. I mean we are only five units, but it just got to be so 
difficult to organize and much too time intensive and way too combative. Since I 
am the board I just wanted to pass off the responsibility to someone else, someone 
who could exert control differently than me and who maybe seemed like he had 
more authority to the other owners—someone who could cite the CC&Rs and 
could more strongly enforce sanctions if need be without personal repercussion. 
 
This board member was most interested in shifting the responsibility of dealing with 
complaints, delinquencies, and collections. He assumed that using a manager would 
legitimize the authority of the association because instead of answering to “the guy in the 
unit next door” as he described himself, the other owners would now answer to someone 
who could use his position as manager, and the power of the Covenants, Conditions, and 
Restrictions to enforce the authority of the condominium trust. This type of leadership is 
akin to Weber’s legal-rational authority wherein authority resides in the rules and the 
rights of those elevated to authority positions and imbued with the power to use the rules 
to issue such commands. By imparting this type of formal authority onto a manager, this 
board member believed the economic well-being of association would be better 
preserved.93 
                                                        
93 Board members frequently used words such as “authority,” “control,” or “power” to describe their 
reasons for hiring a manager or management company. Of those board members whom I interviewed 50 of 
them employed a manager or management company and 36 of them used language such as this to describe 
why they hired a manager or management company. 
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 The Social Logic of Homeownership 
The social logic of homeownership broadly represents the manifestation of the 
institutional orders of the community, the family, and the state and the economic system 
of cooperative capitalism (Thornton, 2004; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012). 
Homeownership is a route to individual fulfillment and community betterment; it is a 
way to connect with others who share similar values and build social relationships. 
Increased neighborhood stability, social and civil involvement, and a shared commitment 
to social values are just some of the social benefits that homeowners believe are 
associated with their investment in a home (Rohe, Van Zandt, and McCarthy, 2001). This 
logic imbues homeownership with a social value—particularly that of democratic 
participation and personal relationships. As such, homeownership is framed as an 
investment in community, the homeowner identifies as a neighbor, and a homeowners’ 
association is likened to a family business. 
Homeownership as an Investment in Community 
Homeownership has long been credited with providing social benefits to the 
individual and society. The introduction to President Bill Clinton’s National 
Homeownership Strategy (1995), for example, attributes homeownership not only with 
economic benefits, but also with social benefits such as creating stronger families and 
communities and better citizens. The 2013 National Housing Pulse Survey reveals that 
the public echoes and even elevates the importance of the perceived social betterment 
properties of homeownership. Survey respondents, when asked to rate the reasons for 
why homeownership is important, gave some of the highest importance ratings to 
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neighborhood stability and quality measures rather than wealth accumulation measures.94 
Homeownership functions to create common bonds and build community. 
Many people purchase a home in order to foster social relations and build a 
connection to a community. Homeowners are more apt to be knowledgeable about 
community affairs and are presumed to be more likely to participate in community 
affairs. In keeping with this view, the board members I interviewed were just as likely to 
offer a social rationale for purchasing a home as they were likely to offer an economic 
rationale.95 Take, for example, this board member’s reasoning for purchasing a home and, 
in particular, purchasing a home in a homeowners’ association: 
My wife and I were in the process of downsizing. Our kids were out of the house 
and married and the house we had was just too big for us—you know the whole 
“empty nest” thing. We wanted a smaller place and we wanted to be in a place 
where people shared a similar lifestyle. We wanted to be around people and 
activity. We wanted playmates. Our old neighborhood was a great place to raise 
kids, but we weren’t a part of that scene anymore, we kind of felt like the old 
fogies of the street. 
 
I asked him if his and his wife’s desire to be a part of a community with similar interests 
factored into their decision to purchase a home in a homeowners’ association. 
 It did. You know we weren’t exclusively looking at 55-year and older 
communities to live in, but once we visited this property—and this might seem 
cliché to say—we knew it was the one. We knew that it was the right decision for 
us. 
 
I prompted him to tell me more about how he and his wife knew it was the right decision. 
                                                        
94 The national telephone survey, sponsored by the National Association of Realtor (NAR), took place from 
May 28 – June 5, 2013 and consisted of 2,000 respondents. Of the five highest rated factors relayed to 
survey respondents, three were indicators of the social benefits of homeownership and two were indicators 
of the economic benefits of homeownership. 
95 When asked about their decision to buy a home 41 of 56 respondents cited social reasons related to 
building community and making personal connections. 
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 Well, I guess I would have to say that we knew it was right when we saw the 
clubhouse. We hadn’t ever really considered that any property we might buy may 
have a clubhouse, but once we saw it we kind of fell in love with it. There was a 
gym, a pool, and rooms to play pool or cards… you know different types of 
activities. We liked the idea of being active and having things to do.  
 
This board member’s account is representative of the institutional orders of the 
community in three ways. First, he and his wife were invested in finding a home and a 
community in which personal relationships were valued. They wanted a home situated 
near people in the same stage of their life course; presumably so that they could bond 
with others who were likely to share similar values. Second, his and his wife’s 
identification of the clubhouse as a key factor in their decision to purchase a home in a 
homeowners’ association signaled the symbolic value of the clubhouse. Homes tend to be 
personal in nature, the clubhouse, however, symbolized a shared connection and group 
membership. Third, he and his wife wanted to be active members in their community; 
they wanted to be a part of something larger than themselves. In all, homeownership for 
them was an investment in the social relationships and a homeowners’ association 
represented the mechanism to build social relationships and community. 
 The view that homeownership is an investment in social relationships and 
community was common, especially in board members reasons for choosing to purchase 
a home in a homeowners’ association.96 Many of my interviewees noted that prior to 
purchasing their home they believed that homeowners’ association communities would 
better represent their interests and values because of owners’ membership in the 
                                                        
96 Interviewees explicitly cited personal relationships, shared values, shared interests, similar life stage and 
the like in 44 of the 56 interviews to describe why owning a home in a homeowners’ association appealed 
to them. 
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homeowners’ association. Group membership and a commitment to the group were 
resonant themes. Consider this board member’s commentary on the homeowners’ 
association as a voluntary organization: 
 You have to be a part of the association. Buying equals membership. To me this 
meant that you are in it together. So when I purchased my home I actually felt 
some comfort in that. I had just gone through a difficult selling process with my 
previous home because of the financial downturn. When I purchased my current 
home I really liked that I would now be a part of something that people had 
chosen to be a part of. 
 
I asked her to tell me more about why membership in the association was important to 
her given her difficulty in selling her previous home. She states: 
 Well I feel like we are working together to make the best community possible. 
Membership in an HOA means that you have a stake in something. Before I was 
selling a home on my own, when it comes time to sell my current home it won’t 
be on my own – I mean the work I put into my personal home will be part of it, 
but I won’t just be selling that, I’ll be selling a fabulous community too – one that, 
as a board member, I helped to build and maintain. I think it’s priceless really. We 
have real friendships here and such a small-town atmosphere. 
 
This board member’s admission is interesting not only because it echoes the sentiment 
that personal relationships are important in the home buying process, but also because of 
her purposeful emphasis on the voluntary nature of membership in a homeowners’ 
association.97 She frames a homeowners’ association as a type of voluntary association 
wherein members are united not only by their membership in the association, but also by 
their interests and values. By acknowledging the role of the association in the housing 
market she likens the process to one of cooperative capitalism. In her view, homeowners’ 
associations represent an autonomous entity whereby people voluntarily cooperate for 
                                                        
97 When an individual buys a home in a homeowners’ association he or she is automatically a member of 
the association. She and some of my other interviewees’ emphasis on the voluntary nature of membership 
are notable because some would characterize it as “forced” or “obligatory” membership. 
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their mutual economic and social benefit. She equated building a harmonious community 
and strong social relationships with building the economic value of the community. 
 Homeowner as Neighbor 
 As detailed in the “The Economic Logic of Homeownership – Homeowner as 
Investor” section of this chapter, the status of homeowner is incorporated as an important 
part of one’s identity. Whereas the economic logic of homeownership imparts the identity 
of “homeowner as investor”, the social logic of homeownership imparts the identity of 
“homeowner as neighbor”. Building upon the assumption of this institutional logic that 
homeownership is an investment in community and social relationships, this identity 
emphasizes one’s sense of self as a member of a social group, in this case a neighborhood 
or community. This identity is solidified through the process of “neighboring” and is 
supported by academic research which shows that homeowners, unlike more transient 
renters, will more readily forge personal relationships with their neighbors and nurture a 
sense of community.  The implication is that homeowners who identify as neighbors are 
more likely to involve themselves in community matters. 98 A board member, when asked 
about why he volunteered to serve on the board, reveals how he came to understand his 
identity: 
 I lived in my home for a long period of time and was never interested in serving 
on the board. I was busy—I worked full-time, I had had two young kids, and I just 
really didn’t need another obligation. To be honest, my wife and I were pretty 
self-centered at the time; we didn’t really take this whole association thing 
seriously. That changed though when we heard that our HOA board was 
supporting a measure to install a cell phone tower on our property. This was a 
                                                        
98 Galster’s (1987) investigation of neighborhood upkeep in Minneapolis and Ohio revealed that 
homeowners’ sense of familiarity and solidarity with their neighbors was significant in determining 
community involvement. 
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turning point for me because it really changed my perspective on the association. I 
got together with a few of my neighbors and we banded together to prevent it 
from happening. After that I realized I needed to serve on my board because we 
are each other’s business and we really need to be active. 
 
I asked him to explain more about why this was a pivotal turning point for him. He states: 
 Well, it started out of anger and the turning point came out of my reflection on the 
cause of that anger. I was outraged because it didn’t seem like the board valued 
our perspective on such a big decision. It propelled me to act. It changed my 
beliefs and it changed the way I felt about myself and my community. After that I 
realized that we are more than just people who bought a house next door to one 
another – we are neighbors, we are partners – and that means that all voices 
should be heard… and that we should act as one. 
 
His use of the label “neighbor” is laden with meaning. A neighbor, in his view, is not just 
someone who lives in close proximity; it is someone who shares similar values and unity 
of vision. It represents a connection that will inspire action and “neighborly” behavior. A 
non-board member unit owner expounds upon this point: 
 I really learned the importance of community in my current home. My husband 
died suddenly two years ago and because of that I moved to Boston to be closer to 
my daughter. In the day-to-day though I was alone and at 63-years old I was 
starting over. I used to sit in the patio area every afternoon because I was lonely, 
being inside by myself seemed claustrophobic. Well anyway, people started to 
notice me – in particular a young woman who lives in my development. She 
started to stop and talk to me on her way to her place. I guess she talked to others 
she knew in the development—she was a board member—and they started to stop 
by and talk to me too. Eventually the board decided to host a “social hour” once a 
month for people in the development to connect. This woman, for me, taught me 
about neighborliness and community. 
 
Taken together, these accounts define the identity of neighbor as one in which there is a 
social relationship between people that is characterized by a common boundary or 
interest, a commitment to shared values and beliefs, and an emotional connection or 
response that inspires action. The legitimacy of this identity comes from a strong 
  
145
ideological identification with the status of homeowner and a unity of action on the part 
of those beliefs. 
 Homeowners’ Association as a Family Business 
 Corporations and family businesses may both deal in the distribution of goods or 
services for profit, but there are real differences between the focus and intentions of the 
two types of enterprises. Corporations, and the investors who run them, in the strictest 
sense, are motivated solely by the profits at the expense of any other short- or long-term 
considerations. Family businesses, and its stewards, by contrast, act in the long-term 
interest of business and all of those involved. This distinction may be extended to beliefs 
about the purpose of a homeowners’ association as defined by the economic and social 
logics of homeownership. As I detailed earlier in this chapter the economic logic of 
homeownership likens  a homeowners’ association to a corporation and homeowners to 
investors, the social logic of homeownership, on the other hand, likens a homeowners’ 
association to a family business and homeowners to neighbors. The economic system of 
cooperative capitalism and its correspondent belief that homeownership is an investment 
in community creates a family business-like atmosphere in which there is an emphasis on 
enlightened self-interest, social relationships, and family politics. 
 The social logic of homeownership recognizes the business interests of 
homeowners’ associations, but does not frame those interests as purely driven by 
individual self-interest or a strict profit motive as may be expected by the economic logic 
of homeownership. Instead, the interests of the homeowners’ association are driven by 
“enlightened self-interest”. This concept, first introduced by Alexis de Tocqueville in 
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1835, refers to self-interest driven by serving the long-term good. As de Tocqueville 
noted in his book Democracy in America: “The Americans…are fond of explaining 
almost all of the actions of their lives by the principle of interest rightly understood; they 
show with complacency how an enlightened regard for themselves constantly prompts 
them to assist each other and inclines them willingly to sacrifice a portion of their time 
and property to the welfare of the state”. Board members who act as stewards for their 
association sacrifice some short-term interests of unit owners for the long-term interests 
of the association. One board member comments on his struggles to maintain a “patient 
capital” approach: 
 I am constantly struggling with how to make our unit owners understand the 
decision-making process of the board. Many of them are solely focused on the 
short-term; they want lower monthly fees and don’t even get me started about 
when we broach the topic of a special assessment. I have to remind them that if 
we don’t fix things now then little problems become big problems. It’s like 
medicine really—some preventative measures go a long way. 
 
This type of approach, a patient, preventative, and proactive approach, may be likened to 
family businesses in that owners of family businesses often have to forgo personal 
financial rewards in the short-term in order to help launch, nurture, grow, and maintain 
their businesses in the long-run. The pursuit of short-term profit usually undermines 
future security as in the case of one Boston-area condominium association that for years 
delayed capital investments in its infrastructure eventually leading the board to levy a 
$100,000 special assessment. Upon completion of their capital improvements projects the 
board released a memorandum stating the following: 
 We are writing to update you on the capital improvements projects that have 
taken place over the last several years. As you know the Board is charged with the 
responsibility of protecting the value of the Baldwin Condominium Trust. From 
  
147
the 1960s to the 1990s there was little maintenance done on the property and 
major renovations were deferred. This Board has taken an aggressive approach 
(both structural and cosmetic) to “catch up” on the deferred maintenance and 
bring the Condominium to a condition of which we are all proud. ….  While it is 
impossible to speak about the future in certain terms, the Board would like keep 
up this approach and plan now for the future. … While the Board has the ultimate 
responsibility for protecting the Condominium, the Board has always taken into 
account the desire of the majority of the Unit Owners. 
 
This memorandum references the importance of enlightened self-interest, responsible 
governance, and social relationships. The board must make responsible decisions that 
take into account the interests of all parties involved—including current and future unit 
owners. This will create an environment in which the “family” business system can 
continue to flourish and not fall victim to what one board member called the “tragedy of 
the association” as a riff off of the classic economic problem of the tragedy of the 
commons. This witty and future-thinking board member also shared his “rules” for 
governance in a homeowners’ association. The rules included making long-term 
stewardship a priority, running the association as a business but with a democratic and 
“community” focus, working with unit owners to ensure a smooth transition from “one 
generation to the next,” investing in education for “the kids,” and respecting and learning 
from other unit owners because “this business is personal”. 
The latter portion of his rules speaks to the importance of social relationships and 
the dynamics of “family” politics in homeowners’ associations. His choice of words like 
“next generation” and “the kids” to describe other members of the association was 
surprisingly common.99 The nature of the relationships in homeowners’ associations took 
                                                        
99 Twenty-five of my 56 interview respondents used the analogy of a family to describe personal 
relationships in homeowners’ associations. 
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several different forms, however, one common theme was that board members were 
“parents” and non-board members were “children”, children who were often in need of 
discipline. 
For example, one board member, when asked about why types of non-compliance 
with community rules and regulations occur, remarked: 
It’s almost like we [the board] are the parents and our children are trying to get 
away with things, either out of ignorance first, or they’re just trying to find a way 
around it. So one of the things we routinely do is we’ll go through the halls and 
the stairways and get after people about not leaving stuff out in the hallways. It’s 
a common area, don’t do it. Those are the kind of things that we feel like, “Why 
are we still even talking about this?” They are our children, and we are training 
them. But, it never ends. They never grow up. 
 
Another board member’s account uses a similar analogy after asked about whether or not 
the board is threatened with lawsuits by other non-board member unit owners: 
 No. They wouldn’t dare, they’re afraid. Now, what I see is, even if somebody 
asks for something that they really want, but they get an explanation about why 
we really can’t allow it and we say “You understand that right?” Really 
patronizing you know. They’ll go along with that now, more likely than a couple 
of years ago [before what she described as “a regime change” on the board]. So 
our children are growing up a bit. 
 
Not all characterizations, however, are negative. Board members liken homeowners’ 
associations to family businesses because of the complex mixture of the public and the 
private. The following board member makes note of the interplay between the two: 
 The place is well run and cared for. So we are able to establish boundaries 
between the business and the family. So we’re able to now get down to the social 
events. And you know what we discovered? Yeah, some of our neighbors are 
interesting people! And isn’t it nice, now we can have friendly relations with our 
neighbors, not everybody—we still got a couple of the crazy relatives you 
know—it’s like a family. How do you get the family together and have a nice 
time when the roof is leaking and there’s no hot water and there’s no heat and 
nobody is doing anything about those things? 
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Another common theme was that homeowners’ associations’ boards, much like 
family businesses, must develop a succession plan and prepare the “future generation” of 
board members. One board member reflected upon the imminent end of his term: 
I’m served several terms, probably more than I should have according to the 
CC&Rs, but I kind of founded this board after we took over from the developer. 
I’m ready to retire though, so to speak, because I can’t keep up with everything 
because of some health problems I’m having. So I’m stepping down at the end of 
my current term. I’m trying to find the right replacement though—the right person 
to pass the baton too, I want there to be consistency and an ease in the transition, 
and I want to know that the board will be run similarly to how I run it. 
 
The worry that this board member is feeling regarding his succession in reminiscent of 
the struggles that family businesses face when personal relationships are tested by the 
transition from one leader to the next. He felt the need to recruit and train the next 
generation of board members to ensure that they would keep his tradition and style of 
leadership alive in the association. 
In summary, my qualitative research identifies, explains, and defines the 
simultaneous presence of two institutional logics in homeowners’ associations, an 
economic logic of homeownership and a social logic of homeownership. The economic 
logic primarily draws from the institutional orders of the market, the corporation, and the 
state and is characterized by self-interest, rational and efficient practices, a profit motive, 
bureaucratization, and managerial control. The social logic primarily draws from the 
institutional orders of the community, the family, and the state and is characterized by 
group membership, ideological identification, personal relationships, and democratic 
participation. Both logics stem from the American history and ideology of 
homeownership, societal beliefs and expectations regarding the economic and social 
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benefits of homeownership, and serve to influence the identities, goals, and cognitive 
schemas of organizational actors in homeowners’ associations. 
The Ideology of Homeownership and the Logics of Homeownership in Homeowners’ 
Associations 
Ideology, Logics, and Cultural Embeddedness 
Homeowners’ associations are situated against the backdrop of the American 
ideology of homeownership and the organizational actors that populate homeowners’ 
associations are culturally embedded within in it. Cultural embeddedness is a critical 
component of Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s (2012) micro-foundational theory and 
refers to “the role of shared collective understandings in shaping strategies and goals” 
(Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990: 17). The ideology frames the American public’s 
understanding of homeownership and provides them with symbolic structures to 
understand and construct their environments. In the context of homeowners’ associations, 
the ideology frames the purpose of the organization and imposes a set of expected goals 
and modes of action upon the organizational actors that reside within it. It represents a 
top-down structure that informs, focuses, and directs the attention of social actors. I argue 
that, in practice, the American history and ideology of homeownership generates and 
institutionalizes two logics of homeownership and that institutional complexity results 
from the problematic intersection of the American history and ideology of 
homeownership and homeowners’ associations’ hybrid organizational form. The two 
logics of homeownership generate conflicting visions about the purpose of 
homeownership, the nature of the identity of homeowner, and the purpose of a 
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homeowners’ association. Figure 3-1 diagrams the cultural embeddedness of 
homeowners’ associations and describes the layered relationships between the American 
ideology of homeownership, institutional sectors, the logics of homeownership, and the 
beliefs, goals, and expectations that they impose on organizational actors.  
The identification of the economic and social logics of homeownership bring to 
the fore how the American history and ideology of homeownership produces a cultural 
rhetoric of homeownership that is mismatched to the organizational structure and 
composition of homeowners’ associations. One can see in Figure 3-1 that the institution 
of homeownership is complicated by the communal nature of homeowners’ associations. 
Homeowners’ associations, by virtue of their hybrid organizational form, sit at the crux 
of two different ideas about homeownership – one that primarily views homeownership 
as an individualistic endeavor (the economic logic) and one that primarily views 
homeownership as a collective endeavor (the social logic). Because institutional logics 
shape the “rules of the game” and “promulgate assumptions” about organizational vision, 
purpose, and behavior, the mere presence of multiple logics forces organizational actors 
to “play in two or more games at the same time” (Kraatz and Block, 2008: 243). 
To the extent that this is true, the presence of both the economic logic of 
homeownership and the social logic of homeownership in homeowners’ associations 
creates two different “rules of the game”. On the one hand, board members have the 
economic logic of homeownership available to them. This logic draws from the 
institutional orders of the market, the corporation, and the state and is characterized by 
self-interest, rational and efficient practices, a profit motive, bureaucratization and  
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Figure 3-1: Cultural Embeddedness of Homeowners’ Associations 
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managerial control. It makes homeownership a financial investment, the homeowner an 
investor, and the homeowners’ association a corporation. On the other hand, board 
members have the social logic of homeownership available to them. This logic draws 
from the institutional orders of the community, the family, and the state and is 
characterized by group membership, ideological identification, personal relationships, 
and democratic participation. It makes homeownership an investment in community, the 
homeowner a neighbor, and the homeowners’ association a family business. Institutional 
complexity results from the simultaneous accessibility of these logics by organizational 
actors and the contradictions of the relative orders of the logics. 
Institutional Complexity and the Space for Agency 
The mere availability of both logics, however, is critical because it creates the 
space for agency on the part of organizational actors. Given the availability of multiple 
logics, individuals have the potential for agency in choosing which of the multiple logics 
they rely on for social action and interaction (Friedland and Alford, 1991). The choice of 
logics is dependent upon bottom-up attentional processes such as individual differences 
in the degree of cultural embeddedness and the salience of the logics given the situation 
(Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012). For example, a board member who is more 
strongly embedded in the economic logic of homeownership may neglect the social 
responsibilities of the association and focus solely on her identity as an investor. In doing 
so, she would only activate the economic logic of homeownership and her decisions on 
association matters would be solely motivated by profit. Likewise, a board member who 
is more strongly embedded in the social logic of homeownership may be more likely to 
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focus his attention on the social dynamics of the association, focusing on building 
personal relationships at the expense of potential profit. There is also the option that a 
board member could be equally embedded in the economic and social logics of 
homeownership and may “activate” one logic over the other given the salience of 
environmental stimuli in a particular situation. The latter case of which represents the 
optimal space for agency—or the potential for purposeful action on the part of 
organizational actors. Board members in homeowners’ associations arguably act with 
bounded intentionality: they are culturally embedded in a social group with which they 
identify and which structures and conditions their interests and goals.  
Consider the following two accounts of my observations of two homeowners’ 
associations meetings: 
A fight is brewing between board members and homeowners during the quarterly 
open owner meeting of the Seaside Community Trust.100 One of the homeowners 
has just approached the microphone to speak with the board during the Q&A 
portion of the meeting. Before he even gets a word out the head of the 
management company the homeowners’ association hires to manage the everyday 
workings of the organization steps forward to remind everyone to be “civil” and 
“constructive” with their comments. The homeowner, visibly angry, speaks loudly 
in to the microphone: “It is just children having fun. It was a summer afternoon of 
fun. It is not of your concern. Your focus should be on our money… our 
investment. That is your job. Your job is not to stop and police our kids—the 
community’s kids. I am not [he takes a moment to look back at the 20-25 
homeowners gathered behind him]—we are not going to stand for this. I will not 
pay this [he holds up and shakes what appears to be a letter from the board]. You 
need to make the right decision here. You need to make the right decision for us.” 
 
Months later in a different homeowners’ association meeting some 25 miles away 
another heated disagreement is taking place, this time, however, the disagreement 
is between two board members. The chairman of the board is calling for a vote 
                                                        
100 Names of homeowners’ associations and interviewees have been replaced with pseudonyms to protect 
respondent confidentiality. 
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about whether or not to levy a $150,000 special assessment on the association. He 
argues that the special assessment is “badly needed” and will “ultimately increase 
our property values.” Another board member responds: “That may be true, but we 
just can’t—and shouldn’t—do this right now. We can’t drive the community apart 
right now. We’ve just healed and we just need time… the economy… isn’t good 
right now. Nothing is good right now. This just isn’t the time for this. We need 
peace. We need stability. We need to focus first on building their [the 
homeowners] trust in us. We need to be good neighbors right now.” 
 
These two scenarios seem quite different at first glance. In the first case, a 
homeowner is protesting a citation from the board fining him for his child’s chalk 
drawings on the sidewalk outside of his house. He is calling upon the board to decide not 
only to dismiss the fine, but also to change the rules of the association so that situations 
like this do not occur in the future.  In the second case, a board member is presenting a 
case for why the board should decide not to levy an expensive special assessment on the 
association given that the association has just settled a lawsuit against a former board 
member who was found guilty of embezzling funds from the association. 
A closer examination of these accounts, however, reveals the influence of both 
logics of homeownership and their references to the American history and ideology of 
homeownership. It also reveals the mismatch between the cultural rhetoric of 
homeownership and the organizational structure and culture of homeowners’ 
associations. This mismatch creates the space for agency on the part of organizational 
actors. In the first scenario, the homeowner is both advocating against and for both the 
economic and social logics of homeownership. He is fighting the board’s decision to fine 
him for his child’s sidewalk chalk drawings (presumably because it impacts the financial 
value of the community) and charging them to only focus on the economic logic of 
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homeownership, while at the same time pushing the board to think about the community 
and to make decisions that allow personal relationships to flourish. The second scenario 
exhibits a similarly scaly conflict. In this case, the board member is invoking the 
importance of the social logic of homeownership at the expense of the economic logic of 
homeownership. She is able to access both logics, but given the situation, is advocating 
for the activation of the social logic; she wants to preserve the personal relationships of 
the association until the time is right to enact and use the economic logic. 
Institutional Logics as Bits of Culture 
The concurrent presence of multiple logics in various organizational 
environments and the newly recognized ability of organizational actors to exercise 
agency in the practice of institutional logics warrants the reconceptualization of 
institutional logics. Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s (2012) micro-foundational theory 
of institutional logics and their model of human behavior as situated, embedded, and 
boundedly intentional allows for both enabling and constraining effects (rather than just 
constraining effects as institutional theory has traditionally assumed). This model thus 
effectively decouples logics from institutional orders. The disassociation of logics from 
institutions sanctions “a theorization of logics as flexible bits of culture that constitute 
actors and shape their actions” (Glynn, 2013: 2). In practice this means that 
organizational actors can draw upon multiple institutional logics in the decisions and 
actions they make in an organization. Envisaging of logics in this way has an affinity to 
Swidler’s (1986) cultural toolkit approach in that it conceives of organizational actors of 
having a repertoire of logics that they can choose from in the decision-making process.   
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By identifying, explaining, and defining the logics present in homeowners’ 
associations and showing how they intersect with the American ideology of 
homeownership and the hybrid organizational form of homeowners’ associations, one 
can better assess the how institutional logics become present and accessible in these 
organizations and how they are they are enacted in the beliefs, decisions, and activities of 
organizational actors. I show how homeowners’ associations exist in institutionally 
pluralistic and complex environments which require organizational actors to exercise 
bounded intentionality and highlight the ability of institutional logics to both enable and 
constrain organizational actors’ agency.  
Conclusion 
 One of the main goals of this chapter was to identify, explain, and define the 
available institutional logics that govern the setting of a homeowners’ association. 
Identifying the available logics and distinguishing the differences among and between 
these logics was important to understanding how and when these logics are enacted in 
practice and the potential consequences of their enactment. Existing research often 
implicitly assumes that if multiple logics exist it is: first, problematic, and second, the 
result of different organizational actors bringing different institutional logics to bear in 
the organizational environment. My qualitative data, however, drawing from and building 
upon the institutional pluralism and institutional complexity constructs and Thornton, 
Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s (2012) meta-theory of institutional logics and micro-
foundational theory of institutional logics, suggests that an organizational actor can draw 
upon multiple logics in a singular organizational setting. In the next chapter I will detail 
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the enactment of institutional logics in homeowners’ associations and explore how 
organizational actors’ responses to institutional pluralism and complexity, in particular 
those actualized in organizational actors’ perceptions and practices, and use or disuse of 
multiple logics may create the potential for more and less intra-organizational conflict. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: “DOING” LOGICS TO LESSEN CONFLICTS 
 
Introduction 
Intra-organizational conflict is common in all types of organizations; it is 
naturally occurring and to be expected. The presence and nature of conflict, however, 
varies and can be detrimental to the functioning of an organization and its organizational 
actors. Structural explanations of conflict suggest that organizational and board 
structures, or characteristics of the organization itself, will best explain the existence of 
conflict. Cultural explanations of conflict suggest that an organization’s culture, or its 
congruity of organizational vision, will best explain the existence of conflict. As I have 
shown in the last two chapters, both of these explanations have merit. They can, to an 
extent, explain the presence of conflict. And while cultural explanations have proven to 
better explain the occurrence of conflict in institutionally pluralistic and complex hybrid 
organizations like homeowners’ associations—where the dual presence of the economic 
logic of homeownership and the social logic of homeownership exist in opposition to one 
another—they still cannot fully explain the intra-organizational conflict that hybrid 
organizations experience. Neither the structural nor the cultural explanations of conflict 
can explain the variability in intra-organizational conflict that hybrid organizations 
experience. What makes some hybrid organizations more conflicted and other hybrid 
organizations less conflicted? 
A close examination of both explanations reveals some glaring oversights and 
troubling assumptions; namely their failure to fully consider the role of organizational 
participants and their agentic potential to cause both more and less conflict. Structural 
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explanations focus only on characteristics of the organization itself (i.e., organizational 
and board structures) omitting the concern for other organizational variables. Cultural 
explanations are somewhat better, but still do not consider bottom-up attentional 
strategies. This failure has recently been acknowledged in the institutional and 
institutional logics literature which notes that while there is a rich literature studying how 
macro-level institutions affect meso-level organizational strategies and structures 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, 2004; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012), 
there are very few studies which detail how micro-level processes, such as how social 
actors respond to multiple institutional logics or translate institutional logics into their 
everyday perceptions and practices, affect meso-level organizational outcomes. This is 
especially true in hybrid organizations where conditions of institutional pluralism and 
complexity are automatically presumed to create conflict (Figure 4-1 displays this 
relationship).101 
Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s (2012) micro-theory of the institutional logics 
perspective detailed in the previous chapter is meant to endorse research in this area. I use 
elements of their micro-theory in addition to recent scholarship in the institutional work 
and institutional ambidexterity literatures to advance a third explanation for the presence 
of and variability in intra-organizational conflict in hybrid organizations like 
homeowners’ associations.  
                                                        
101 As I noted in Chapter Three: Identifying, Explaining, and Defining the Logics of Homeownership, I do 
not see the constructs of institutional pluralism and institutional complexity as synonymous. I differentiate 
the two constructs based on their influence in the organizational environment. For me, institutional 
pluralism refers to situations where multiple logics are present, but are not simultaneously accessible or do 
not exist in direct contradiction with one another and institutional complexity refers to situations where 
multiple logics are present, accessible, and contradictory. This view is in keeping with recent scholarship 
from Pache and Santos (2010) and Besharov and Smith (2013). 
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Figure 4-1: Traditional Causal Model 
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ambidextrous organizations, perceive the simultaneous presence and accessibility of 
multiple institutional logics as novel and instinctively treat it by disrupting one or more 
institutional logics. They do this by contesting or separating one or more logics. In 
practice this response creates a self-reinforcing cycle of problem and contestation and 
ultimately results in an incongruous organizational vision and more intra-organizational 
conflict. Homeowners’ associations that respond to institutional pluralism and complexity 
ambidextrously are less conflicted. Board members in ambidextrous homeowners’ 
associations perceive the simultaneous presence and accessibility of multiple institutional 
logics as routine and purposefully “do” logics to lessen conflicts. They actively maintain 
and use both the economic logic of homeownership and the social logic of 
homeownership and “do” logics by making adjustments, improvising, and switching 
between logics on a context-specific basis. In practice this response creates a self-
reinforcing cycle of ambidextrous action and ultimately results in a congruous 
organizational vision and less intra-organizational conflict. 
My focus in this chapter then is to demonstrate how board members’ responses to 
multiple, permanent, and conflicting institutional logics affect organizational outcomes. I 
aim to show that the decoupling of institutional logics from institutions creates the space 
for organizational actors to exercise agency. Organizational actors, namely board 
members of homeowners’ associations, are able to use informed discretion to draw from 
their institutional logics “toolkit” and strategically “do” logics for the benefit of the 
organization. “Doing logics” means to perform complex, continuing, and context-related 
actions which inscribe different organizational perceptions and practices within one 
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organizational space.102 By “doing logics” they are able to lessen significant intra-
organizational conflict and address coexisting and opposing institutional logics as a “part 
of the ordinary, everyday nature of [organizational] work, rather than [as] exceptional 
phenomena” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009: 289). 
The organization of this chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will review 
several “problem-based” models of organizational responses to institutional pluralism 
and complexity. These models focus more on top-down processes than bottom-up 
attention strategies and are primarily concerned with organizational strategies to “correct” 
the problem of institutional pluralism and complexity. Second, I will review recent 
theoretical and empirical work in the institutional theory literature which seeks to develop 
an alternative organizational response to institutional pluralism and complexity. This 
practice-based approach focuses on how organizational actors interact and act in 
institutionally pluralistic and complex settings, exalts the potential benefits of 
institutional pluralism and complexity, and centers on the concepts of institutional work 
and institutional ambidexterity. Third, I will use my interview, observation, and textual 
data to compare and contrast organizational responses to institutional pluralism and 
complexity in ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous homeowners’ associations. I will 
show how organizational actors’ perceptions and practices create the conditions for both 
more and less intra-organizational conflict. Finally, I will re-visit my argument that it is 
organizational actors’ not-doing or doing of logics, rather than just the mere presence of 
                                                        
102 I am liberally borrowing the terminology of West and Zimmerman (1987) to describe the ways in which 
organizational actors codify and manifest multiple, potentially contradictory, institutional logics. 
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multiple and opposing institutional logics, that creates the potential for more and less 
intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations. 
Organizational Responses to Institutional Pluralism and Complexity 
 Identifying and Predicting Responses 
 The nature of institutional pluralism and complexity demands that organizations 
respond to multiple and sometimes conflicting institutional demands. How organizations 
respond to institutional pluralism and institutional complexity has been the focus of much 
recent research. This research centers on identifying meso-level strategic organizational 
response strategies to deal with the “problem” of institutional pluralism (Oliver, 1991; 
Kraatz and Block, 2008) and predicting organizational response strategies given the 
nature of the conflict caused by institutional complexity (Pache and Santos, 2010).   
 Oliver (1991) set an early precedent for seeking to understand strategic responses 
to institutional processes.103 She suggested that organizations, and their members, might 
not simply respond to institutional demands with passive compliance (as suggested by 
prevailing isomorphic theories) but could employ a range of “strategic” responses to deal 
with institutional pressures. Oliver argued that organizations may defy isomorphic 
pressure from powerful institutions either by quietly ignoring those pressures or by 
actively challenging and attacking the sources of those pressures when they believe they 
can demonstrate the rationality or righteousness of their position or when they believe 
they have little to lose by exercising agency. She specified five types of organizational 
responses to plural institutional pressures including acquiescence, compromise, 
                                                        
103 Oliver’s (1991) model of strategic responses integrates institutional theory and resource dependency 
theory. 
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avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. The adoption of each response is bound to 
institutional factors including cause, constituency, content, control, and context. The 
response of acquiescence, for example, may require the organization (and its members) to 
accede to demands of the institutional environment and can result from habit (an 
unconscious adherence to taken-for-granted norms), imitation (conscious or 
unconscious), and voluntary compliance. Because acquiescence is essentially an act of 
conformity, Oliver suggested that organizations are highly likely to resort to more 
resistant strategies like compromise (i.e., a mild alteration of demands and/or responses), 
avoidance (i.e., circumventing, buffering, or escaping institutional influence), defiance 
(i.e., explicit rejection via dismissal or challenge), or manipulation (i.e., active alteration 
via co-option, influence, or control).  
 Kraatz and Block (2008) adapted and extended Oliver’s (1991) typology to 
specifically address how organizations respond to what they termed institutional 
pluralism. They propose that under conditions of organizational change, and in particular 
during periods of institutional plurality, there are multiple ways in which an organization 
can address its self-concept and purpose. First, the organization can eliminate pluralism 
by ignoring or resisting the new institutional logic and by preserving its original 
institutional logic. In this case, resistance is deployed (a la Oliver’s (1991) four resistance 
strategies) in the name of a strong commitment to a particular organizational identity and 
history (Kraatz and Block, 2008; King, Falin, and Whetten, 2010). The organization can 
also eliminate pluralism by favoring the new institutional logic, essentially denying the 
validity of or deleting the old institutional logic and embracing a new monolithic self-
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concept (Pratt and Foreman, 2000). Second, the organization can attempt to balance the 
plurality of its institutional demands by loosely coupling its institutional logics or trying 
to increase cooperation between institutional logics. This would involve forging strategic 
linkages between institutional demands in order to work towards the same end (Pratt and 
Foreman, 2000; Binder, 2007) and effectively yields a multiple-identity or a “blended” 
hybrid organization. Third, the organization can decouple and “compartmentalize” its 
self-concepts and relate independently to its multiple constituencies (Kraatz and Block, 
2008; Pratt and Foreman, 2000; Binder, 2007) yielding a “structurally differentiated” 
hybrid organization. Finally, the organization may “forge [a] durable identity of [its] 
own” and emerge as an “institution in [its] own right” (Kraatz and Block, 2008: 262). In 
this situation, the organization would, to an extent, detach from its institutional 
environment, make itself anew, and become self-reinforcing. 
 Pache and Santos (2010) build upon Oliver’s (1991) and Kraatz and Block’s 
(2008) models of response strategies to institutional pluralism by detailing the conditions 
under which different response strategies are likely to be utilized. Pache and Santos’s 
model, in contrast to the earlier models which largely ignored the role of internal 
organizational actors, focuses on how intra-organizational dynamics filter, alter, and 
inform responses to institutional complexity (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). They 
recognize that although there may be institutional pluralism that does not necessarily 
mean there is problematic institutional complexity. In other words, just because multiple 
logics may be present and available to the organization that does not mean multiple logics 
are directly represented in the organization; not all situations of institutional pluralism are 
  
167
equally complex. The relative power of logic’s representation in the organization is of 
particular importance to determining degree of complexity. 
Their model identifies organizational responses to situations in which the conflict 
between institutional logics goes unresolved at the field level and is internalized in the 
organization. They posit that the preferred organizational response strategies 
(acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, or manipulation) are dependent upon 
the nature of the demands and internal representation. They predict that organizational 
responses will vary based on whether the conflict is over “means only” disagreements 
(there is institutional/organizational agreement on the goals of the organization, but 
disagreement about the means or methods to achieve these goals) or “goals” 
disagreements (there is institutional/organizational disagreement about the goals the 
organization should pursue) and whether there are zero, one, or two or more conflicting 
demands (Pache and Santos, 2010: 463-470). Their emphasis on the presence, 
representation, and power of the institutional logics underlines the importance of the 
internal political dimensions of the organization; the more balanced the power structure 
is, the higher the likelihood of organizational paralysis and breakup. Heimer (1999) 
similarly recognizes the role of power and status in the decision-making process of 
organizations, in particular the status of the logic “carrier”. Her analysis of the competing 
influences of law, medicine, and family in neonatal intensive care found that 
organizational actors who routinely participate in organizational decisions (e.g., the 
dominant carriers such as physicians in hospitals) are more influential than organizational 
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actors who are only part-time participants (e.g., non-dominant carriers such as parents of 
patients) (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
These models of institutional pluralism and strategic responses to institutional 
complexity are helpful in that they take steps to systematically predict the influence of 
multiple logics in an institutional environment and connect that to organizational-level 
responses to complex, and potentially conflict-ridden, institutional environments. 
Nonetheless, these models are still predominantly outward-focused and problem-based; 
they are more concerned with organizational efforts to achieve social endorsement and 
legitimacy via external referents and less concerned with how multiple logics are 
reflected and refracted in the organization’s structures and, more importantly, the 
perceptions and practices of organizational actors. This is a critique that recent work in 
the institutional complexity, work, and ambidexterity literature has sought to rectify 
through advocating a practice-based approach to studying institutions. 
Adapting Structures and Practices 
 The concept of institutional work describes “the purposive action of individuals 
and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006: 215) and the concept of institutional ambidexterity describes the 
ability to “simultaneously perform contradictory processes when both are critical to 
organizational success” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013: 45).104 As arms of institutional theory, 
                                                        
104 Ambidexterity literally means the ability to use one’s hands equally well. Organizational and 
management scholars have appropriated this term and leveraged this metaphor to deal with paradoxes; such 
as how organizations can simultaneously engage in both “exploitation” and “exploration” (March, 1991; 
Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). Exploitation refers to an organization’s ability to be “aligned and efficient” 
with current business demands while exploration refers to an organization’s ability to be “adaptive to 
changes in the environment” (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008: 685). 
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these two concepts are at the forefront of efforts by institutional theorists to establish a 
broader vision of individual agency in relationship to organizations and institutions. They 
represent components of a practice-based approach to the study of organizations and an 
alternative response to institutional complexity. Such an approach focuses on how 
institutional pluralism is reflected in the structure and practices of organizations 
(Greenwood et al., 2011) and sits in contrast to strategy-based approaches of identifying 
and predicting organizational responses to institutional pluralism. 
 Practice Approach 
 A practice-based approach to institutions (Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009; 
Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, and Van de Ven, 2009; Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007; Smets, 
Morris, and Greenwood, 2012) is “particularly well-positioned for generating actionable 
insights into the relationship of organizational and institutional life … [and is] 
particularly relevant in institutionally complex settings, in which coexisting and 
potentially conflicting logics are ‘part of the ordinary, everyday nature of work, rather 
than exceptional phenomena’ (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009: 289)” (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2013: 37). This approach focuses on explaining the relationship between human action 
and the cultures and structures in which actors are embedded (Bourdieu, 1997, 1990, 
1993; Giddens, 1984). DiMaggio and Powell (1991), in their early call to explore practice 
as a micro-foundation for institutional research, suggested that this type of approach was 
needed in institutional theory because it would help institutional theorists to develop a 
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more balanced view of the relationship between actors and institutions.105 Although 
researchers did not immediately respond to DiMaggio and Powell’s call, they are now 
increasingly advocating for a practice-based approach.106  
Recent theory and research in this area (e.g., Jarzabkowski, 2005; Jarzabkowski, 
Balogun, and Seidl, 2007; Schatzki, 2001) directs attention to how local actors interact 
with, construct, and draw upon their context in their everyday activities and practices. 
There is an explicit and purposeful focus on the mundane: “how people engage in the 
doing of ‘real work’” (Cook and Brown, 1999: 387), particularly in situations of 
institutional complexity. Recent examinations of institutional complexity using a 
practice-based approach to institutions include Jarzabkowski et al.’s (2009) study of 
market and regulatory logics in a telecommunications company, Smets et al.’s (2012) 
study of German and English professional logics in a law firm merger, and Zilber’s 
(2002) study of feminist and clinical logics in a rape crisis center, all of which focus on 
the practical coping of individual actors with multiple and potentially competing 
institutional logics in their everyday activities. Each of the studies takes actions, 
interactions, and negotiations between multiple individuals as their core unit of analysis 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Jarzabkowski et al., 2007) and considers the mutually 
reinforcing relationships between organizational actors, organizations, and institutions. 
                                                        
105 By drawing on a practice-based approach, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) thought that institutional 
theorists would be better able to find a mid-point between over- and under-socialized views of agency. 
Their advocacy of this approach came from their critique of the neo-institutionalism and institutional 
entrepreneurship perspectives respectively. 
106 Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca (2009: 5-6) suggest that little work in institutional theory has used a 
practice-based approach because 1) institutional studies of organization tend to accentuate the role of 
collective actors rather than individual actors and 2) the relative temporal orientation of action in the 
practice approach is short- or long-term, while the temporal orientation of action in institutional approaches 
is intermediate in nature. They introduce the concept of institutional work to mitigate these tensions. 
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 Institutional Work 
 The concept of institutional work depicts institutional actors as reflexive, goal-
oriented, and capable, focuses on actors’ actions, and strives to capture structure, agency, 
and their interrelations (Battilana, Leca, Boxenbaum, 2009). Scholarly work in the area is 
oriented around discovering how institutions are created, maintained, and disrupted and 
can be broadly divided into three categories: studies of how institutional work occurs 
(e.g., institutional entrepreneurship, political work, technical work, cultural work, 
practice work, boundary work), studies of who does institutional work (e.g., 
professionals, leaders, collectives), and studies of what constitutes institutional work 
(e.g., individual agency) (Lawrence, Leca, and Zilber, 2013).107 The crux of the concept 
of institutional work is on how actors engage in three distinct work practices: institutional 
creation, institutional maintenance, and institutional disruption. 
 Institutional creation examines how new institutions emerge and become 
established with corresponding institutional logics. It builds upon the concept of 
institutional entrepreneurship and primarily explores the kinds of actors who work to 
create institutions, the environmental conditions that surround their work, and the work 
strategies they employ (Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002; Hargadon and 
Douglas, 2001; Lawrence, 1999; Lounsbury, 2001; Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence, 
2004). It is the most studied form of institutional work. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 
221) specify three types of work associated with creating institutions: “overtly political 
                                                        
107 For representative studies of how institutional work occurs see Slager, Gond, and Moon (2012), 
Perkmann and Spicer (2008), Zietsma and Lawrence (2010), and Dacin, Munir, and Tracey, 2010); who 
does institutional work see Suddaby and Viale (2011), Empson, Cleaver, and Allen (2013), Kraatz (2009), 
and Dorado (2013); and what constitutes institutional work see Battilana and D’Aunno (2009), Zundel, 
Holt, and Cornelissen (2013), and Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013). 
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work in which actors reconstruct rules, property rights and boundaries that define access 
to material resources,” “actions in which actors’ belief systems are reconfigured,” and “ 
actions designed to alter abstract categorizations in which the boundaries of meaning 
systems are altered.” Creation work is particularly relevant in the context of institutional 
pluralism where there is the potential for the generation of a new logic and/or the 
readjusting and reconfiguring of existing belief systems and meanings (Jarzabkowski, 
Matthiesen, and Van de Ven, 2009). 
 Institutional maintenance examines how institutions are self-reproducing, or 
actively created and re-created through everyday practice. It is the least studied and most 
overlooked form of institutional work. It is the most overlooked form of institutional 
work because it often occurs quietly due to the taken-for-granted status of institutions 
(Phillips and Malhotra, 2008; Scott, 2008).  Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 230) identify 
two main types of maintenance work, those that address the maintenance of institutions 
through “ensuring adherence to rules systems” and those that focus efforts on maintaining 
institutions by “reproducing existing norms and belief systems.” Jarzabkowski, 
Matthiesen, and Van de Ven (2009: 288) argue that the concept of institutional 
maintenance is especially pertinent to the study of institutional pluralism because “when 
multiple, potentially contradictory logics coexist, it seems that any particular institution 
must continuously be maintained, in order to not be dominated by other competing 
logics.” 
 Institutional disruption examines how institutions are undermined, disembodied, 
or disturbed. It occurs when existing institutions do not meet the interests of local actors 
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who are able to band together to interrupt institutional processes. Disruption work is often 
assumed to be a precursor for institutional change (Greenwood et al., 2002) or 
deinstitutionalization. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 235-237) name three forms of 
disruption work: “disconnect[ing] rewards and sanctions from sets of practices, 
technologies, or rules,” “dissociating the practice, technologies, or rules from its moral 
foundations,” and “undermining core assumptions and beliefs.” Jarzabkowski, 
Matthiesen, and Van de Ven (2009: 289) propose disruption work is also important to 
understanding institutional pluralism because “competing institutions may seek to disrupt 
each other.” Few studies, however, have examined institutional disruption in the context 
of institutional pluralism because of the underlying assumption that any conflict or 
disruption is due to the “shift” from one dominant institution or logic to another. 
Consequently, the extent to which institutional disruption is possible, particularly if 
multiple institutions are legitimate and have the ability to maintain their logics, beliefs, 
and practices, has not been extensively studied. 
 A practice approach to the study of institutional work examines how institutions 
are created, maintained, and disrupted through the actions, interactions, and negotiations 
of multiple actors. Research applying the practice approach and the concept of 
institutional work to the study of institutional pluralism sit in contrast to prior studies of 
institutional pluralism which mainly focus at the field level of analysis and which view 
institutional pluralism primarily as source of institutional change either through 
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substitution, sedimentation, or synthesis of institutional logics.108 Jarzabkowski, 
Matthiesen, and Van de Ven (2009)’s real-time case study of a utility company and its 
constituent actors grappling with opposing market and regulatory institutional logics 
offers an alternative explanation for how organizations and organizational actors cope 
with institutional pluralism over time. They find that both the market logic and the 
regulatory logic remained “intact and discrete” throughout their longitudinal analysis and 
identified work practices through which organizational actors engaged with both logics 
and actively did creation work, maintenance work, and disruption work in their routine 
and day-to-day activities and decisions. For example, after discrete periods of 
institutional disruption, incompatibility, conflict, creation, there was, eventually, 
adjustment. Adjustment in the organization required the active maintaining and 
reinforcing of and adherence to both the market and regulatory logics. The authors 
ultimately conclude that under conditions of institutional pluralism, actors “must 
continuously maintain opposing institutional logics, which requires them to engage in the 
politicized work of creating their own institutional logic and disrupting the opposing 
logic” (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, and Van de Ven, 2009: 313). They thusly show the 
possibility for ongoing situations of institutional pluralism and complexity, mutual 
maintenance and interdependencies between multiple logics, and the potential for 
organizational actors to exercise agency in their everyday practices and shape 
organizational responses, organizations, and institutions. 
                                                        
108 As previously noted, many studies of institutional pluralism posit that pluralism is a source of 
institutional change. Change can happen via substitution (an existing institutional logic is replaced by a 
new institutional logic), sedimentation (a new institutional logic is layered over an existing institutional 
logic), and synthesis (reconciliation of an existing institutional logic with a new institutional logic). 
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 Institutional Ambidexterity 
 The concept of institutional ambidexterity emerged as mechanism to address the 
extraordinary challenge of individuals and organizations to develop the simultaneous 
capacity to engage in two (or more) predominant beliefs and practices and with two (or 
more) distinct institutional logics. It represents a different approach to studying 
organizational responses to institutional complexity because it does not portray multiple 
logics as fundamentally incompatible or emphasize the “paradoxical cognitive frames” 
(Smith and Tushman, 2005), “inherent contradictions” (Lavie et al., 2010), or 
“paradoxical challenges” (Jansen et al., 2009) of institutional pluralism and complexity. 
Instead, research in this area focuses on the adaptation of organizational structures and 
practices, particularly by organizational actors, to manage and potentially benefit from 
the presence of multiple, potentially contradictory, logics.  
 Structural Ambidexterity 
 Greenwood et al. (2011) point to the development of hybrid organizational 
structures as an adaptation to the management of institutional complexity. They argue 
that the development of “blended” and “structurally differentiated” hybrid organizations 
(Simsek, 2009) resonate with the organizational ambidexterity literature which focuses 
on the simultaneous development of organizations to functionally both “exploit” and 
“explore” (March, 1991; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). They state: “[Blended hybrid 
organizations] seek to synthesize processes of exploitation and exploration within the 
same organizational unit, whereas [structurally differentiated hybrid organizations] 
partition—compartmentalize—them into separate units” (Greenwood et al., 2011: 352). 
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Hybrid organizations may be better suited organizational structures to address the beliefs 
and activities required of multiple institutional logics. 
 Blended hybrid organizations layer institutional logics and manage organizational 
responses to institutional pluralism and complexity through acts of reflexivity and 
agency. Organizational actors “wittingly” (Greenwood et al., 2011; Boxenbaum and 
Jonsson, 2008) or consciously, purposefully, and with awareness combine and integrate 
beliefs and practices from multiple institutional logics. This is adaptation is akin to the 
organizational responses of “loose coupling” (Kraatz and Block, 2008) and “forging 
strategic linkages” (Pratt and Foreman, 2000; Binder, 2007) that may ultimately result in 
a synthesis of institutional logics.109 Important questions remain, however, regarding how 
multiple institutional logics are effectively “blended” and managed by organizational 
actors and the organization. Research by Battilana and Dorado (2010) on successful and 
unsuccessful adaptations of organizational structures and practices in two microfinance 
banks in Bolivia suggests that this type of adaptation is only possible in cases where 
organizational members do not have any attachments to or prior experience with the 
logics; leading to the conclusion that blended hybridization is only possible in new 
organizations (Greenwood et al., 2011).110  
                                                        
109 Greenwood et al. (2011) liken blended hybrid organizations to the “inhabited institutions” perspective 
(Hallet and Ventresca, 2006), but question whether this type of hybrid organizational structure ultimately 
becomes institutionalized within the organization resulting in “uncontested settlements” (Rao and Kenney, 
2008) or exist with ongoing tension and conflict that must be managed by ongoing practices of agency and 
reflexivity. Similarly, Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Bednarek (2013) question whether blended hybridization 
will ultimately produce “slippage” towards either logic. 
110 Greenwood et al. (2011) go on to suggest that the construction of organizational identity is an important 
mechanism through which organizational responses to institutional complexity are determined. This echoes 
sentiments from other institutional theorists (e.g., Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012; Creed, DeJordy, 
and Lok, 2010; Glynn, 2008; Kodeih and Greenwood, 2013; Kraatz and Block, 2008; Lok, 2010; Rao et al., 
2003). 
  
177
 Structurally differentiated hybrid organizations separate, compartmentalize, or 
partition an organization so that different levels, units, or persons deal in specific logics 
(Anand, Gardner, and Morris, 2007; Kraatz and Block, 2008; Pratt and Foreman, 2000). 
This organizational response essentially decouples potentially conflicting logics and 
creates organizational ambidexterity by default. This type of hybrid organization is fairly 
common (e.g., universities, hospitals, multinational corporations) though relatively 
understudied. Recent inquiries in the area have focused on the relationships between 
differentiation and integration (e.g., Binder, 2007; Reay and Hinings, 2009; Jarzabkowski 
et al., 2009; Goodrick and Reay, 2011), boundary management (e.g., Carlile, 2002; Ferlie 
et al., 2005; Simsek, 2009), and identity and leadership (e.g., O’Reilly and Tushman, 
2004; Jansen et al., 2009; Fang, Lee, and Schilling, 2010; Kraatz, 2010, and Pratt and 
Kraatz, 2010). Institutional theorists’ understanding of how ambidexterity functions in 
these organizations, however, remains very limited because of the literature’s almost 
singular focus on controlling and containing the effects of multiple logics by separating 
and compartmentalizing those who use them.111 A spate of studies in the identity and 
leadership literature assessing the possibility of ambidexterity in structurally 
differentiated hybrids, for example, only focus on institutional ambidexterity in the upper 
ranks of the organization (e.g., exalting the importance of the “ambidextrous leader” who 
has the ability, authority, and skills to manage the complex terrain of multiple logics) 
rather than assessing practical adaptations to institutional complexity on the ground with 
the people who actually do the day-to-day work of the organization. 
                                                        
111 One might question whether these organizations are ambidextrous at all because of the emphasis on 
compartmentalization and separation rather than integration. 
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 Practice Ambidexterity 
 The aforementioned critique is at the center of an adapted article by 
Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Bednarek (2013) which seeks to expose “the empty promise” 
of ambidexterity and get “institutional work to work” by advocating a practice-based 
approach to the study of institutional ambidexterity at the individual and organizational 
levels of analysis.112 They state: “In order to fulfill the promise of the institutional 
ambidexterity concept, we need an approach that leverages institutional complexity in 
practice” (3), one that “depart[s] from previous approaches that saw institutional 
complexity as problematic and focused on resolving conflict by keeping apart people, 
practices, or audiences that followed contradictory logics (e.g., Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006; Seo and Creed, 2002; Smets et al., 2012)” (2). Their practice-based and benefits-
based approach relies upon an “embrace” of complexity and awareness that multiple 
logics “are interdependent yet also contradictory” (Friedland and Alford, 1991:250).” 
 A practice approach to the study of institutional ambidexterity examines 
alternative organizational responses to institutional complexity; in particular, 
ambidextrous responses that integrate practices derived from two or more potentially 
contradictory logics and which permanently remain “interdependent yet separate” 
                                                        
112 Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Bednarek (2013) stress the difference between the concept of “organizational 
ambidexterity” and “institutional ambidexterity”. Organizational ambidexterity is characterized as a 
strategic organizational resource that is associated with organizational performance (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004; He and Wong, 2004; Simsek, 2009; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996), is achieved via 
organizational structure (e.g., O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996), organizational 
culture/context (e.g., Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004), or leadership (e.g., Carmeli and Halevi, 2009; Jansen 
et al., 2009), and is “virtually synonymous with structurally differentiated hybrids” (Greenwood et al., 
2011: 355). Institutional ambidexterity, in contrast, has an explicit focus on integration, spans multiple 
levels of analysis, and is interested in doing (Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Benarek, 2013: 7-10). 
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(Jarzakbkowski, Smets, and Bednarek (2013).113 These responses emanate from 
organizational actors who “share a practical understanding” and in their actions, 
interactions, and negotiations constitute and re-constitute multiple institutional logics.114 
Thus, this approach recognizes that “institutions themselves cannot be ambidextrous; 
rather, people do institutional ambidexterity in their everyday actions and interactions as 
they work within and enact multiple logics” (Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Bednarek, 2013: 
11). 
 Four potential examples of practical understandings (i.e., people’s performances 
or “doing”) of institutional ambidexterity include: expanded practice repertoires, situated 
improvising, mutual adjustment, and switching (Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Bednarek, 
2013: 13-15). Expanded practice repertoires refer to organizational actors’ enactment of 
practices relevant to the multiple institutional logics comprising the organizational 
environment in addition to newly created hybrid practices (Smets and Jarzabkowski, 
2013). It shows the generative capacity of institutional complexity (Kraatz and Block, 
2008) and a cultural and practical expansion of an organizational actors’ toolkit (Swidler, 
1986). Situated improvising refers to organizational actors’ spontaneous adjustments of 
their actions and practices in institutionally complex contexts. These adjustments may be 
made because of the urgency the situation and the need to get work done (Smets et al., 
2012). Mutual adjustment (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, and Van de Ven, 2009; Lindblom, 
                                                        
113 It is the sustained separation of logics that differentiates ambidextrous responses from a structural 
response like blended hybridization. 
114 Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Bednarek’s (2013) practice model of institutional ambidexterity proposes 
“practical understanding,” or the “know-how and embodied repertoires that compose a practice” (Schatzki, 
2002: 77-78) as the ideal unit of analysis because they are grounded in actors’ actions and encompass the 
tacit knowledge that often goes unarticulated in collective practice. 
  
180
1965) refers to organizational actors’ alterations or accommodations to contradictory 
institutional logics. Such an adjustment may be marked by a tolerance to or recognition 
of another’s beliefs, actions, or practices (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, and Van de Ven, 
2009). Finally, switching refers to organizational actors’ ability to move between 
multiple institutional logics by enacting them at different times or in different spaces. The 
logics themselves remain distinct and discrete and are purposefully called upon given a 
situation or context.  
Summarily, research in institutional theory suggests three broad organizational 
responses to institutional pluralism and complexity: organizational change, contested 
coexistence, and ambidexterity. The first two responses, organizational change and 
contested coexistence, are predominantly strategy, reactionary, and problem-based 
approaches while the latter response, ambidexterity, is a practical, proactive, and 
benefits-based approach. Although little empirical research has been conducted using a 
practice-based approach to institutional complexity that incorporates the concepts of 
institutional work and institutional ambidexterity, I believe that this type approach is 
appropriate for this research because it considers the role of organizational actors and is 
better able to reveal the practice of institutional logics on the ground and “in action”.  
Data Collection & Analysis 
 I use the same qualitative interview, observation, and textual data specified in 
Chapter Three: Identifying, Explaining, and Defining the Logics of Homeownership. In 
keeping with the findings of that chapter, I understand that there are two dominant, 
accessible, and functionally contradictory institutional logics culturally embedded in the 
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institutional environment of homeowners’ associations. The economic logic of 
homeownership views homeownership as a financial investment and appeals to an 
individual’s pursuit of self-interest. Homeowners’ association board members adhering to 
this logic view the homeowners’ association as a corporation, homeowners as investors, 
and will make decisions to maximize short-term returns on their investment.  The social 
logic of homeownership views homeownership as a civil investment and appeals to a 
collective’s pursuit of community. Homeowners’ association board members adhering to 
this logic view the homeowners’ association as a family business, homeowners as 
neighbors, and will make decisions to benefit the long-term interests of the 
community.115 Homeowners’ associations thus exist in an institutionally pluralistic and 
complex environment facing the enactment of both the economic logic of 
homeownership and the social logic of homeownership. 
As noted in Chapter Two: Structure v. Culture: The External and Internal 
Determinants of Conflict, of the 176 board members responding to my original 
Homeowners’ Association Survey, approximately 46% reported their association 
experienced at least one significant instance of conflict in the prior 12 months. Data was 
collected and divided into two discrete data sets. The first data set comprised survey, 
interview, observational, and textual data with more conflicted homeowners’ associations 
and the second data set comprised survey, interview, observational, and textual data with 
less conflicted homeowners’ associations. I distinguished between “more conflicted” and 
“less conflicted” associations using responses to several survey questions designed to 
                                                        
115 For a full description of the economic and social logics of homeownership see Chapter Three: 
Identifying, Explaining, and Defining the Logics of Homeownership. 
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measure the presence and dimensions of conflict such as “How many times in the last 
year has your board experienced a significant instance of disagreement regarding the 
proper course of action for your association?”, “How many times in the last year has your 
association issued a notice of non-compliance?” and “How many times has the 
association been threatened with or involved in a legal dispute in the last five years?”.116 I 
followed up with 80 participants (40 respondents each from less and more conflicted 
associations). Of those 80 participants that I requested to interview, 56 consented to the 
interview (30 respondents from the most conflicted and 26 respondents from the least 
conflicted associations).117 Qualitative data from these two data sets were gathered, 
coded, analyzed, and compared to decipher the appreciable differences in the actions, 
practices, and responses of organizational actors to institutional pluralism and complexity 
that could account for and explain the differences in the variability of intra-organizational 
conflict the organizations reported experiencing. 
Interview, observational, and textual data comprising the unfolding decisions, 
interactions, and practices between organizational actors in more conflicted and less 
conflicted homeowners’ associations as they attempt to cope with institutional pluralism 
and complexity occasioned by the economic and social logics of homeownership are the 
                                                        
116 In general, more conflicted homeowners’ associations reported experiencing at least one significant 
instance of conflict in the prior 12 months, reported experiencing at least one significant instance of 
disagreement regarding the proper course of action for the association in the prior 12 months, reported 
issuing at least one notice of non-compliance in the prior 12 months, and/or had been threatened with or 
involved in at least one legal dispute in the last five years and less conflicted homeowners’ associations did 
not report experiencing at least one significant instance of conflict in the prior 12 months, did not report 
experiencing at least one significant instance of disagreement regarding the proper course of action for the 
association in the prior 12 months, did not issue at least one notice of non-compliance in the prior 12 
months, and/or had not been threatened with or involved in at least one legal dispute in the last five years. 
117 A table (C-1) detailing the descriptive characteristics of my interviewees may be found in Appendix C. 
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basis of my analysis in this chapter. In addition to my incorporation of a practice 
perspective and “practical understandings” (Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Bednarek, 2013) 
as my unit of analysis, I continue to use an inductive, grounded theory approach to data 
analysis looking for organizational actors’ invocation and use of both institutional logics, 
and evidence of practices associated with institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006; Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, and Van de Ven, 2009) and institutional ambidexterity 
(Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Bednarek, 2013; Jarzabkowski et al., 2013) and intra-
organizational conflict. While I did keep an open mind to emergent themes and codes in 
the data, these conceptual models and theoretical concepts informed my coding 
judgments. 
Explaining Conflict in Homeowners’ Associations 
 My qualitative research reveals that all homeowners’ associations exist in in 
institutionally pluralistic and complex institutional environments (i.e., all exhibit 
evidence of the simultaneous presence and accessibility of the economic logic of 
homeownership and the social logic of homeownership). How board members of 
homeowners’ associations respond to institutional pluralism and complexity, however, 
varies. I contend that organizational responses to institutional pluralism and complexity, 
in particular those actualized in organizational actors’ perceptions and practices, explain 
the variability in intra-organizational conflict. Homeowners’ associations that respond to 
institutional pluralism and complexity by eliminating or compartmentalizing logics are 
more conflicted. Board members in eliminatory and compartmentalizing homeowners’ 
associations, what I will call non-ambidextrous organizations, perceive the simultaneous 
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presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics as novel and instinctively treat it 
by disrupting and disusing one or more institutional logics. They do this by contesting or 
separating one or more logics. In practice this response creates a self-reinforcing cycle of 
problem and contestation and ultimately results in an incongruous organizational vision 
and more intra-organizational conflict. Homeowners’ associations that respond to 
institutional pluralism and complexity ambidextrously are less conflicted. Board 
members in ambidextrous homeowners’ associations perceive the simultaneous presence 
and accessibility of multiple institutional logics as routine and purposefully “do” logics to 
lessen conflicts. They actively maintain and use both the economic logic of 
homeownership and the social logic of homeownership and “do” logics by making 
adjustments, improvising, and switching between logics on a context-specific basis. In 
practice this response creates a self-reinforcing cycle of ambidextrous action and 
ultimately results in a congruous organizational vision and less intra-organizational 
conflict. Table 4-1 summarizes the major characteristics of non-ambidextrous and 
ambidextrous organizations and   Figure 4-2 diagrams my causal model. 
 Elimination/Compartmentalization as a Response 
 Homeowners’ associations that respond to institutional pluralism and complexity 
by eliminating or compartmentalizing logics are more conflicted. The non-ambidextrous 
nature of their response is reflected in their perceptions (beliefs) and practices (actions). 
Board members in non-ambidextrous homeowners’ associations perceive the 
simultaneous presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics usually during  
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Table 4-1: Major Characteristics of Non-ambidextrous and Ambidextrous Organizations 
 
Characteristic Non-ambidextrous Ambidextrous 
   
Institutional pluralism Yes Yes 
Institutional complexity Yes Yes 
Organizational actors’ 
responses to pluralism and 
complexity 
Elimination 
 
Compartmentalization 
Ambidexterity 
Organizational actors’ 
perceptions of pluralism and 
complexity 
Novel 
 
Multiplicity is a problem 
Routine 
 
Multiplicity is a benefit 
Organizational actors’ 
responses to pluralism and 
complexity 
Instinctual 
 
Disruption work 
 
Contestation, separation 
Purposeful 
 
Maintenance work 
 
Adjustment, improvisation, 
switching 
Organizational actor’s 
recognition of pluralism and 
complexity 
Change, uncertainty, 
ambiguity, and crisis 
Always, continuously, and 
continually 
Organizational outcome More conflict Less conflict 
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Figure 4-2: Organizational Responses to Institutional Complexity in More and Less 
Conflicted Homeowners’ Associations 
 
 
 
 
Simultaneous Presence and Accessibility of Economic and Social Logics of Homeownership  
(Institutional Complexity)
Presence of Economic and Social Logics of Homeownership
(Institutional Pluralism)
Ambidexterity
Perceptions:
Routine
Multiplicity is a benefit
Practices:
Purposeful
Maintenance work
Adjustment, improvisation, switching
Elimination / Compartmentalization
Perceptions:
Novel
Multiplicity is a problem
Practices:
Instinctual
Disruption work
Contestation / Separation
 
More Conflict 
 
Less Conflict 
Organizational Actors’ Responses 
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times of change, uncertainty, ambiguity, and crisis, and treat it as novel. They 
instinctively rectify this “problem” by disrupting and disusing one or more alternative 
institutional logics. They do this by contesting or separating one or more institutional 
logics in an effort to maintain the dominance of a single logic. In practice this response 
creates a self-reinforcing cycle of problem and contestation and ultimately results in an 
incongruous organizational vision and more intra-organizational conflict. 
 Perceptions 
 Board members in non-ambidextrous homeowners’ associations regard the 
simultaneous presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics as novel. They 
exhibit a singular understanding of their organization and will often either frantically 
fight to maintain their organizational vision or will succumb to the dominance of a new 
or alternative organizational vision. Organizational actors’ do not see the possibility for 
the co-existence of two organizational visions and thus multiplicity is a problem. Board 
members instinctively disrupt new and alternative institutional logics by contesting and 
separating institutional logics. They do this to maintain the dominance of a single logic. 
The following petition for a special election placed under the doors of a large Boston-area 
homeowners’ association exemplifies the embedded response of board members who 
adhere to a single institutional logic and the reactionary response of holders of alternative 
logics (emphasis in original): 
Petition for Election 
 
 Bad things will happen when good people do nothing. 
 
 Dear neighbors, 
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 We would like to ask for your support to call for a Bellvue Condominium Trust 
7th trustee election and a Special Meeting.118 
 
 The reason we are asking for a signed petition and a special meeting is the recent 
board decision to appoint the 7th board member rather than through the election 
process. 
 
 Last year two board members, Nancy Pillham and Ronald McArthur unlawfully 
ejected three active board members from the voting process and appointed three 
new board members. 
 
 They got away with this because they knew people believe—or want to believe—
the board is acting in our best interests. 
 
 Today, a year later, the board members are repeating the same troubling and 
solitary action. Why are they doing this? The real intent is to insert a board 
member that they are comfortable with and able to control. 
 
 We are concerned that these board members can potentially return us to an era of 
mismanagement and corruption that many of you still remember. 
 
 According to the By Laws a petition to vote and hold a special meeting may be 
called upon via written application of the unit owners. 
 
 If you want to support our community please sign the petition and return to our 
community manager. 
 
This petition, laden with meaning from and prompted by organizational memory on the 
part of the writer, communicates a sense of urgency from one unit owner to other unit 
owners, or his or her “neighbors,” to intervene in the governance of the association to 
prevent “mismanagement and corruption”. These charges, both in their language and in 
their context, insinuate the incompatibility of two types of organizational actors (non-
board member unit owners and board members) and their respective beliefs and practices 
with regard to the purpose of the organization. Board members via their alleged emphasis 
                                                        
118 Names of homeowners’ associations, interviewees, and other potential identifiers have been replaced 
with pseudonyms to protect confidentiality. 
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on control, self-interest, and passivity on the part of non-board member unit owners are 
implied to represent the economic logic of homeownership. Their choice to “unlawfully 
eject” some board members and “appoint” new board members could be interpreted as an 
attempt to disrupt, disuse, marginalize, or altogether eliminate other understandings and 
viewpoints in service of maintaining the dominance of their understandings and 
viewpoints. Meanwhile, the writer of the petition, presumably a non-board member unit 
owner, through his or her allusions to shared interests, community, and neighborliness, 
references the social logic of homeownership. It is this logic which is continually muffled 
and silenced as a result of the belief by present board members that multiplicity is a 
problem. 
 A different but common example of the perceived problem caused by the 
simultaneous presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics occurs when 
homeowners’ associations set out to hire a manager or management company. A long-
time board member of a very small homeowners’ association recounts his decision to hire 
a manager and the subsequent transition of management: 
 So I’ve been primarily running the association for as long as I’ve lived here. It can 
be a lot of work, but I could always handle it. Well recently my mother became ill 
and most of my spare time has been spent caring for her. So I approached the 
other unit owners and said “Do you want to take over or do you want to hire a 
manager?” We all agreed to hire a manager. Wow. What a change. It was much 
more difficult than I anticipated. I’ll tell you, it was equal parts frustrating, 
disconcerting, and maddening. At one point I thought it would be just best if we 
fired him. Sometimes I still think about it! 
 
When probed for more detail about why the transition was much more difficult than he 
expected he responds: 
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 Well he [the new manager] came in guns blazing talking codes, new legislation, 
voting quorums, reserve studies… this, that, and the other thing. That just wasn’t 
my style. I’m not schooled in this but our association, I believed—and as far as I 
know other unit owners have believed—that our association and our homes have 
been well cared for. I was exceedingly surprised by his want and need to 
depersonalize our association and make it a business.  I still am. If I could I think 
that I would fire him and go back to the way things were, before everything was 
about the money. 
 
His recounting of the difficulty of the transition in management of the association 
highlights incompatible practical understandings of the homeowners’ association. The 
introduction of a new way of thinking and doing, marked by differences in languages, 
beliefs, and practices—particularly one smacking of the economic logic of 
homeownership—depersonalized the association for this board member who had long 
utilized a less formal and more personal social logic of homeownership. His beliefs, 
decisions, actions, and practices were profoundly marked by an ideological identification 
with the association and an emphasis on building community. For example, when I asked 
him about how he managed the association on a day-to-day basis he reported that he 
would often discuss association matters in passing, “out on the stoop, at the mailbox, or 
even on line at Trader Joe’s (a local supermarket)”. The new manager, although wanted 
and needed, brought with him a different way of thinking and doing and a different 
perspective about the purpose of the homeowners’ association. He wanted to “make it a 
business”, formalize the decision-making process, and build the financial and business 
profile of the association.  
 When I followed-up with this board member six months later and asked about 
how the association is managed now, my board member concedes that it is “different 
now”. He says that he has largely “let go” of his style of management and relinquished 
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control due to “massive and frequent” disagreements between himself and the manager. 
When asked about what the biggest change was he states: “There are fewer meetings out 
on the stoop. I have new neighbors, but I really don’t even know them. We don’t really 
have any reason to talk to each other now. The manager he takes care of everything and 
it’s all just really… I don’t know…formal I guess? Business-like? Professional? I mean 
it’s not an overly bad thing I guess, everything is taken care of and I have more time to 
focus on my mom. I guess all I can say is that it feels different.”  
 Just as in the first example, this board member regards the simultaneous presence 
and accessibility of multiple institutional logics as problematic (as do other 
organizational actors such as presumably that of the referenced homeowners’ association 
manager). He is surprised by the existence of and reliance upon the economic logic of 
homeownership by the newly hired manager and does not see the opportunity for the co-
existence of two organizational visions. As a result of this perception, both situations 
ultimately result in the elimination or compartmentalization of one of the logics of 
homeownership and the eventual acquiescence to a single dominant logic. In the first 
example, board members forcibly maintain the dominance of the economic logic of 
homeownership by appointing only those who share their understandings of the 
organization and, in the second example, the former manager and board member 
succumbed to the presumed power and dominance of the newly contracted manager and 
his invocation for the economic logic of homeownership instead of advocating for the 
continued dominance of the social logic of homeownership or the co-existence of both 
the economic and social logics of homeownership. 
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 Practices 
 The practices and actions of organizational actors also create the potential for 
more and less intra-organizational conflict. Board members in non-ambidextrous 
homeowners’ associations perceive the simultaneous presence and accessibility of 
multiple institutional logics problematically and instinctively respond by trying to rectify 
the “problem” of multiplicity through disruption work. They do this by contesting or 
separating one or more alternative institutional logics in an effort to maintain the 
dominance of a single logic. The elimination and compartmentalization of institutional 
logics creates more intra-organizational conflict. Table 4-2 provides representative 
examples of organizational actors’ eliminatory and compartmentalizing responses to 
institutional pluralism and complexity. 
 Organizational actors in non-ambidextrous organizations perceive the 
simultaneous presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics primarily during 
times of change, uncertainty, ambiguity, and crisis. It may happen when a new external 
actor introduces a new institutional logic (as in the previous section when a board 
member of a small homeowners’ association who utilized the social logic of 
homeownership hired a professional manager who brought with him the economic logic 
of homeownership), when there is a change in leadership, when there is a change in the 
material conditions of the organization, or even there is a substantial turnover in the 
makeup of the members of an organization. The introduction of change or even the 
potential for change in an organization may create the conditions for the employment of 
multiple logics where there was previously only a single dominant logic (available and/or  
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Table 4-2: Representative Examples of Organizational Actors’ Eliminatory and 
Compartmentalizing Responses to Institutional Pluralism and Complexity 
 
Elimination / Compartmentalization 
Contestation Separation 
Of social logic: 
 
“We don’t need to deal in personal 
relationships. That isn’t our responsibility. 
I enforce the rules for the economic 
benefit of the association. That’s all I care 
about.” 
 
Of economic & social logics: 
 
“We are concerned about the money—the 
budget, the reserves, the bottom line. Our 
rules preserve our profit. Personal 
relationships are nice, but that’s not our 
main responsibility, it doesn’t get us a 
profit.” 
 
 
Of social logic: 
 
“It is the fiduciary responsibility of the 
business that is my key priority. Sociality 
and such is unnecessary fluff.” 
 
Of economic & social logics: 
 
“There is a social committee that plans 
parties and stuff. They are separate from 
us. It’s OK to have that kind of stuff, but 
that’s not the board’s work.” 
 
Of social logic: 
 
“To me a homeowners’ association is a 
service business and board members are 
business leaders. We know this is a 
business. Some people try to add 
community building aspects to the job and 
I don’t really see how that is as important. 
My job is to keep us efficient and 
profitable. 
 
 
Of economic & social logics: 
 
“Yeah, we have a social committee, but 
we generally consider this committee as 
independent of the board. We set the rules 
and govern the committee, but it’s not us. 
We are the meat of the association. The 
social committee is the garnish. They are 
the parsley.” 
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directly represented). In these situations there is an absence of consensus and frustration 
about divergent expectations, beliefs, and practices. In the following case, I observed the 
first meeting of a homeowners’ association board following the election of three new 
board members. 
 Board chairman (continuance of term): Welcome to the monthly meeting of the 
70/80 Birchwood Road Trust. I’d like to congratulate the incoming board 
members on winning the election and thank outgoing members for their years of 
service. We’ll use this meeting to transition from the old board to the new. I guess 
the first order of business would be to address any questions you might have 
about your new positions and to get you up-to-date on association matters. Does 
anybody have any questions? 
 
 New board member #1: Well I guess what I would like to know is, what are our 
main responsibilities? 
 
 Board chairman: Well, first, uh, let me state the obvious. Our main responsibility 
is and has always been the financial management of the trust. We need to watch 
out for and protect our investments. That is all of our jobs: to act in the best 
interests of the trust. 
 
 New board member #2: Can I add to that? I appreciate the importance of 
financials, but part of the reason I wanted to be on the board was to do some 
community building. Isn’t that a main responsibility of the board too? I’d really 
like to think about doing things like having an ice cream social or setting up a 
book library down in the community room where we can take a book/leave a book 
or even like, you know, set up a social committee to welcome new owners. Down 
the line I’d even like to set up a fully functioning website. 
 
 Board chairman: [Laughs and gives an incredulous look to an outgoing board 
member] Wow – those are some new ideas and, forgive me, but it might be 
necessary to say, a little bit frivolous to talk about at this juncture. We really need 
to be talking about our budget, the end of the year financials, and our upcoming 
reserve study. So maybe I was getting ahead of myself here. Why don’t we just 
start with that, that way we will all be on the same page; then maybe we can 
address any questions you might have. I’ll hand it over to Steve Levinson (the 
association’s financial advisor) to go over some of our operating documents [he 
starts handing out a packet of papers to the incoming board members]. 
 
 New board member #2: Hi Steve. I look forward to your presentation, but first can 
I … I uh … I just need to say this. I think that whole exchange was just 
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unnecessarily rude and dismissive. I really felt like a chastised little girl and that 
was wholly unnecessary. We are adults and I do not think my ideas were in any 
way frivolous or unwarranted. You were at the open meeting. You saw how upset 
people were with the board. You seem to think that you did a very good job, but 
not all would agree. I would appreciate it if you were just as receptive to my ideas 
as I am to yours. 
 
 Board chairman: Hey now, I’m just talking from experience. We have to pay the 
bills first. We can get together and get to know people second. It is what it is. 
Now Steve, what were you saying last time about what we need to get together for 
the reserve study? Weren’t you saying it was of very high importance…? 
 
This exchange is notable for several reasons. First, it is taking place during a moment of 
change—the changeover from one governing board to the next. Second, one of the new 
board members (board member #2) is introducing an alternative logic or way of thinking 
about homeownership and the purpose of the homeowners’ association. Her way of 
thinking and doing conflicts with the board chairman’s way of doing and the tension 
between the two is palpable. Third, the board chairman reacts to the alternative way of 
doing in such a way that suggests that he perceives that the norms of his logic have been 
egregiously violated. His instinctual response is to prevent or contest any change in 
thought or action. And, fourth, despite the new board member’s resistance, he is able to 
invoke and reassert the importance of the economic logic of homeownership by 
referencing his prior experience and re-framing the discussion by linking to an external 
referent (i.e., the association’s financial advisor). In doing so he has, at least temporarily, 
maintained the dominance of the economic logic of homeownership and disrupted and 
contested the introduction of an alternative logic, the social logic of homeownership.  
 A second illustration of an organizational actor perceiving the simultaneous 
presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics as problematic during a time of 
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change, uncertainty, ambiguity, and crisis is exemplified by the following homeowners’ 
association manager’s account of ongoing on-and-off tension and incompatibility 
between himself and a mid-size homeowners’ association board. 
 It comes out of nowhere. And it always gets me. It’s just happens and it’s just out 
of the gate hostile again. Just rude you know. It’s really demoralizing and during 
those times it gets so bad that I think of quitting. I can’t tell you how many times 
I’ve thought of quitting. It just really gets to you. But then it’s gone, or at least 
manageable. I wouldn’t say rosy, but you know…easier.  
 
Upon some probing and discussion I get him to detail the circumstances under which 
incompatibility and hostility arises. What I find out is that it usually does not just occur 
“out of nowhere”, but seems to happen soon after he sends out notices to unit owners 
regarding issues of non-compliance. For example, at the time of our interview he recently 
delivered a notice of a “disposal fee” to a long-time unit owner in the building, whom 
happened to be very good friends with several of the board members, for “improper 
disposal of a large appliance”. From what I gather, this unit owner placed an old 
television on the loading dock over the weekend by the trash receptacles. It is apparently 
against the association’s rules and regulations to do so, so the manager watched video 
surveillance footage of the loading dock to find the culprit and then issued a notice of 
noncompliance which proclaimed the unit owner must “retrieve the television or pay a 
$50 disposal fee”. The manager did not hear from the unit owner the next day so he 
assumed the unit owner wanted the television disposed of and so did so. The unit owner 
later went down to the loading dock to retrieve the television and found it gone. This set 
off the unit owner who did not wish to pay the disposal fee. He [the unit owner] went to 
the board and vehemently complained about the actions of the manager. The board then 
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approached the manager with hostility accusing him of “acting without proper authority” 
and “disrupting personal relations”. The ambiguous set of circumstances – did the 
manager or didn’t the manager have the proper authority to act with discretion in his 
adherence to the association’s rules and regulations – coupled with the collision of the 
manager’s invocation of the economic logic of homeownership (as evidenced by his 
emphasis on rules and managerialism) with the board member’s invocation of the social 
logic of homeownership (as evidenced in what the board member’s described to him as 
the “thoughtless” and “strict” following of the rules and the interference of community 
relationships) created a what this organizational actor perceived to be a novel problem. 
The failure or inability to fully recognize the presence and possible incorporation of the 
two logics of homeownership thus creates the conditions for sustained and ongoing on-
and-off tension between the manager and the board.  
 In both of these cases, and as may be typical in non-ambidextrous homeowners’ 
associations, there was an element of surprise or dubiousness on the part of one or more 
organizational actors, who didn’t anticipate or expect—or, more importantly, 
thoughtfully respond to—the invocation of another way of thinking and doing. Ultimately 
this led to an incompatibility between practical understandings of proper courses of 
thought and action. In the first case, the board chairman is incredulous that someone 
might consider community building as an important method of building the value of the 
homeowners’ association and in the second case, the manager is taken aback by his on-
and-off designation of “the other,” or his position as someone who the board can easily 
place blame upon because of the ambiguity of his position of authority in the 
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organization. Both, however, instinctively respond to the simultaneous presence and 
accessibility of multiple institutional logics by disrupting the invocation of an alternative 
institutional logic and contesting or separating one or more institutional logics. In each 
case organizational actors enact practices to eliminate or compartmentalize multiple 
institutional logics. 
 One of the ways in which organizational actors enact practices to eliminate or 
compartmentalize multiple institutional logics is to engage in institutional work—namely 
disruption work. My analysis reveals that organizational actors in non-ambidextrous 
homeowners’ associations were far more likely to engage in the institutional disruption of 
one or more institutional logics when compared to organizational actors in ambidextrous 
homeowners’ associations. Board members in non-ambidextrous homeowners’ 
associations were especially likely to engage in the practice of disrupting the creation or 
maintenance of the social logic of homeownership. In other words, board members in 
non-ambidextrous homeowners’ associations were more likely to assert and defend the 
dominance of the economic logic of homeownership rather than the social logic of 
homeownership and to engage in political acts to contest the enactment of the social logic 
of homeownership.  
 As shown in the previous sections, organizational actors in non-ambidextrous 
homeowners’ associations often perceive multiplicity as problematic and instinctively 
enact practices to contest or separate alternative institutional logics in an effort to 
maintain the dominance of a single logic. Organizational actors engage in disruption 
work by attempting to block the introduction and incorporation of new or additional 
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institutional logics and undermining the taken-for-granted assumptions, norms, beliefs, 
legitimacy, or value of new or alternative logics. Organizational actors may do this 
instinctually out of ignorance or in defense of their way of doing or, less commonly in 
my analysis, as a purposeful act of sabotage. In my data, I often found evidence of 
disruption work in the relative dismissal of the importance or value of the social logic of 
homeownership. The following interview excerpts represent some of many examples of 
disruption work in non-ambidextrous homeowners’ associations: 
 To me a homeowners’ association is a service business and board members are 
business leaders. We know this is a business and we operate as such. Some people 
try to add community building aspects to the job and I don’t really see the value in 
that. In fact, I purposefully voted against the proposal to develop a social 
committee. What a waste of time.  
 
 It is the fiduciary responsibility of the business that is the key priority. Sociality 
and such is unnecessary fluff. 
 
 Yeah, we have a social committee, but we generally consider this committee as 
independent of the board. We set the rules and govern the committee, but it’s not 
us. We are the meat of the association. The social committee is the garnish. They 
are the parsley. 
 
 I don’t believe in leading by consensus. What a bunch of hooey. We are on the 
board. We were elected to be on the board. We don’t need to play nice with 
everyone. We don’t need to share the details of our decision-making process. We 
are here to do a job and as long as we are doing it that is what matters. The 
numbers [a reference to increasing property values] don’t lie. 
 
These beliefs also translate into concrete actions and practices. In the following 
example a board member unwittingly confides in me how his board sought to disrupt the 
social logic of homeownership despite the potential for a negative outcome: 
 Our board just imposed a major assessment on our 200 unit owners. The purpose 
of the assessment is to upgrade the sliding doors to the balconies. It’s kind of 
tricky though because only about 80 of the sliding doors currently need to be 
upgraded; the other 120 are working fine. A couple of us on the board though 
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have the malfunctioning doors, so we just decided that we were going to do it. So 
we just passed through the assessment without going to a vote – we would have 
never got a quorum and our doors need to be replaced. So we just classified it as a 
repair, not an improvement. Sometimes those are the things you have to do. In the 
long run it’s better anyway. We won’t have to keep paying for repairs as other 
doors start to malfunction. They’ll get over it. If we sought a consensus on 
anything we would never get anywhere. 
 
Laden in this board member’s magical reasoning is a clear disruption of the social logic 
of homeownership which would call for a quorum to be met about whether or not the 
assessment should be levied. These board members were clearly acting in their own best 
interests rather that the community’s best interests thereby undermining the core 
assumption of the social logic of homeownership. Their decision to classify the sliding 
door replacement as a repair rather than an improvement (the Master Deed of this 
association requires voters to approve “additions, alterations, or improvements,” but not 
repairs) clearly constitutes the practice of disruption work and effectively works in 
service of the elimination or compartmentalization of the social logic of homeownership. 
 Ambidexterity as a Response 
 Homeowners’ associations that respond to institutional pluralism and complexity 
ambidextrously are less conflicted. The ambidextrous nature of their response is reflected 
in their perceptions (beliefs) and practices (actions). Board members in ambidextrous 
homeowners’ associations always, continuously, and continually perceive the 
simultaneous presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics as routine and 
purposefully “do” logics to lessen conflicts. They actively maintain both the economic 
logic of homeownership and the social logic of homeownership and “do” logics by 
making adjustments, improvising, and switching between logics on a context-specific 
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basis. In practice this response creates a self-reinforcing cycle of ambidextrous action and 
ultimately results in a more congruous organizational vision and less intra-organizational 
conflict. 
 Perceptions 
 Board members in ambidextrous homeowners’ associations regard the 
simultaneous presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics as routine. They 
exhibit a multitudinous understanding of their organization and will work ably to 
maintain a congruous organization vision despite—or because of—the presence and 
accessibility of multiple institutional logics. Organizational actors’ see the possibility for 
the co-existence of two organizational visions, and see multiplicity as a potential benefit. 
Board members purposefully maintain multiple logics by making adjustments, 
improvising, and switching between logics as a situation requires. They do this to 
simultaneously address the concerns of multiple logics. Unlike the perceptions of 
organizational actors in non-ambidextrous homeowners’ associations, the perceptions of 
organizational actors in ambidextrous homeowners’ associations about institutional 
pluralism and complexity are subtle and nearly imperceptible, they are only revealed in a 
close analysis of the everyday practices of the association. Consider the following 
exchange I observed during a monthly meeting of the Forest Hills Condominium Trust: 
Board chairwoman: The next matter on the docket is the issue of the number of 
rental units in the building. Over the past several years we have seen an increasing 
number of absentee owners and subsequent renters. Should we be concerned 
about this? What are your feelings on the matter? 
 
Board member #1: I am concerned. Having lots of renters doesn’t look good – 
they don’t care as much about the property and don’t really know about the rules 
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and regulations. Are they going to decrease the value of the property? Are good 
prospective buyers going to buy other properties because of it? 
 
Board member #2: I share those concerns; however, we really haven’t had those 
types of problems. Plus, if anything, I’ve observed fewer problems with our 
renters than our owners. I don’t remember a single complaint. Maybe the real 
concern is maintaining a high quality of renters; renters who are invested in the 
area and the community. 
 
Board chairwoman: So maybe we can find some sort of middle ground here. Let’s 
look into seeing if we can establish a minimum lease term—maybe two or three 
year commitments instead of one— or even a rent-to-buy type of structure. This 
way we can make sure we have people here who we know and see and who will 
be aware of our rules and who, maybe down the line, would ultimately buy in to 
the community. 
 
The board chairwoman’s response complements both the economic logic of 
homeownership (i.e., finding a way to limit the number of renters) and the social logic of 
homeownership (i.e., ensuring the long-term interests of the association by honoring the 
values of the community). She does not see the co-existence of both logics of 
homeownership as problematic, nor does she strictly assert the dominance of one of the 
logics of homeownership. For example, if she were to adhere purely to the economic 
logic of homeownership she might have decided to establish a rental cap by limiting the 
number or percentage of units that can be rented or restricted the number of units a single 
individual could own and if she were to adhere purely to the social logic of 
homeownership she might have decided to poll the community for their input and placed 
the power of the decision in the hands of a quorum of unit, constituent voters. The 
notable point is her virtually seamless, simultaneous, and purposeful acknowledgement, 
adjustment, and incorporation of both logics and their distinct concerns in the decision-
making process and in the ultimate decision. 
  
203
 A similar acknowledgement and management of the two logics of homeownership 
happens in everyday decisions about ordinary association matters like noise and unruly 
behavior violations. These matters certainly have the potential to be viewed 
problematically and spark sustained frustration, annoyance, and incompatibility; 
however, board members in ambidextrous associations offer practiced, balanced, and 
deliberate responses because of their perception that multiplicity can be beneficial to the 
organization. In the following passage, for example, a board member comments upon his 
association’s management of noise violations. 
 Noise violations are a common problem. You know we live in a condo building 
with shared walls and close quarters so, you know, it happens. It’s not unusual. 
We probably have about 1-3 complaints per month, more probably in the winter 
because people go out less. We realize though that, for the most part, people are 
respectful. So if we understand that hey sometimes people have other people over 
and it gets a little noisy that it doesn’t need to be this big thing. So we usually 
simply knock on the door and ask the unit owner to reduce the volume of the 
noise within a half-hour. We also have a room downstairs that unit owners can 
rent out for a small use fee, so we’ll also offer them the opportunity to move the 
party downstairs to this room. Most of the time these methods work, and I think it 
works because we work so hard to not be anonymous and to offer reasonable 
options. You know we are a familiar presence and regularly remind owners the 
rights and responsibilities of shared ownership. 
 
Another board member in a different association discusses a chronic noise violation and 
unruly behavior case. He offers a similar management rationale. 
 We had one case a few years back where someone had a treadmill in their 
bedroom and would use it late at night or very early in the morning. The unit 
owner below him was constantly complaining and we were constantly tasked with 
responding to the complaint. It was a case that we really learned from because we 
got it you know. On the one hand you have someone in their own home who has a 
busy schedule and wants to exercise at the discretion of his or her personal 
schedule. On the other hand you have someone who is also in their own home and 
wants to have peace and quiet. We get it. So what do you do right? Do you 
continually issue warnings, complaints, fines, and so forth until the situation 
becomes increasingly untenable or do you make it personal and relatable and 
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work hard to find a mutually agreeable option. Well, we chose the latter. We had 
the owners meet one another discuss the matter and work to resolve the issue. 
Long story short, the owner agreed to move the treadmill into the living room 
because the sound didn’t carry into the bedroom during those hours.  
 
In both of these accounts, the boards of the homeowners’ associations managed the noise 
violation and unruly behavior cases in a similar fashion; they knowingly decided to focus 
on resolution rather than escalation by preferring the social logic of homeownership 
rather than the economic logic of homeownership as the situation required. By focusing 
on shared ideological identification (via referencing the rights and responsibilities of 
shared ownership, offering a community room for parties rather than barring them, or 
finding a compromise) the board members were able to quell, if not entirely dissipate, the 
potential for conflict and bring stability to the association by recognizing the individual 
and communal nature of homeownership. Had they responded by preferring the 
economic logic of homeownership (as some of my non-ambidextrous associations did on 
very similar matters) they might have “fined, fined, fined” or told the unit owner “to file a 
complaint with the local police” because “we are not legally responsible for such 
matters”. These types of responses would have at the very least escalated the conflict by 
formalizing it and attaching to it a sense of novelty, challenge, contestation, and scrutiny.  
 In each of these cases, organizational actors regard the simultaneous presence of 
multiple institutional logics as a benefit. They recognize the presence and accessibility of 
both the economic logic of homeownership and the social logic of homeownership and 
make addressing the concerns of both logics routine. They readily and ably respond to the 
simultaneous presence of multiple institutional logics. Their responses share several 
features. First, multiplicity is marked by stillness, or the distinct absence of drama and 
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noise. Organizational actors recognize the concerns of multiple logics and do not 
perceive them problematically or approach them with fear or hostility. Second, multiple 
logics are simultaneously incorporated, considered, and balanced in the decision-making 
process. Organizational actors make adjustments, improvise, or switch between logics 
given a specific situation. In some situations they may prefer the economic logic to the 
social logic or vice versa. Their preference for one or the other logic, however, does not 
result in the contestation or separation of a logic. The concerns of both logics are 
embedded in the decision-making process and are addressed in the final resolution. Third, 
organizational actors’ in ambidextrous organizations are capable of carrying and invoking 
multiple institutional logics. Both the economic and social logics of homeownership are 
accessible to all organizational actors in homeowners’ associations. 
 Practices 
 As in non-ambidextrous organizations, the practices and actions of organizational 
actors in ambidextrous organizations are important to understanding the variability of 
intra-organizational conflict. Board members in ambidextrous homeowners’ associations 
perceive the simultaneous presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics 
beneficially and purposefully respond by trying to contemporaneously manage 
multiplicity through maintenance work. They do this by using, or “doing” logics and 
making adjustments, improvising, and switching between logics in an effort to act 
ambidextrously. Table 4-3 provides representative examples of organizational actors’ 
ambidextrous responses to institutional pluralism and complexity. 
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Table 4-3: Representative Examples of Organizational Actors’ Ambidextrous Responses 
to Institutional Pluralism and Complexity 
 
Ambidexterity 
“Doing” Logics 
Adjustment Improvisation Switching 
Accommodating logics: 
“It’s not necessarily natural 
for me to think about 
personal relationships in 
economic decisions, but I’ve 
learned by working in this 
setting that I need to work 
with the other members of 
the board. I think that’s 
gotten easier and now our 
association reflects that.” 
Expansion of logics: 
“We were just kind of 
figuring it out after the 
transition from the 
developer. We knew they 
were only about a profit. We 
knew that wasn’t enough. 
We went to classes and we 
learned better ways of 
building economic value and 
building personal value.” 
Shifting logics: 
“I am Madam Chairwoman 
and I am mommy at any 
given time and at any given 
moment, but really that 
works to our benefit. It’s a 
craft and it’s an art form, but 
it’s become normal” 
 
Accommodating logics: 
“We have to work with our 
manager. We’ve adjusted to 
one another. I know how he 
is thinking and I think that 
he knows how I am thinking. 
Now I can think for the both 
of us—but I don’t!” 
 
Expansion of logics: 
“We were like days away 
from a hostile takeover and 
maybe a lawsuit. It took that. 
It really took that for me to 
realize I—we—had to 
change what we were doing. 
We couldn’t be ignorant any 
longer.” 
Shifting logics: 
“Let’s make a decision about 
this. We need to fire him, 
he’s not educated and it’s 
costing us. He’s been here a 
long time though and people 
trust him… so let’s find a 
way to honor them and to 
make them feel it was right.” 
Accommodating logics: 
“More than anything else I 
think that we are tolerant to 
the dual needs of the 
association. It’s not always 
easy but…well in a way it is. 
It’s like a compromise. And 
that process has become 
easier. We bounce off of one 
another and somehow find a 
balance for all that we need 
to do and be.” 
Expansion of logics: 
“I hate to say this, and this is 
confidential right? I used to 
just hire my buddies for 
contract work here. That 
changed though because 
another board member 
challenged me. It really 
changed the culture of the 
board. But in a good way. 
We had to move quick and I 
learned. I learned to do my 
job in a new way.” 
Shifting logics: 
“We used to just be about 
our fiduciary 
responsibilities, but we 
learned that that was short-
sided. Over time we learned 
to alter our actions to what 
was expected of us as a 
business and as a neighbor. 
This meant acting one way 
with our counsel and another 
way with our community 
members.” 
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Organizational actors in ambidextrous organizations perceive the simultaneous 
presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics always, continuously, and 
continually. The concerns of multiplicity are perpetual and omnipresent. Although 
conflict can and occasionally does occur, it is often anticipated and expediently resolved 
via learned collective practices. The resolution happens through the practice of 
organizational members who engage in context-specific and thoughtful actions which 
instantiate, reproduce, and modify their shared understandings and practices of multiple 
institutional logics. The leadership mantra and decision-making strategies of one 
homeowners’ association illustrates the simultaneous and continual employment of the 
economic and social logics of homeownership. A board member of this homeowners’ 
association explains: 
 There is a difference between living in a community and being a part of that 
community. Being part of a community means sharing with your neighbors and 
cultivating a common desire and interest. We find this goal is best achieved 
through communication, consensus and community involvement. So that’s the 
way we think through our decisions. I mean an HOA is really equal parts 
business, government, and community. So we try to be mindful of each of these 
parts as best we can in each of our decisions. 
 
I asked him to elaborate upon how this works in practice. He explained how the board 
recently decided to renovate the lobby of the clubhouse. 
 We [the board] started discussing potentially renovating the clubhouse about two 
months ago. It has started to look tired and it doesn’t show well. There is a new 
townhome development a couple of miles away that is bright and shiny. We feel 
like it might be dragging down our value a little bit so we want to be proactive 
and competitive by making a few improvements now. We [the board] were all in 
agreement, we had enough money in the reserves to do it, and because legally it is 
classified as a repair we have the authority to just do it. But because we know this 
is a community we decided to hold a town hall meeting where we could openly 
discuss the potential project and properly explain why it was needed before 
starting the renovation. It was a thoughtful decision on our part because we know 
  
208
that people don’t like to be surprised. They [other unit owners] felt like they had a 
part in the decision and that matters when you are neighbors with the people you 
are making decisions for. You have to bring change in the right way because at 
the end of the day you still live together. 
 
The direct representation and prudent incorporation of both the economic logic of 
homeownership and the social logic of homeownership is evident. The board’s invocation 
of the social logic of homeownership in making the decision to renovate the clubhouse 
was, in part, a practiced, strategic, and careful maneuver designed to balance their 
original invocation of the economic logic of homeownership.  
 No homeowners’ associations in my analysis were completely without conflict. 
Ambidextrous homeowners’ associations were less conflicted in part because of their apt 
responses to disagreements and conflicts between institutional logics. Their responses 
exhibited a tacit “know-how” and practiced invocation of institutional logics. The 
following board member describes how her association responded to community unrest 
regarding the board’s decision to fire a long-employed staff member: 
 Our maintenance worker had worked in the building since the early 1990s. He had 
a great working knowledge of the building for a great many years; however, after 
we completed a large-scale renovation of the property he no longer had the proper 
knowledge to service the building. We instructed him to seek out more education. 
He didn’t. We let several incidents go with just warnings. Recently though he put 
us in a very dangerous situation and we had to fire him. Within hours there was 
gossip circulating around the building about his firing. We knew that we had to 
respond and communicate why he was fired in the right way so we decided to 
host an informational meeting.  
 
The board’s employment of the economic logic of homeownership resulted in the, 
seemingly rightful, decision to fire a long-serving, well-known, and beloved employee; 
however, the board anticipated that appeals to this logic in the informational meeting 
would be met with resistance because of the personal relationships many of the unit 
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owners had developed with the former employee. So while there was certainly a sound 
rationale and justification for the firing, the board “just knew” that the real purpose of the 
informational meeting was not to explain why the maintenance worker was fired, but 
instead to reassure people that “Mike would be OK”. So prior to the informational 
meeting the board called their management company and asked that Mike be considered 
for maintenance positions in other buildings that they managed. I attended the 
informational meeting and was somewhat surprised to discover just how astute their 
analysis was; the meeting began with very angry accusations about mismanagement and a 
failure to “understand the importance of trust” and ended with unit owners thanking the 
board for their prompt and judicious response. The specific reasons for why Mike was 
fired (i.e., his unwillingness to pursue more education and his mismanagement of 
equipment in the boiler room) were never discussed. 
 In both of these examples, and as may be typical in ambidextrous homeowners’ 
associations, there was an anticipation on the part of one or more organizational actors to 
thoughtfully respond to multiple, and potentially opposing, ways of thinking and doing. 
Their anticipation led them to take steps to ensure the compatibility of practical 
understandings of proper courses of thought and action. In the first example, the board 
member explained how his board balanced the concerns of the economic and social 
logics of homeownership in their decision to hold a town hall meeting about the possible 
renovation of the clubhouse. The second example similarly shows how board members 
took steps to proactively enact both the economic and social logics of homeownership in 
their management of a staff change. Both purposefully respond to the simultaneous 
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presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics by maintaining both the 
economic logic of homeownership and the social logic of homeownership. In each case 
organizational actors enact practices to ambidextrously respond to multiple institutional 
logics. 
 One of the ways in which organizational actors enact practices to act 
ambidextrously is to engage in institutional work—particularly maintenance work. My 
analysis reveals that organizational actors in ambidextrous homeowners’ associations are 
far more likely to engage in the institutional maintenance of multiple institutional logics 
when compared to organizational actors in non-ambidextrous homeowners’ associations. 
Board members in ambidextrous homeowners’ associations often engage in institutional 
maintenance to preserve and reproduce the norms and beliefs of both the economic logic 
of homeownership and the social logic of homeownership.  
As shown in previous sections, organizational actors do maintenance work by 
consciously and thoughtfully expressing and upholding the value of understanding other 
ways of doing and perpetuating norms and beliefs of both logics in their actions, 
interactions, and practices. In some cases it was different organizational actors each 
maintaining and using a different logic (e.g., a board member maintaining the social logic 
of homeownership and the manager maintaining the economic logic of homeownership 
or one board member maintaining the social logic of homeownership and a different 
board member maintaining the economic logic of homeownership) or, more commonly in 
my data, single organizational actors each maintaining and using multiple logics (e.g., 
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one or multiple board members, managers, unit owners, etc. maintaining both the 
economic logic of homeownership and the social logic of homeownership). 
 In my analysis, I often found evidence of maintenance work, where organizational 
actors routinely expressed an implicit understanding of the need to incorporate, uphold, 
and balance multiple ways of thinking and doing in the decision-making process. The 
following interview excerpts represent some of many examples of maintenance work in 
these homeowners’ associations: 
 Any time we make an important decision we do a checks and balances procedure 
and we ask two questions. Is this good us and is this good for others? We have to 
answer yes to both of those questions or else it is back to the drawing board.  
 
 When you become an owner in a homeowners’ association, you give up certain 
things and you gain certain things. You lose direct control of certain aspects of 
homeownership, but you gain relationships. When you are on the board you have 
the power to make decisions, so you get the control back, but now there is the 
greater potential to lose relationships. If you are losing relationships then what 
you are doing is wrong. 
 
 Good governance is not making decisions based on your own interests. You know 
you aren’t doing that if sometimes you aren’t happy with the decision but you 
make it anyway. 
 
Each of these excerpts insinuate a nuanced understanding that one must consider multiple 
ways of thinking and doing in the decision-making process. The interviewees maintain 
the values of both the economic logic of homeownership and the social logic of 
homeownership by acknowledging the individual and communal impacts of their 
decisions and the cultural embeddedness of their authority. This bleeds in to their actions 
and practices as is illustrated in the following example of the proceedings of a newly 
transitioned condominium unit owners meeting. 
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 Board president: Welcome to the first meeting of Sutton Avenue Condominium 
Association. We are here to celebrate our transition from being a developer-run 
association to a unit-owner run association. With that in mind, I am happy to 
answer any questions unit-owners might have about the transition, your homes, or 
the association. 
 
 Unit owner: I am planning to screen in my porch and was wondering if you could 
recommend a contractor who is reputable and would do it for a reasonable price. 
 
This unit owner clearly does not understand that he cannot screen in his porch without 
permission from the board. 
 Board president: Well, I’m sorry to tell you that you actually cannot enclose your 
porch without express and written permission from the board. With these 
documents that are a bit vague regarding porches, I could see how you might 
believe that you could, but, if you look at the bylaws, it specifically says that any 
alterations to the unit, common element, or limited common element—which your 
porch would be—needs approval from the board. But since he’s here let’s just 
check with our legal counsel, Chuck Zito, to make sure that I am interpreting 
these documents correctly. [He directs the question to the legal counsel present 
who indeed confirms that unit owners may not enclose their porches without 
permission from the board.] 
 
 Unit owner: OK. I just wanted to check. 
 
There were many other questions similar to this one asked over the course of the two-
hour meeting, and the newly minted board members all took turns fielding them, helping 
one another when they were stumped, and directing questions to the legal and insurance 
representatives present when necessary. One of the reoccurring questions raised by unit 
owners at this meeting was the reckless driving of one of the unit owners. The board 
clearly knew who the offender was, but rather than embarrass him publicly, they chose to 
make their comments generally and appealed to his sense of community—“a lot of us 
have the need for speed, but God forbid that need would hurt one of our neighbors, by 
golly, then there would be a real need for speed!”. The board’s patterned, thoughtful, and 
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seemingly practiced responses, served two purposes. First, they maintained the economic 
logic of homeownership by placing an emphasis on the use of professionals and the 
importance of rule following and adherence to authority. Second, they also maintained 
the social logic of homeownership by appealing to a larger sense of community and the 
importance of board practices to service congenial relations. The board members drew 
upon their natural instincts, the context, and their culturally embedded understandings of 
the meaning of homeownership in a homeowners’ association to invoke, maintain, and 
uphold the norms and beliefs of the both logics, either by making adjustments to the 
logics, improvising, or switching between logics, given the question, concern, or decision 
they were responding to. 
“Doing Logics” to Lessen Conflicts 
My analysis reveals that all homeowners’ associations are subject to institutional 
pluralism and complexity but that responses to institutional pluralism and complexity 
vary. I propose that it is not the mere presence of multiple and functionally contradictory 
institutional logics that causes intra-organizational conflict as the institutional logics often 
implicitly presumes, but rather organizational responses to institutional pluralism and 
complexity, in particular those responses that stem from the agency of organizational 
actors. I argue that organizational actors’ responses to institutional pluralism and 
complexity, as evidenced in their perceptions and practices, better explains the presence 
of and variability in intra-organizational conflict that homeowners’ associations’ 
experience than traditional structural and cultural explanations. Organizational actors’ 
beliefs about the simultaneous presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics 
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and use, enactment, and practice of logics in day-to-day decisions, interactions, and 
routine activities create the potential for both more and less intra-organizational 
conflict.119 As I have shown, homeowners’ associations that respond to institutional 
pluralism and complexity by eliminating or compartmentalizing logics are more 
conflicted. Board members in eliminatory and compartmentalizing homeowners’ 
associations (i.e., non-ambidextrous) adhere to a single dominant institutional logic by 
eliminating new or alternative logics or separating and compartmentalizing multiple 
logics. This creates a cycle of problem and contestation that ultimately results in an 
incongruous organizational vision and more intra-organizational conflict. Homeowners’ 
associations that respond to institutional pluralism and complexity ambidextrously, in 
contrast, are less conflicted. Board members in ambidextrous homeowners’ associations 
make a continuous and thoughtful choice to reify and maintain and use multiple 
institutional logics. This enables them to use their logics as a cultural and practical 
“toolkit” and act ambidextrously. They are able to simultaneously “do” logics, or to 
perform complex, continuing, and context-related actions which inscribe different 
organizational perceptions and practices within one organizational space. Because of 
these actions they create a self-reinforcing cycle of ambidextrous action which ultimately 
results in a congruous organizational vision and less intra-organizational conflict. 
                                                        
119 Alternative explanations are available. For example, one such alternative explanation may posit that it is 
the presence of the economic logic only which leads to more conflict and the presence of the economic and 
social logics which lead to less conflict as opposed to my argument of ambidextrous/non-ambidextrous 
responses to the presence of multiple logics. While possible, my research finds consistent evidence of 
differential outcomes based on organizational actors’ relative ability to “do” logics (i.e., ability to make 
adjustments, improvise, and switch between logics on a context-specific basis). Ultimately, more research 
is needed which empirically tests the institutional ambidexterity construct. 
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Automatic Action: Organizational Responses in Non-Ambidextrous Homeowners’ 
Associations 
Organizational actors in non-ambidextrous homeowners’ associations respond to 
institutional pluralism and complexity by disrupting the creation and/or maintenance 
work of new or alternative logics. As I have shown in the previous sections of this 
chapter they do this by undermining the value of new or alternative logics and 
instinctively re-establishing the dominance of their logic by eliminating or contesting 
new or additional institutional logics or by separating and compartmentalizing multiple 
institutional logics. It appears that this is often an automatic, re-occurring, and self-
reinforcing response. Organizational actors’ perceive the simultaneous presence and 
accessibility of multiple institutional logics as novel and deem multiplicity as 
problematic. As such they instinctively disrupt new and alternative logics by contesting 
them or separating them from the dominant logic. I contend that each time an 
organizational actor chooses to do this he or she contributes to the development of an 
incongruous organizational vision and creates more intra-organizational conflict. Each of 
these flare-ups represents missed opportunities for organizational actors to adapt their and 
their organization’s responses to the simultaneous presence and accessibility of multiple 
institutional logics and practice ambidexterity.  
Instead of practicing institutional ambidexterity non-ambidextrous organizations 
treat the “problem” of institutional pluralism and complexity by either adhering to a 
single institutional logic by eliminating a potentially new or an alternative institutional 
logic or separating and compartmentalizing multiple institutional logics. The perception 
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of institutional pluralism and complexity as problematic by organizational participants is 
apparent in my data and their subsequent actions to eliminate or compartmentalize 
multiple institutional logics comply with theoretical expectation (Oliver, 1991; Kraatz 
and Block, 2008; Pache and Santos, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011). The notion, however, 
that organizations, and by extension organizational actors, respond “strategically”, 
however, was unfounded in my analysis. In the cases presented in the previous section, 
one can see how organizational actors in non-ambidextrous homeowners’ associations 
frequently, although not exclusively, respond to institutional pluralism and complexity 
instinctively and without careful or deliberate thought. They undermine or de-legitimate 
the economic logic of homeownership or the social logic of homeownership in order to 
fend off the threat of the unknown in an attempt to maintain the dominance and 
legitimacy of their preferred institutional logic. They do this because it is what they know 
and are comfortable with, not because they are aware of or acting in accordance with 
field-level pressures to comply with a single logic as is suggested by most institutional 
literature (Greenwood et al., 2011). My analysis reveals that this is often an automatic 
response and is frequently done without strategic aforethought; organizational actors are 
simply acting and responding to a new or different way of doing and coping with the 
resultant conflict as best they know how. They are unwitting participants and often do not 
see or anticipate incompatible practical understandings or the connections between their 
beliefs, actions, and practices and episodes of conflict. I thusly conclude that these 
homeowners’ associations are more conflicted because organizational actors’ automatic 
actions and inadvertent responses to institutional pluralism and complexity, in the 
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absence of concrete change or deliberate reckoning, continually create and re-create the 
context for more intra-organizational conflict. This may help to explain why some 
organizations exist in a sustained “uneasy truce” (Reay and Hinings, 2005: 364), or in 
extended situations of contested institutional pluralism and complexity. 
Thoughtful Practice: Organizational Responses in Ambidextrous Homeowners’ 
Associations 
 Organizational actors in ambidextrous homeowners’ associations respond to 
institutional pluralism and complexity by actively and purposefully maintaining and 
using multiple institutional logics. As I have shown in previous sections of this chapter 
they do this by simultaneously and continually incorporating the norms, concerns, 
actions, and practices of both the economic logic of homeownership and the social logic 
of homeownership into their day-to-day perceptions and practices. By regarding 
multiplicity as a benefit and making adjustments, improvising, and switching between 
logics on a context-specific basis they do not regularly prefer a single logic over another, 
but instead reify the underlying norms and values of both. Organizational actors’ 
maintenance work legitimizes the present institutional logics and makes them available to 
organizational actors to use as a situation requires. I contend that this makes the 
organization and its actors ambidextrous.120 They are able to use both logics to their 
organization’s benefit. Organizational actors perform ambidexterity on the ground by 
drawing upon tacit understandings of context-specific situations and subsequently “doing 
                                                        
120 Practices associated with ambidexterity may begin at the individual level and ultimately become 
institutionalized at the organizational level. Because this construct was principally identified through an 
inductive process I do not empirically test the construct against other potential causes of institutional 
ambidexterity in individuals or organizations and other contributing factors. 
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logics”.  Ambidexterity and “doing logics” is a performed response that is produced and 
reproduced in the everyday activities of organizational actors. Consequently, and despite 
existing in a continually institutionally pluralistic and complex environment, these 
organizations experience less intra-organizational conflict. 
According to my analysis, ambidexterity requires a conscious, although largely 
unarticulated, awareness of institutional pluralism and complexity and to “do” logics one 
must thoughtfully adjust, improvise, and switch between the economic logic of 
homeownership and the social logic of homeownership in order to make the appropriate 
compromises and accommodations the situation requires. To avoid or lessen conflicts, 
organizational actors must simultaneously satisfy the implicit demands and mitigate the 
contradictions of multiple logics. Because of the simultaneous nature of ambidexterity, 
there are often individual carriers of multiple logics. In other words, one individual can, 
and often does, invoke, enact, or perform the beliefs and actions of multiple logics. This 
assertion is not unfounded in the literature; in fact it extends a recent finding by 
McPherson and Saunder (2013). Their ethnographic analysis of a drug court provides 
evidence of the discretionary use of four types of logics by four different types of 
organizational actors. They effectively show that in the context of institutional pluralism 
and complexity local actors can both perform their “home” logics and “hijack” the logics 
of other organizational actors to get the work of the organization done. My analysis 
extends this work to show organizational actors can, and do, perform actions at the 
micro-level which benefit meso-level organizational processes. Organizational actor’s 
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ability to “do” logics, or to respond to organizational pluralism and complexity 
ambidextrously, benefits the everyday functioning of the organization. 
 McPherson and Saunder’s (2013) and this author’s findings build upon the view 
first expressed in the last chapter that institutional logics can function as “flexible bits of 
culture” (Glynn, 2013: 2) and that organizational actors can, and do, exercise a great deal 
of agency in their everyday use of logics, both in terms of which logics they adopt and for 
what purpose. Organizational actors in ambidextrous homeowners’ associations respond 
to the presence and accessibility of multiple institutional logics by “doing” logics. They 
“do” logics by thoughtfully making adjustments, improvising, and switching between 
logics on a context-specific basis. Making adjustments, improvising, and switching 
represent actions embedded with tacit understandings of a situation, undertaken in 
response to a specific context (Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Bednarek, 2013).  
Organizational actors mutually make adjustments, or act in ways both according 
to and not according to specific logics, to benefit the organization. These adjustments do 
not require an “overarching coordinating device” but rely on the tolerance of multiple 
parties to potentially contradictory ways of doing (Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, and Van de 
Ven, 2009; Lindblom, 1965). For example, in my analysis board members and managers 
often need to make mutual adjustments. Board members are generally more in sync with 
the social logic of homeownership because they reside in the community and thus are 
more apt to understand the social relational aspect of the organization; in contrast, 
community managers are generally more in sync with the economic logic of 
homeownership because they are apt to draw upon their professional understandings of 
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the business. In practice then, board members must adjust to the economic logic of 
homeownership while community managers must adjust to the social logic of 
homeownership. The two thus make compromises and accommodations to mitigate the 
contradictions of multiple logics so that they make work interdependently and get the 
work of the organization done.  
Organizational actors also improvise, or try to find ways around obstacles, to get 
the work of the organization done (Smets et al., 2012, Jarzabkowski, Smets, and 
Bednarek, 2013). In practice I find that this requires experimentation and an expansion of 
practices and responses, yielding, in time, an expanded practice repertoire (Smets, 
Morris, and Greenwood, 2012; Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013). For example, in my 
analysis some associations recalled going from what I may have classified as non-
ambidextrous to ambidextrous by improvising to make concrete changes to their 
responses to institutional pluralism and complexity. In one case a board member recalled 
years ago when he “ruled with an iron fist” as a means to make the association financially 
responsible and accountable (he led the board strictly according to the economic logic of 
homeownership). He felt that he was “doing his job well” but didn’t “get the respect he 
deserved”. He recounted years of overly contentious open board meetings and emails and 
hostile relations with other non-board member unit owners. He spoke though of a 
“turning point” when a new board member joined the board and “challenged him” to “re-
think his leadership style”. He automatically reacted at first by championing the “first 
responsibility of the board” (i.e., fiscal management) but eventually relented to an 
acknowledgement of a new way of thinking and doing after a “near hostile takeover” 
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prompted him to make concrete changes to his decision-making process. The moment of 
urgency forced him to respond to institutional pluralism and complexity in a different 
way—by acknowledging both the economic logic of homeownership and the social logic 
of homeownership. The moment itself required situated improvising (he ended up calling 
an open meeting to review construction management bids rather than just contracting 
“old buddies”) and ultimately led to an expanded practice repertoire whereby he 
developed new practices that incorporated both logics of homeownership. He shares that 
he now has a broader and more “balanced approach,” one “with two distinct aims” 
instead of just one. He thusly came to respond to institutional pluralism and complexity 
ambidextrously and with a new appreciation for the ability of two logics to not only co-
exist in an institutional environment but also to benefit the organization. 
Organizational actors also have the ability to switch between multiple logics. 
McPherson and Saunder’s (2013) study shows how individuals mostly adhere to their 
“home” logics but can switch or “hijack” other’s logics. My analysis also shows the 
potential for organizational actors to switch between the economic logic of 
homeownership and the social logic of homeownership. For example, board members in 
my analysis often conformed to certain facets of each of the logics of homeownership 
given a particular decision or situation—sometimes even within the frame of a single 
decision. In closed-door matters they might reason in accordance with the economic logic 
of homeownership (e.g., making the decision to fire a long-serving doorman for cost-
saving reasons) but in open-door matters they might ‘switch’ to reason in accordance 
with the social logic of homeownership (e.g., making the decision to hire a contract 
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company of doormen to keep the community safe). Individual actors’ thus embody 
different identities are able to “participate in multiple [inconsistent] cultural traditions” 
(DiMaggio, 1997: 268 in Jarzabkowski, Smets, and Bednarek, 2013). Although resonant 
with structural hybridization or compartmentalization (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz 
and Block, 2008; Meyer and Rowan, 1977), switching is distinct because a single actor or 
an individual carrier is able to shift between multiple logics by enacting them at different 
times or in different spaces and given a specific context (Jarzabkowski, Smets, and 
Bednarek, 2013). 
 “Doing” logics and acting ambidextrously requires organizational actors to draw 
from their institutional logics toolkits. Organizational actors in ambidextrous 
homeowners’ associations create cultural (i.e., make accessible and maintain multiple 
logics of homeownership) and practical (i.e., develop the capacity to thoughtfully practice 
ambidexterity by making adjustments, improvising, and switching between logics) 
toolkits to draw upon given a specific context. Organizational actors in non-ambidextrous 
homeowners’ associations do not respond to institutional complexity reflexively; they do 
not create these toolkits and thus suffer disadvantageous consequences—more and 
prolonged conflicts.  
Conclusion 
This chapter used recent micro-theorizing in institutional theory and the concepts 
of institutional ambidexterity and institutional work to argue that it is not the mere 
presence of multiple logics in an organizational environment that causes intra-
organizational conflict as the institutional logics literature presumes, but organizational 
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actors’ use, enactment, and practice of logics on the ground. Organizational responses to 
institutional pluralism and complexity, in particular those actualized in organizational 
actors’ day-to-day decisions and routine activities, create the potential for more and less 
intra-organizational conflict. While both non-ambidextrous and ambidextrous 
homeowners’ associations are subject to multiple logics, ambidextrous homeowners’ 
associations actively maintain multiple logics for the benefit of the organization. 
Organizational actors in ambidextrous homeowners’ associations use the economic and 
social logics in thoughtful practice: they “do” logics by making adjustments, improvising, 
and switching between logics on a context-specific basis. Board members in non-
ambidextrous homeowners’ associations instinctively respond to institutional pluralism 
and complexity by adhering to a single institutional logic or compartmentalize multiple 
logics and, as a consequence, have a greater potential to experience more intra-
organizational conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
224
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
In this dissertation, I have examined and explained the existence, sources, and 
variability of intra-organizational conflict in a hybrid organization. I have assessed the 
usefulness of “structural” and “cultural” explanations of intra-organizational conflict and 
ultimately developed and advanced an alternative explanation for the presence of and 
variability in intra-organizational conflict in a hybrid organization. Homeowners’ 
associations were used as a case for understanding the development of multiple 
institutional logics and the relationship between institutional pluralism and complexity 
and the presence of and variability in intra-organizational conflict in a hybrid 
organization. In particular, I examined how the American history and ideology of 
homeownership influenced the production of multiple, permanent, and functionally 
contradictory institutional logics in homeowners’ associations and how their existence 
enabled and constrained individual action at the organizational level. Using institutional 
theory and the concepts of institutional work and institutional ambidexterity I argued that 
organizational and organizational actor’s responses to institutional pluralism and 
complexity, as evidenced in their perceptions and practices, and use or disuse of multiple 
institutional logics determined whether a hybrid organization was subject to more or less 
intra-organizational conflict. This study was based on quantitative and qualitative 
research conducted on homeowners’ associations in the Greater-Boston area. It drew 
upon approximately 250 original surveys and 56 in-depth interviews with board members 
of homeowners’ associations in addition to observations of homeowners’ associations 
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and textual analysis of homeowners’ association documents. In my analysis I sought to 
address three principal questions: 1) How common is intra-organizational conflict in 
homeowners’ associations; 2) What are the sources of intra-organizational conflict in 
homeowners’ associations; and 3) What makes some homeowners’ associations more and 
less conflicted? 
In this chapter I will do the following. First, I will review the major findings of 
my dissertation. These findings correspond directly to the three principal questions of my 
dissertation. Second, I will enumerate the original theoretical contributions of my 
dissertation and explore how my research extends and deepens theory and scholarship on 
intra-organizational conflict, hybrid organizations, institutional logics, institutional 
pluralism and complexity, and homeownership. Third, I will address the political and 
legislative implications of my findings for homeowners’ associations and make three 
recommendations to reduce the potential for conflicts in homeowners’ associations. 
Fourth, I will assess the limitations of my research design and reason how and why this 
may have affected the generalizability of my findings. Fifth, I will offer suggestions for 
future research in the area of hybrid organizations and institutional theory. Finally, I will 
tender my final thoughts about the nature of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ 
associations. 
Summary of Findings 
My findings lead to three general conclusions. First, many homeowners’ 
associations experience significant conflict. Nearly half of the homeowners’ associations 
I surveyed reported having experienced at least one significant instance of conflict in the 
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last 12 months. This finding is largely consistent with theory and literature in the area of 
organizations and management which point to the relative unavoidability and inevitability 
of conflict in organizations. Conflict, this scholarship reports, is a natural, relatively 
inescapable, and, in some cases, necessary component of organizational life. In short, 
intra-organizational conflict is common in homeowners’ associations. 
Second, structural and cultural explanations of conflict only partially explain the 
presence of conflict in homeowners’ associations. They do not explain the variability of 
conflict in homeowners’ associations. As I detailed in Chapter Two, “Structure v. 
Culture: The External and Internal Determinants of Conflict,” both the structural and 
cultural explanations of conflict hold weight. My complete statistical model, which 
assessed the relative strength of both external and internal and “structural” and “cultural” 
predictors of intra-organizational conflict, revealed two particularly strong and 
statistically significant predictors: organization size (an external and structural predictor) 
and ideological homogeneity (an internal and cultural predictor). I found that 
homeowners’ associations of a large size and homeowners’ associations who report 
sharing a common vision about the purpose of a homeowners’ association are less likely 
to experience a significant instance of conflict when compared to those homeowners’ 
associations of a small size and homeowners’ associations who do not report sharing a 
common vision about the purpose of a homeowners’ association. This is all to say that I 
found some empirical support for both the structural (i.e., the assertion that characteristics 
of the organization itself best explain the presence of conflict) and the cultural (i.e., the 
assertion that cultural and material conditions of the organization best explain the 
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presence of conflict) explanations of conflict. The strongest predictor, however, was 
cultural. My measure of the presence of institutional pluralism, ideological homogeneity, 
was found to be the most statistically robust predictor of intra-organizational conflict in 
homeowners’ associations. 
This outcome led me to more fully explore cultural explanations of conflict. For 
while my measure of ideological homogeneity may indicate the incongruity of 
organizational vision and the possible presence of multiple institutional logics, it did not 
directly or fully measure the presence of institutional logics nor did it identify what 
institutional logics might be present. Through interviews with board members of 
homeowners’ associations and other related organizational actors, in addition to 
observations of homeowners’ associations and textual analysis of homeowners’ 
association documents, I did confirm the correlative association between ideological 
homogeneity and the presence of intra-organizational conflict and the presence and 
existence of multiple institutional logics. I found two institutional logics culturally 
embedded in the hybrid organizational and institutional environment of homeowners’ 
associations: the economic logic of homeownership and the social logic of 
homeownership. As I explained in Chapter Three, “Identifying, Explaining, and Defining 
the Logics of Homeownership,” I believe that these logics stem from the American 
history and ideology of homeownership and serve to prime organizational actors about 
the purpose of homeownership and the homeowners’ association. The economic logic of 
homeownership primarily corresponds to the market and financial interests of 
homeownership and the homeowners’ association. This logic focuses organizational 
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actor’s attention largely on financial performance indicators, such as property values and 
the investment potential, and prompts organizational actors to act in their personal and 
individual best interests. The social logic of homeownership primarily corresponds to the 
civil and communal interests of homeownership and the homeowners’ association. This 
logic focuses organizational actor’s attention largely on public performance indicators, 
such as shared values and democratic participation, and prompts organizational actors to 
act in the community’s best interests. Because these two logics of homeownership exist 
in opposition to one another, they create ideological heterogeneity, incongruous 
organizational visions, and prescribe different goals and modes of action, and, as my 
survey data strongly suggests, have the potential to cause significant intra-organizational 
conflict.  
Third, and most significantly, the micro-actions of organizational actors matter in 
situations of institutional pluralism and complexity. While the dual presence of the 
economic logic of homeownership and the social logic of homeownership may, at least 
partially, explain the presence of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ 
associations, it does not explain the variability in intra-organizational conflict that 
homeowners’ associations experience. Neither the structural nor the cultural explanations 
of conflict explain why some homeowners’ associations are more and less conflicted than 
others. I argue that the structural and cultural explanations of conflict cannot fully explain 
the variability of intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations because they 
completely or almost completely ignore the role of organizational actors and their agentic 
potential to both cause more and less conflict. Indeed, as I explained in Chapter Two and 
  
229
in the previous section, structural explanations of conflict focus solely on structural 
attributes of the organization—not on the perceptions and practices of the people within 
it. The primary concerns if this approach are to categorize and classify conflict rather 
than to understand the role of organizational participants. The cultural approach moves 
somewhat closer to addressing the role of organizational participants, but falls short of 
truly embracing the importance of how organizational actors impact the organization 
itself. As I detailed in Chapter Three and in the previous section, this approach, while 
cognizant of embedded agency and applicable to multiple levels of analysis, still mainly 
focuses on the top-down role that dominant institutional logics play in promoting 
conformity within fields and organizations rather than on the bottom-up role that 
organizational actors play in reproducing and transforming organizational structures. 
I ultimately offer and develop a third explanation for conflict. My explanation 
draws from institutional theory and recent scholarship on institutional work and 
institutional ambidexterity and addresses how individual and institutionalized 
organizational responses to institutional pluralism and complexity affect the magnitude of 
intra-organizational conflict in homeowners’ associations. I outlined and provided 
empirical support for my argument in Chapter Four, “Doing Logics to Lessen Conflicts.” 
In this chapter, I proposed that organizational actors’ responses to institutional pluralism 
and complexity explain the variability in intra-organizational conflict, and that it is their 
relative “not doing” or “doing” of logics that determines whether a homeowners’ 
association exhibited more or less intra-organizational conflict. Organizational actors 
who “don’t do” logics respond to institutional pluralism and complexity by eliminating 
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and compartmentalizing logics. They perceive multiplicity as novel and problematic and 
enact disruptive practices to contest and separate logics. A non-ambidextrous response 
results in more intra-organizational conflict. Organizational actors who “do” logics 
respond to institutional pluralism and complexity ambidextrously. They perceive 
multiplicity as routine, and even beneficial, and enact practices to maintain multiple 
institutional logics via context-specific and purposeful practices including adjustment, 
improvisation, and switching. An ambidextrous response results in less intra-
organizational conflict. 
Theoretical Contributions 
 My dissertation makes several contributions to the theory and scholarship on 
intra-organizational conflict, hybrid organizations, institutional logics, institutional 
pluralism and complexity, and homeownership. First, my research advances scholarship 
on intra-organizational conflict in significant ways. One of the primary aims of this study 
was to explore the factors that explain the presence of intra-organizational conflict among 
homeowners’ associations and homeowners’ association’s governing boards.  
Understanding what factors predict organizational and board conflict is a step toward 
choosing policies and institutional arrangements that help reduce dysfunctional conflict 
or mitigate its negative effects on the organization and the governing board. Although 
research on the determinants of intra-organizational conflict was bountiful during the 
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, its popularity has slowed, if not stalled, in the past several 
decades (after the 1970s the focus of research shifted to methods of managing conflict as 
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opposed to identifying sources of conflict).121 As a consequence there are few studies—
much, much less than would be expected—which explore factors that explain the 
presence of conflict in newer types of organizational structures and arrangements. This 
study, to my knowledge, was the first of its kind to assess the predictive capacity of 
traditional structural explanations of conflict and newer cultural explanations of conflict 
in a hybrid organization. In an age when the number of hybrid forms of organization 
continues to grow and the sectorial lines of demarcation continue to blur this is a 
significant omission from the literature. The finding that internal and cultural factors, 
such as ideological homogeneity, may best explain conflict in hybrid organizations 
moves us forward in understanding how congruous organizational visions impact 
organizational functioning and performance. 
 Relatedly, my research considers both the presence and variability of intra-
organizational conflict in organizations. Unlike previous explanations of intra-
organizational conflict I recognize and attempt to empirically account for experiential 
differences in intra-organizational conflict. In traditional structural explanations of 
conflict the primary focus is on the presence or absence of conflict, or, more recently, on 
the presence of “good/functional” conflict or “bad/dysfunctional” conflict; little thought 
is given to what conditions engender more and less conflict in organizations. Recent 
scholarship, for example, has theorized about which conditions create “beneficial” 
conflict and which conditions create “detrimental” conflict and how those conditions can 
                                                        
121 Wall and Callister (1995: 517-526) reference Deutsch (1990) in support of their comment that “In the 
past twenty years researchers have not concentrated on finding causes,” but instead on classifying and 
managing its effect on “individuals, on relationships, and on communications, behaviors, structure, and 
issues”. 
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be associated with organizational functioning (Jehn, 1995). Cultural explanations are 
similarly flat in their analysis of variability in intra-organizational conflict. These 
explanations tend to implicitly assume that conflict is caused by the presence of multiple 
institutional logics or the conditions of institutional pluralism and complexity, as such 
conflict is very rarely concretely defined or empirically measured as much as it is 
evaluated for treatment or remedy in service of institutional compliance (Pache and 
Santos, 2010). By advancing a third explanation for intra-organizational conflict that 
accounts for both the presence of and variability in intra-organizational conflict I hope to 
offer a more nuanced understanding of conflict and inspire more research into the 
dynamic nature of conflict and its ability to change form and shape in organizations.   
 Second, my manuscript extends institutional theory and deepens our 
understandings of some of its main assumptions and constructs, particularly with respect 
to scholarship on institutional logics and the concepts of institutional work and 
institutional ambidexterity. One of the ways that my research adds to scholarship on 
institutional logics is in my utilization of Glynn’s (2013: 2) reconceptualization of 
institutional logics as “bits of culture”. Her recognition that a disassociation of 
institutional logics from institutions sanctions a “theorization of logics as flexible bits of 
culture that constitute actors and shape their actions,” informs my analysis. Indeed, as I 
show in Chapter Three and Four individual organizational actors in homeowners’ 
associations have the capability to not only simultaneously access multiple institutional 
logics but also to have them actively shape their perceptions and practices. When 
organizational actors respond to institutional pluralism and complexity ambidextrously, 
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for example, they are able to simultaneously access the economic logic of 
homeownership and the social logic of homeownership and purposefully respond to the 
concerns of both logics given the specific context. Within moments board members of 
homeowners’ associations are able to simultaneously enact and embody perceptions and 
practices consistent with either logic, but never in such a way where the original intent of 
either logic is eliminated or separated from the other. Envisaging of logics in this way has 
an affinity to Swidler’s (1986) cultural toolkit approach; I see organizational actors as 
capable of having a repertoire of logics that they can choose from in their decision-
making process. Indeed, my argument, to an extent, hinges on organizational actors’ 
ability to acquire a cultural and practical toolkit that they can draw from given a specific 
context. This conceptualization of logics is top-down and bottom-up whereas most 
traditional conceptualizations of logics are purely top-down. 
 Another way that my research adds to scholarship on institutional logics is in my 
distinction between the constructs of institutional pluralism and institutional complexity. 
In a large body of literature the constructs of institutional pluralism and institutional 
complexity have been treated as synonymous and interchangeable terms. I differentiate 
the two constructs based on their influence in the organizational environment. For me, 
institutional pluralism refers to situations where multiple logics are present, but are not 
simultaneously accessible or do not exist in direct contradiction with one another and 
institutional complexity refers to situations where multiple logics are simultaneously 
present, accessible, and contradictory. My distinction draws from Pache and Santos’s 
(2010) assertion that intra-organizational dynamics can filter, alter, and inform responses 
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to institutional pluralism and that institutional logics can be more and less accessible 
and/or powerful in an organization and in an organizational field. They note that the 
relative accessibility and power of an institutional logic’s representation in an 
organization is of particular importance to determining how complex an organizational 
environment is.122 Although this factor did not become relevant to my analysis—all of 
the homeowners’ associations included in my study were subject to the conditions of 
institutional pluralism and complexity (i.e., I found evidence of the simultaneous 
presence and accessibility of both the economic logic of homeownership and the social 
logic of homeownership in all of the homeowners’ associations included in my study)—I 
did allow for the possibility that both were not simultaneously present and/or accessible 
(i.e., homeowners’ associations could exist in a pluralistic or non-pluralistic and/or 
complex or non-complex environment) in my analysis.123 
 My bringing together of two hitherto separate concepts is another way that my 
research adds to or extends scholarship in these areas. The concepts of institutional work 
and institutional ambidexterity, and their respective scholarship, have developed 
separately for the most part. I join together these two bodies of literature and incorporate 
the two concepts to establish my explanation of intra-organizational conflict. I argue that 
processes associated with the concept of institutional work (e.g., institutional creation, 
                                                        
122 Besharov and Smith’s (2013) model of organizational hybridity makes a similar claim. They suggest 
that the degree of complexity in an organization is dependent upon the degree of logic centrality and the 
degree of logic incompatibility. 
123 As I discussed in Chapter Four, there is an alternative explanation which may posit that it is the presence 
of the economic logic only which leads to more conflict and the presence of the economic and social logics 
which lead to less conflict as opposed to my argument of ambidextrous/non-ambidextrous responses to the 
presence of multiple logics. While possible, my research finds consistent evidence of differential outcomes 
based on organizational actors’ relative ability to “do” logics (i.e., ability to make adjustments, improvise, 
and switch between logics on a context-specific basis).  
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institutional maintenance, and institutional disruption) can be used in service of 
individual responses to institutional pluralism and complexity including responses of 
ambidexterity and elimination or compartmentalization. As I detail in Chapter Four, an 
ambidextrous response to the simultaneous presence and accessibility of multiple logics 
depends upon organizational actor’s practice—maintenance—of multiple logics. 
Organizational actors must continually “do” logics and perform maintenance work; they 
must actively and consistently ensure adherence to rules and reproduce existing norms 
and beliefs systems for both the economic logic of homeownership and the social logic of 
homeownership. In contrast, a non-ambidextrous response to the simultaneous presence 
and accessibility of multiple logics results from organizational actor’s practice of 
disruption work. Although organizational actors do engage in the maintenance of their 
preferred logic, they are more likely than ambidextrous associations to engage in 
institutional disruption, or to engage in the instinctual practices that undermine the core 
assumptions and beliefs of any new or alternative logics. 
 Each of these distinctions contributes in some way to my most significant addition 
to institutional theory and scholarship on the institutional logics. I add to this literature 
and research an empirical study that details micro-meso level connections in a hybrid 
organization. The study of how organizational members act and do the work of the 
organization in circumstances of permanent institutional pluralism and complexity is 
remarkably understudied. While there is a rich literature studying how macro-level 
institutions affect organizational strategies, structures, and practices (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, 2004; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012), there are very 
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few studies which detail how micro-level processes, such as how social actors translate 
logics into action as they engage in everyday organizational activities, affect meso-level 
organizational outcomes.124 This void in the institutional logics literature was recently 
emphasized in Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s (2012) synthesis of the institutional 
logics perspective. In their discussion about the implications of the institutional logics 
perspective for future research they state: “It would be very useful to…understand how 
different institutional logics become more or less available and accessible, and become 
activated in particular situations—such as in processes related to decision-making, sense-
making, coordination, and problem solving” (183). In Chapter Four, I do just that. I detail 
how organizational actors’ responses to institutional pluralism and complexity relate to 
perceptions about the availability and accessibility of multiple institutional logics and 
how in homeowners’ associations organizational actors enact practices to simultaneously 
activate and use—either by making adjustments, improvising, or switching—or 
deactivate or disuse —by contesting or separating—multiple institutional logics. 
 My third and final contribution relates to the meaning of homeownership. I 
broaden the meaning of homeownership. The American history and ideology of 
homeownership frames organizational actors’ understandings of homeownership and 
provides them with symbolic structures to understand and construct their environments. 
By extension it imbues homeowners’ associations with meaning and purpose. The 
problem that homeowners’ associations face is that this ideology often frames property 
                                                        
124 McPherson and Saunder (2013) is an exception. Their ethnographic analysis of a drug court provides 
evidence of the discretionary use of four types of logics by four different types of organizational actors. 
They effectively show that in the context of institutional pluralism and complexity local actors can both 
perform their “home” logics and “hijack” the logics of other organizational actors to get the work of the 
organization done. 
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and homeownership as a private and singular experience; it does not consider, for the 
most part, public and communal or shared ownership structures. This study points to the 
need to broaden our cultural understandings of homeownership, particularly in light of 
the growing number of communal homeownership structures. My research suggests that 
there is a need to simultaneously maintain both the economic logic of homeownership 
and the social logic of homeownership and to purposefully incorporate them into the 
perceptions and practices of these organizations to lessen the conflicts caused by their 
private/public and individual/communal nature. As I have shown, ambidextrous 
responses to the presence of these logics benefit the overall functioning of the 
organization. 
Policy and Legislative Implications 
 My research also carries significant political and legislative implications. In 2006, 
the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), prompted by a study which 
indicated that approximately 46% and 56% of owners in single-family and condominium 
homeowners’ associations respectively were over the age of 50 and in response to media 
furor over the alleged misdoing and mismanagement of homeowners’ associations, 
drafted a set of ten principles, or “rights”, to address the nature of intra-organizational 
conflict in homeowners’ associations. Their “Bill of Rights for Homeowners in 
Associations” uses legalese so that state legislatures and homeowners’ associations’ 
boards can follow it when developing laws and regulatory procedures for or developing 
or modifying governing documents of homeowners’ associations. The Bill of Rights for 
Homeowners sets forth the following ten principles: 
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I. The Right to Security against Foreclosure: An association shall not 
foreclose against a homeowner except for significant unpaid assessments, 
and any such foreclosure shall require judicial review to ensure fairness. 
 
II. The Right to Resolve Disputes without Litigation: Homeowners and 
associations will have available alternative dispute resolution (ADR), 
although both parties preserve the right to litigate. 
 
III. The Right to Fairness in Litigation: Where there is litigation between an 
association and a homeowner, and the homeowner prevails, the 
association shall pay attorney fees to a reasonable level. 
 
IV. The Right to Be Told of All Rules and Charges: Homeowners shall be 
told—before buying—of the association’s broad powers, and the 
association may not exercise any power not clearly disclosed to the 
homeowner if the power unreasonably interferes with homeownership. 
V. The Right to Stability in Rules and Charges: Homeowners shall have 
rights to vote create, amend, or terminate deed restrictions and other 
important documents. Where an association’s directors have power to 
change operating rules, the homeowners shall have notice and an 
opportunity, by majority vote, to override new rules and charges. 
 
VI. The Right to Individual Autonomy: Homeowners shall not surrender any 
essential rights of individual autonomy because they live in a common-
interest community. Homeowners shall have the right to peaceful 
advocacy during elections and other votes as well as use of common areas. 
 
VII. The Right to Oversight of Associations and Directors: Homeowners shall 
have reasonable access to records and meetings, as well as specified 
abilities to call special meetings, to obtain oversight of elections and other 
votes, and to recall directors. 
 
VIII. The Right to Vote and Run for Office: Homeowners shall have well-
defined voting rights, including secret ballots, and no director shall have a 
conflict of interest. 
 
IX. The Right to Reasonable Associations and Directors: Associations, their 
directors and other agents, shall act reasonable in exercising their power 
over homeowners. 
 
X. The Right to an Ombudsperson for Homeowners: Homeowners shall have 
fair interpretation of their rights through the state Office of Ombudsperson 
for Homeowners. The ombudsperson will enable state oversight where 
needed, and increases available information for all concerned. 
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The document was picked up by a couple of media organizations and its contents soon 
spread like wildfire among homeowners’ association advocacy groups. While the sample 
model statute has not resulted in many significant legal changes regarding the status of 
homeowners’ associations and the rights of ownership at the level of state legislature, the 
implications of its contents have inspired many debates about the supposed problems 
inherent in homeowners’ associations.125 
Chief among them are debates about the governance issues caused by the hybrid 
organizational form of homeowners’ associations. The most loudly voiced issue concerns 
whether homeowners’ associations, by design, omission, or default, come to function as 
“residential private governments” (Dilger, 1992; Barton and Silverman, 1994; McKenzie, 
1994; Stabile, 2000; Glasze, Webster, and Frantz, 2005; Staropoli, 2006, 2008). Because 
these organizations straddle the neat political distinction between public and private life 
they could become “natural laboratories for testing the impact of shedding public services 
by local governments” (Dilger, 1992: 86). Proponents of the privatization of public 
services argue that private firms (such as that of homeowners’ associations) can deliver 
services more effectively than governments and opponents of the privatization of public 
services argue that privatization would isolate the least privileged members of society 
who could not afford to meet their needs in the private sector. Dilger (1992), for example, 
fears those homeowners’ associations which are embattled in conflict and which may 
                                                        
125 There are some exceptions. A homeowners’ association reform bill goes into effect in July 2014 in 
Florida which is set to effectively end the run of so called homeowners’ association “dictatorships”. 
Another bill, the North Carolina Planned Community Act, went into effect in 2013. This bill sought to 
change the foreclosure process and change dispute mediation procedures. By and large, however, there 
have been no sweeping regulations of homeowners’ associations. 
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operate without sufficient accountability and governance structures could come to only 
represent the interests of middle- to upper-middle-income groups with specific political 
agendas.126   
Other related areas of concern include the impetus embedded in the governance 
structure and related governance documents. Boudreaux and Holcombe (2009) contend 
that homeowners’ associations do not work well as private governments because the 
pursuit of self-interest is built in to its organizational structure and its governing 
documents. They suggest that the origination of homeowners’ associations as 
organizations for developers to maximize their investment does not bode well for a 
collaborative and communal living environment. In other words, because the developer 
has an incentive to set up a governance structure that is meant to maximize profits, they 
craft organizational documents and procedures meant to net the highest income, not to 
protect the best interests of the community.  
Finally, another concern is the limited role for non-board member homeowners in 
the decision-making process due to homeowners’ associations’ hybrid organizational 
form. The sheer number of complaints regarding the election process and the power of 
the board are a testament to the domination of homeowners’ associations’ corporate-like 
interests. These interests are written into the laws of homeowners’ associations and 
                                                        
126 Social stratification scholars have, for some time, denoted processes of social closure that exclude or 
limit the access of subordinate groups to valued resources and institutions. Housing represents one such 
arena within which processes of closure may play out—a fact denoted by the substantial literature on racial 
residential segregation and its persistence (see: Massey & Denton, 1993; Charles, 2003; and Karafin, 
Tester, and Roscigno, 2005).  Homeowners’ associations exacerbate existing inequalities by creating a 
legal framework for private land and property use controls, particularly for formally public services now 
provided privately by homeowners’ associations. For example, homeowners’ associations are tasked with 
maintaining common areas and land, providing security, and collecting trash. 
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unless either statutory law or the homeowners’ association’s governing documents 
reserve a particular issue or action for approval by a quorum of non-board member unit 
owners all power is exercised by the board of directors. 
My research has the potential to impact our understandings of each of these issues 
and concerns, and to, ultimately, aid in the development of programs, policies, and laws 
to protect the private and public interests of homeowners’ associations to prevent the 
production of headlines like those that prefaced this dissertation. By acknowledging the 
private and public nature of homeowners’ associations, industry professionals, 
government officials, public agencies, and homeowners can better balance the individual 
and communal facets—and the economic and social interests—of homeowners’ 
associations. Towards that end, I make three public policy and legislative 
recommendations. First, require homeowners’ associations to register with state agencies. 
Homeowners’ associations represent a relatively new organizational form. Over 73% 
were incorporated in the last 20 years and more than half were incorporated in the last 10 
years. In some states the legislative process has kept apace, but in many it has not and the 
laws vary widely. Only three states (Florida, Utah, and Colorado) currently require 
homeowners’ associations to register with the state, and even fewer require homeowners’ 
associations to submit an annual report.127 Second, require homeowners’ association 
board members and industry professionals to attend educational seminars on the unique 
concerns and interests of this type of organization. Most volunteers who serve on 
                                                        
127 Florida’s homeowners’ associations are required to register with the Florida Department of Business and 
Professional Regulation. Utah’s homeowners’ associations are required to register with the Utah 
Department of Commerce. Colorado’s homeowners’ associations are required to register with the Colorado 
Division of Real Estate. 
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homeowners’ association boards lack the time and/or expertise to properly govern the 
association. Further, most states do not require professional managers and management 
companies to be licensed.128 Third, require realtors and other real estate professionals to 
educate people about homeowners’ associations prior to purchasing a unit in a 
homeowners’ association. Homebuyers are rarely sufficiently educated about the role 
homeowners’ associations will play in their home purchase. The average homebuyer does 
not review governing documents before making an offer on a home and is not fully aware 
of the power homeowners’ association boards can wield. Conflicts would be substantially 
reduced if homeowners were aware of the roles and responsibilities of the board and the 
homeowners’ association at the outset. 
Limitations of Research Design 
 My research design had two principal limitations that could potentially impact the 
generalizability of my findings. The first limitation was my sample. My sample was 
limited in three respects. First, I only surveyed and interviewed homeowners’ association 
board members in Greater-Boston Massachusetts (Essex, Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, 
and Suffolk counties). Although Greater-Boston area homeowners’ associations are 
representative of homeowners’ associations in other states and regions, I cannot claim 
full generalizability. The state of Massachusetts does not require homeowners’ 
associations to register with any state agency and there are few laws which regulate the 
activities of homeowners’ associations. For comparative reasons it would have been 
useful to survey and interview homeowners’ association board members in states like 
                                                        
128 Fewer than 10 states require managers and management companies to be licensed. 
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Florida, Utah, or Colorado where there are state registries of homeowners’ associations 
and/or laws regulating their activities.  
Relatedly, there could be place and neighborhood influences that were not 
captured in my research design. Recent sociological literature expounds on the premise 
that both individual and contextual characteristics can have an effect on a wide range of 
social and behavioral outcomes (e.g., educational attainment, crime and delinquency, 
labor force participation, voluntary association participation, etc.).129 These so-called 
“neighborhood effects” generally refer to the study of how local context influences the 
perceptions and practices of individuals in a way that cannot be reduced to the properties 
of the individuals themselves.  
Second, my sampling frame was incomplete. Because there is no state law which 
requires registry of homeowners’ associations in Massachusetts I did not have access to a 
complete sampling frame. For all intents and purposes homeowners’ associations operate 
as “invisible” organizations in the state of Massachusetts. The 2011-2012 board 
membership directory of the New England Chapter of the Community Associations 
Institute (CAI-NE) provided the sampling frame for this study. I recognize that use of 
such a sampling frame creates systematic bias; there are substantive differences between 
those homeowners’ associations who voluntarily choose to register with the Community 
Associations Institute and those homeowners’ associations who do not choose to register 
                                                        
129 See Gephart, 1997; Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn, 2000; Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley, 2002 
for recent reviews of the research on neighborhood effects. 
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with the Community Associations Institute or who do not know about the opportunity to 
register with the Community Associations Institute.130  
Third, I only formally surveyed and interviewed homeowners’ association board 
members. I did not formally survey and interview other organizational actors in this space 
(e.g., non-board member unit owners, managers, and other service providers). Although I 
did informally interview and observe non-board member homeowners, managers, and 
other service providers I cannot make any generalizable claims about their role in the 
organization and their role regarding the presence and magnitude of intra-organizational 
conflict in homeowners’ associations. 
 The second limitation was the precision of my measurement. First, my 
measurement of intra-organizational conflict in my original Homeowners’ Association 
Survey could have been more precise. As I detailed in Chapter Two, I measured the 
presence of conflict using responses to a single survey question. Although this measure 
was valid and reliable, and consistent with the measurement of intra-organizational in 
other studies, I believe that a more precise measure is preferable for future studies of 
intra-organizational conflict. In future studies I would recommend using an index of 
questions or responses to multiple survey questions to measure the presence/absence of 
intra-organizational conflict; for example first asking respondents about the percentage of 
decisions made by the board which were characterized by full agreement and then by 
                                                        
130 For example, larger-size homeowners’ associations may be more likely to register with an organization 
like the Community Associations Institute (CAI). This may have created a bias in my sample whereby I 
missed recording and analyzing the experience of very small homeowners’ associations. My interview data 
did include 12 interviews with homeowners’ associations of 10 units or less and 5 interviews with 
homeowners’ associations consisting of 5 units or less, but I do not know how representative this is of 
homeowners’ associations in the Greater Boston-area. 
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asking respondents their level of agreement about how well the board worked together. I 
believe that these two questions would more precisely measure the presence and variance 
of conflict in organizations. 
 Second, my measurement of the institutional ambidexterity construct is 
necessarily limited. Because this construct was principally identified through an inductive 
process I do not empirically test the construct against other potential causes of 
institutional ambidexterity or other contributing factors. There may be additional 
potential causes of ambidexterity that are not addressed in my research design such as 
those related to context (e.g., neighborhood effects) or individual and group 
characteristics (e.g., professional skills, generational binders, etc.).  
Future Research 
Although this study was concerned with the case of homeowners’ associations, it 
may be broadly applicable and generalizable to other hybrid organizations. The legal, 
economic, and organizational form and status of homeowners’ associations is unique, but 
it is not altogether abnormal. It would be useful to explore the nature of intra-
organizational conflict in other types of hybrid organizations, such as charter schools, 
hospitals, social enterprise organizations, public management organizations, and other 
organizations that exist at the intersections of multiple fields, or which merge the public 
and the private and behave in ways inconsistent with just one sector of society. 
Of particular interest would be more studies of the micro-processes of 
organizational actors in hybrid organizations, particularly those organizations that exist in 
different types and/or levels of institutional pluralism and complexity. There are still too 
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many presumptions made in institutional theory regarding the top-down influence of 
institutional logics. More research needs to be done to assess how organizational actors 
interface with multiple institutional logics, their perceptions about multiplicity, and the 
practices they use to reconcile any institutional contradictions that may exist. 
Final Thoughts 
 The headlines and media reports that opened this dissertation, although perhaps 
extreme and sensationalized, are not anomalies. Real conflict exists in homeowners’ 
associations, and at least some of the variability of intra-organizational conflict in 
homeowners’ associations is due to organizational actors’ responses to the simultaneous 
presence of multiple and functionally contradictory institutional logics. Homeowners’ 
associations have the potential to be organizations that can merge the private and the 
public and can use the conditions of institutional pluralism and complexity to its 
advantage. There are perhaps thousands of associations where people act ambidextrously 
to the economic and social benefit of the association. It’s the associations that are stewed 
in conflict, however, that tend to steal the media spotlight. It is my hope that in the future 
this will change—that we will hear more and learn more about those homeowners’ 
associations and other hybrid organizations that have organizational actors who 
accommodate the institutional imperative of multiple logics and who act ambidextrously 
by “doing” logics. 
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APPENDIX A: BOARD MEMBER QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Homeowners’ Association Board Member Survey 
 
The Homeowners’ Association Board Member Survey is designed to collect descriptive 
information about your homeowners’ association community. It represents an opportunity 
for you to reflect on your experiences serving on the board of your homeowners’ 
association and to assess and plan for the future of your board and community. Your 
willingness to complete the survey will help researchers, homeowners, and the general 
public better understand the role of homeowners’ associations in social life. Please 
answer each question clearly and to the best of your ability. Thank you for your 
participation. 
 
 
 
Community Characteristics 
 
 
1. Which county of Massachusetts is your association located in? 
 
  Essex 
  Middlesex 
  Norfolk 
  Plymouth 
  Suffolk 
  Other – please specify ____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
2. Which of the following best represents the type of housing you are currently 
living in? 
 
  Single-family home 
  Condominium 
  Townhouse 
  Apartment (cooperative) 
  Other – please specify ____________________________________________ 
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3. What is the approximate age of your association? 
 
  0 – 10 years 
  11 – 20 years 
  21 – 30 years 
  31 – 40 years 
  41 – 50 years 
  51 years or more 
  Unsure/I don’t know 
 
 
4. What is the approximate size (total number of housing units) of your association? 
 
  1 – 50 units 
  51 – 100 units 
  101 – 150 units 
  151 – 200 units 
  201 – 250 units 
  251 – 300 units 
  301 units or more 
 
 
5. In your estimation, what percentage of the total population of residents in your 
association is composed of renters? 
 
  0% – 25% 
  26% – 50% 
  51% – 75%  
  76% – 100% 
 
 
6. In your estimation, what is the average length of homeownership in your 
association? 
 
  Less than 5 years 
  5 – 10 years 
  15 – 20 years   
  21 years or more 
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7. In your estimation, what is the average annual income of residents in your 
association? 
 
  Less than $50,000 
  $50,000 - $99,999 
  $100,000 - $149,999   
  $150,000 - $199,999 
  $200,000 - $249,999 
  $250,000 or more 
  Unsure/I don’t know 
  I prefer not to respond 
 
 
8. Which statement best describes the social makeup (i.e. composition) of your 
community? 
 
 The social makeup of my community is mostly homogeneous (similar/not 
very diverse) 
 The social makeup of my community is mostly heterogeneous (dissimilar/very 
diverse) 
 
 
9. Does your association employ a community manager or management company? 
 
  No 
  Yes 
 
 
Board Characteristics 
 
10. Approximately how many members serve on the board of your homeowners’ 
association? 
 
  1 – 3 members 
  4 – 6 members 
  7 – 9 members 
  10 members or more 
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11. How long has the average board member served on the board? 
 
  Less than 3 years 
  3 – 5 years 
  6 – 8 years 
  9 years or more 
 
 
12. Does your community elect its board members? 
 
  Yes 
  No (please skip to Question #15) 
 
 
13. In your estimation, what is the average unit owner response rate to board member 
elections? 
 
  0% – 25% 
  26% – 50% 
  51% – 75% 
  76% – 100% 
 
 
14. Do your elections regularly meet quorum requirements? 
 
  Yes 
  No 
 
 
15. How often does your board meet? 
 
  Less than once a year 
  1 – 8 times a year 
  9 – 12 times a year 
  13 times or more a year 
 
 
16. What types of decisions does your board typically make?  
 
  Financial only (budget, assessments, contracts, etc.) 
  Social only (community rules, social committees, social events, etc.) 
  Both financial and social 
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17. How frequently do the association’s legal documents (Bylaws, CC&Rs, and Rules 
& Regulations) guide the decision-making of the board? 
 
  Very frequently 
  Frequently 
  Infrequently 
  Very infrequently 
 
 
18. Do board members regularly express a common vision about the purpose of the 
homeowners’ association during the decision-making process? 
 
  No 
  Yes 
 
 
19. Does the board regularly share board minutes and budgetary information with the 
community? 
 
  No 
  Yes 
 
 
20. Are you currently serving on the board of your homeowners’ association? 
 
  No 
  Yes 
 
 
Financial Characteristics 
 
21. In your estimation, what is the average community association fee assessed per 
month? 
 
  Less than $100 
  $100 - $199 
  $200 - $299 
  $300 - $399 
  $400 - $499 
  $500 or more 
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22. In your opinion, how frequently does your community charge special 
assessments? 
 
  Very frequently 
  Frequently 
  Infrequently 
  Very infrequently 
 
 
23. In your opinion, does your reserve fund contain sufficient resources to pay for 
routine association maintenance? 
 
  No 
  Yes 
 
Social Characteristics 
 
24. Did your board and/or homeowners’ association experience at least one 
significant (especially important, meaningful, memorable, or notable) instance of 
conflict (i.e., incompatibility, disagreement, or dissonance) in the last 12 months? 
 
  No 
  Yes  
 
 
25. How many times has the board experienced a significant (especially important, 
meaningful, memorable, or notable) instance of disagreement regarding the 
proper course of action for your association in the last 12 months? 
 
  Never 
  1 – 2 times 
  3 – 4 times 
  5 – 6 times 
  7 times or more 
 
 
26. How many times has the board issued a written notice of noncompliance to any 
other board or community members in the past 12 months? 
 
  Never 
  1 – 2 times 
  3 – 4 times 
  5 – 6 times 
  7 times or more 
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27. How many times has the board levied a monetary fine on any board or community 
member in the past 12 months? 
 
  Never 
  1 – 2 times 
  3 – 4 times 
  5 – 6 times 
  7 times or more 
 
 
28. How many times has the board put a lien on or foreclosed upon another board or 
community member’s home in the past 12 months? 
 
  Never 
  1 – 2 times 
  3 – 4 times 
  5 – 6 times 
  7 times or more 
 
 
29. How many times has the board/association been threatened with or involved in a 
legal dispute in the last five years? 
 
  Never 
  1 – 2 times 
  3 – 4 times 
  5 – 6 times 
  7 times or more 
 
 
30. Is the board currently involved in a legal dispute? 
 
  No 
  Yes 
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APPENDIX B: BOARD MEMBER INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
 
Homeowners’ Association Board Member Interview Schedule Coversheet 
 
ID #__________ 
 
1. General Description of Association 
 Complete 
 Incomplete 
 
2. Purpose of Homeowners’ Associations 
 Complete 
 Incomplete 
 
3. Personal Experiences Serving on the Board 
 Complete 
 Incomplete 
 
4. Responsibilities of the Board 
 Complete 
 Incomplete 
 
5. The Board’s Financial Decisions 
 Complete 
 Incomplete 
 
6. The Board’s Social Decisions 
 Complete 
 Incomplete 
 
7. Rules, Regulations, and Governance Documents 
 Complete 
 Incomplete 
 
8. Legal Matters 
 Complete 
 Incomplete 
  
255
9. Board Members and the Community 
 Complete 
 Incomplete 
 
10. The Board and the Manager or Management Company 
 Complete 
 Incomplete 
 
11. Concluding Thoughts 
 Complete 
 Incomplete 
 
12. Available for follow-up? 
 No 
 Yes 
 
Homeowners’ Association Board Member Interview Schedule 
 
The Homeowners’ Association Research Project is designed to collect descriptive 
information on homeowners’ association boards and communities. It represents an 
opportunity for board members and community members to reflect on their experiences 
serving on the board and/or living in a homeowners’ association community. Your 
willingness to participate in this interview will help researchers, homeowners, and the 
general public better understand the role of homeowners’ associations in social life. 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
  Review rights of voluntary participation 
 
  Consent to audio record interview 
 
 
A. Demographic Information 
 
1. Interviewee sex: 
  Male 
  Female 
 
2. Interviewee age: 
 
  _________ 
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3. Interviewee race/ethnicity: 
 
  Non-Hispanic White 
  African American 
  Hispanic 
  Asian/Pacific Islander 
  Other/Mixed 
 
4. Interviewee household: 
 
  One (him/herself) 
  Two 
  Three or more 
 
5. Interviewee currently serving on the board of his/her homeowners’ association? 
 
  No, number of years served on the board _____________________________ 
  Yes 
 
 
6. Name of association: ________________________________________________ 
 
 
7. Categorization of association: 
 
  Less conflicted 
  More conflicted 
 
8. Name of interviewee: ________________________________________________ 
 
 
B.  Purpose of Homeowners’ Associations 
 
Please describe your overall feelings about the purpose of homeowners’ associations. 
 
1. What do you believe is the overall purpose of a homeowners’ association? 
 
 
2. How did you learn about homeowners’ associations (e.g., from a developer, from a 
realtor, from your governing documents, from other community members, from the 
media, from public discourse, etc.)? What did you learn? 
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3. What do you think are the core responsibilities of homeowners’ associations (e.g., 
managing finances, enforcing community rules, enhancing property values, 
maintaining social cohesion, providing services, etc.)? What is its most important 
responsibility? Why? 
 
 
4. Do you believe that homeowners’ associations add value to a community? If so, what 
type of value? 
 
 
C.  Personal Experiences Serving on the Board 
 
Please describe your experiences serving on the board of your homeowners’ association. 
 
5. How would you describe your overall experience serving on the governing board of 
your association? 
 
 
6. Why did you decide to volunteer to be a board member of your association? Did a 
specific event prompt you to decide to volunteer? Did you have a specific agenda or 
goals you wished to accomplish? 
 
 
7. Do you have a defined position on the board? What are your defined responsibilities? 
Are there other undefined responsibilities? 
 
 
8. Are you currently serving on the board? If yes, do you expect to run for the board 
again once your term expires? Why or why not? If no, when did you serve on the 
board? Why are you no longer serving? 
 
 
D.  Responsibilities of the Board 
 
Please describe the short-term and long-term responsibilities of the board. 
 
9. What are the board’s day-to-day, or short-term, responsibilities? What are the board’s 
long-term responsibilities? 
 
 
10. Do all of the members of your board agree on the importance of these 
responsibilities?  
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11. In your opinion, how effective is the board in handling these responsibilities? What 
makes your board ineffective in handling these responsibilities? 
 
 
12. Can you describe one responsibility about which there is great agreement and one 
responsibility about which there is great disagreement? 
 
 
E.  The Board’s Financial Decisions 
 
Please describe the financial decision-making process of the board. 
 
13. What financial decisions does your board make (e.g., operating budget, contracts, 
fees, reserves, etc.)? 
 
 
14. What guides the board’s financial decision-making process (e.g., professional 
experiences, personal beliefs, association’s legal documents, etc.)? 
 
 
15. How often do all of the board members agree about financial decisions? When there 
is disagreement, what is typically the source of disagreement (e.g., personality 
conflicts, disagreements about which tasks to perform, disagreements about how to 
perform tasks, disagreements about role responsibilities, etc.)? 
 
 
16. Can you describe one financial decision where there was disagreement and how it 
was resolved? 
 
 
F.  The Board’s Social Decisions 
 
Please describe the social decision-making process of the board. 
 
17. What social decisions does your board make (e.g., defining community rules, issuing 
sanctions for rule violations, instituting social committees, encouraging community 
involvement, etc.)? 
 
 
18. What guides the board’s social decision-making process (e.g., professional 
experiences, personal beliefs, association’s legal documents, etc.)? 
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19. How often do all of the board members agree about social decisions? When there is 
disagreement, what is typically the source of disagreement (e.g., personality conflicts, 
disagreements about which tasks to perform, disagreements about how to perform 
tasks, disagreements about role responsibilities, etc.)? 
 
 
20. Can you describe one social decision where there was disagreement and how it was 
resolved? 
 
 
21. What other types of decisions does your board make? What guides these decisions? 
How often is there disagreement? How is it resolved? 
 
 
G.  Rules, Regulations, and Governance Documents 
 
Please describe the role of community rules, regulations, and governance documents. 
 
22. How knowledgeable are board members about the association’s governance 
documents (i.e., community rules, regulations, etc.)? 
 
 
23. How knowledgeable are community members (other homeowners) about the 
association’s governance documents (i.e., community rules, regulations, etc.)? 
 
 
24. What issues of non-compliance arise? How many issues of non-compliance are there 
in a typical year? 
 
 
25. Can you describe a situation of non-compliance your board dealt with? Did the board 
apply a sanction (e.g., issue a written or verbal warning, issue a monetary fine, hold 
hearings, contact a lawyer, etc.)? Why or why not? What was the outcome? 
 
 
H.  Legal Matters 
 
Please describe the legalities of your association. 
 
26. How knowledgeable are board members about the legalities of homeowners’ 
associations? 
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27. What legal issues does your board deal with? How many legal issues arise in a typical 
year? 
 
 
28. Can you describe a legal issue your board had dealt with? 
 
 
29. How many times has your board been threatened with or involved in a lawsuit? What 
was the lawsuit about? 
 
 
I.  Board Members and the Community 
 
Please describe board member interactions with other community members (other 
homeowners). 
 
30. How often and in what way do board members typically communicate with other 
homeowners (e.g., in person at meetings, in person around the community, in person 
at social events, by letter, by email, by phone, via the website)? 
 
 
31. What types of interactions do board members typically have with other homeowners 
(e.g., professional, friendly, argumentative, impersonal, etc.)? What are the 
interactions mostly about? 
 
 
32. How often are there disagreements between board members and other homeowners? 
What is typically the source of the disagreement (e.g., personality conflicts, 
disagreements about which tasks the board should perform, disagreements about how 
the board should perform tasks, disagreements about role responsibilities, etc.)? 
 
 
33. Can you describe one disagreement between a board member and a community 
member and how it was resolved? 
 
 
34. Do you believe that community members generally believe that the board is acting in 
their best interests? Why or why not? 
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J.  The Board and the Manager or Management Company 
 
Please describe your board’s interactions with your community manager and/or 
management company. 
 
35. Why did your board decide to hire a manager or management company? What is the 
value in hiring a community manager or management company? What are the 
primary responsibilities of the manager or management company? 
 
 
36. How often does the board communicate with the manager or management company? 
How do the interactions typically take place (e.g., in person, by letter, by email, by 
telephone, via the website, etc.)? What are the interactions typically like (e.g., 
professional, friendly, argumentative, impersonal, etc.)? 
 
 
37. How often does the board disagree with the manager or management company about 
key decisions? What is typically the source of the disagreement (e.g., personality 
conflicts, disagreements about which tasks the board should perform, disagreements 
about how the board should perform tasks, disagreements about role responsibilities, 
etc.)? 
 
 
38. Can you describe one disagreement between the board and the manager or 
management company and how it was resolved? 
 
 
K.  Concluding Thoughts 
 
39. Based on your experiences as a unit owner and as a board member, what are the 
advantages and disadvantages of living in a homeowners’ association? What is the 
single best or worst thing about them? 
 
 
40. Has being a member of a homeowners’ association community changed your feelings 
about the overall purpose and value of homeownership? 
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APPENDIX C: BOARD MEMBER INTERVIEWEE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Table C-1: Board Member Interviewee Characteristics 
Number Sex Organizational role More or Less Conflict 
    
1 Male Board member More conflict 
2 Male Board member More conflict 
3 Female Board member Less conflict 
4 Male Board member More conflict 
5 Male Board member Less conflict 
6 Male Board member More conflict 
7 Male Board member More conflict 
8 Female Board member More conflict 
9 Female Board member Less conflict 
10 Male Board member Less conflict 
11 Male Board member More conflict 
12 Male Board member Less conflict 
13 Female Board member More conflict 
14 Male Board member More conflict 
15 Male Board member More conflict 
16 Male Board member Less conflict 
17 Male Board member More conflict 
18 Male Board member More conflict 
19 Female Board member Less conflict 
20 Male Board member Less conflict 
21 Male Board member Less conflict 
22 Female Board member More conflict 
23 Male Board member Less conflict 
24 Female Board member More conflict 
25 Female Board member More conflict 
26 Female Board member More conflict 
27 Male Board member More conflict 
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28 Male Board member Less conflict 
29 Male Board member Less conflict 
30 Male Board member Less conflict 
31 Male Board member More conflict 
32 Male Board member Less conflict 
33 Male Board member More conflict 
34 Male Board member Less conflict 
35 Male Board member More conflict 
36 Female Board member Less conflict 
37 Male Board member More conflict 
38 Male Board member More conflict 
39 Male Board member Less conflict 
40 Female Board member More conflict 
41 Male Board member Less conflict 
42 Male Board member More conflict 
43 Female Board member Less conflict 
44 Female Board member More conflict 
45 Male Board member Less conflict 
46 Male Board member Less conflict 
47 Male Board member Less conflict 
48 Male Board member Less conflict 
49 Female Board member Less conflict 
50 Male Board member More conflict 
51 Female Board member More conflict 
52 Male Board member More conflict 
53 Female Board member Less conflict 
54 Male Board member Less conflict 
55 Male Board member More conflict 
56 Male Board member More conflict 
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  Duties: Full responsibility for designing and teaching the course 
 
 Independent Study: Honors Practicum 
  2009 – 1 semester (1 student) 
Duties: Full responsibility for designing, teaching, advising, and 
mentoring an advanced student in the field of work and organizations 
 
 Sociological Methods (SO201) 
  2007 – 1 semester (35 students) 
  Duties: Full responsibility for designing and teaching the course 
 
 The American Family (SO205) 
  2007 – 1 summer session (15 students) 
  Duties: Full responsibility for designing and teaching the course 
 
 Principles in Sociology (SO100) 
  2007/2006/2005 – 4 semesters (60 students per semester) 
Duties: Assist instructors with test design, grading, grade management, 
advising students, holding review sessions, and facilitating class 
discussions 
 
Writing Fellow, Boston University 
 
 Time, Work, and Life: A Research Seminar (WR150) 
  2009/2008 – 2 semesters (20 students per semester) 
 Duties: Full responsibility for designing and teaching the research-
intensive course 
 
 Time, Work, and Life: A Writing Seminar (WR100) 
  2008/2007 – 2 semesters (25 students per semester) 
 Duties: Full responsibility for designing and teaching the writing-intensive 
course 
 
Adjunct Instructor, Tufts University 
 
 Seminar in Mass Media Studies: Film & Society (SOC185) 
  2011/2009 – 2 semesters (15 students per semester) 
  Duties: Full responsibility for designing and teaching the course 
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 Media & Society (SOC040) 
  2011/2010 – 2 semesters (50-100 students per semester) 
Duties: Assist co-instructor with teaching, test design, grading, grade 
management, advising students, holding review sessions, and facilitating 
class discussions 
 
Adjunct Instructor, University of Massachusetts Boston 
 
 Methods of Sociological & Criminological Research (SOCIOL/CRMJUS 351L) 
 2014/2013/2012/2011/2010/2009 – 10 semesters (30 students per 
semester) 
  2014/2013/2012/2011/2010 – 5 summer sessions (25 students per session) 
  Duties: Full responsibility for designing and teaching the course 
 
 Introduction to Sociology (SOCIOL 101) 
  2012– 1 semester (35 students) 
  2014/2013 – 2 summer sessions (35 students per session) 
Duties: Full responsibility for designing and teaching the course 
 
 Sociology of Media & Mass Communications (SOCIOL300) 
  2014/2013/2012/2011/2010 – 5 semesters (35 students per semester) 
2014 – 1 summer session (30 students per session) 
  Duties: Full responsibility for designing and teaching the course 
 
Independent Study: Honors Practicum 
  2011– 1 semester (1 student) 
Duties: Full responsibility for designing, teaching, advising, and 
mentoring an advanced student in the field of media research 
 
 Sociology of Popular Culture (SOCIOL120G) 
  2010/2009 – 3 semesters (25 students per semester) 
 Duties: Full responsibility for designing and teaching the writing-intensive 
course 
 
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE 
 
2009 Research Assistant, Massachusetts Institute of Technology – Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 
 
Conducted research for M. Diane Burton on the “for-profit logics” 
affecting the structure and functioning of non-profit organizations 
 
2007  Research Assistant, Boston University – Boston, Massachusetts 
  
296
Conducted research for Emily Barman on the National Taxonomy of 
Exempt Entities (NTEE) codes for her paper, “Classificatory Struggles in 
the Nonprofit Sector” and project Doing Good: Accounting for 
Measurement in the Nonprofit Sector funded through her American 
Sociological Association/National Science Foundation Fund for the 
Advancement of the Discipline Research Grant 
 
2006 Research Assistant, Massachusetts Institute of Technology – Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 
 
Conducted ethnographic research on the construction of safety in research 
laboratories under the direction of Susan S. Silbey for the project “What Is 
The Place of Safety In Science? – An Experiment in Group Ethnography” 
(National Science Foundation Grant #0535780) 
 
2003 Undergraduate Research Assistant, University of Maryland – College 
Park, Maryland 
 
Conducted research for John P. Robinson on the public opinion of and the 
social impact of the Internet and web-use time for his The Social, 
Political, and Cultural Impact of New Technologies: Insights from Surveys 
on Contemporary Patterns of Internet Use (National Science Foundation 
Grant #9819907) and Understanding the Social Impact of the Internet: A 
Multifaceted, Multidisciplinary Approach (National Science Foundation 
Grant #0086143) projects 
 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS AND SERVICE 
 
Discipline 
 
2010 –  Member, American Association of University Women 
 
2005 –  Member, Eastern Sociological Society 
 
2005 –  Member, American Sociological Association 
 
Section Membership: Economic Sociology 
   Teaching & Learning 
   Community & Urban Sociology 
   Organizations, Occupations, and Work 
Department 
 
2007 – 2014  Graduate Student Mentor 
2005 – 2014 Member, Sociology Graduate Student Committee 
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